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In both developed and developing countries, the extent to which sovereign credit rating 
announcements bridge the information gap between investors and issuers of securities 
is debatable. Thus, this thesis investigates the effects of the information provided by 
credit rating agencies on financial markets in 30 African countries during the period of 
1994 to 2014 in order to determine whether long-term foreign currency sovereign credit 
rating announcements contain material information that influences the secondary 
market stock and bond returns.  
 
The analyses draws the following findings. First, African financial markets are weakly 
sensitive to sovereign credit rating announcements, which implies that there is no 
significant evidence of excess market returns influenced by sovereign credit rating 
announcements. Hence, it is inferred that the announcements of sovereign credit 
ratings do not significantly change the African financial market returns because they are 
already perceived to be risky markets, and thus attract mostly passive and long-term 
investors. Second, the changes in sovereign ratings do not have the same implications 
for both stockholders and bondholders as shown by the weak positive association 
between sovereign credit ratings and stock and bond markets. Third, there are marginal 
regional sovereign rating spillover impacts that are quickly absorbed into capital markets 
trading long-term securities. However, there are marginal spillover effects that persist 
over longer time periods in sovereign ratings of countries in the same region from a 
sovereign rating change in a neighbouring country. These results imply that the regional 
bilateral linkages between countries serve as channels of capital and sovereign credit 
rating information flow. Lastly, the sovereign credit ratings do not significantly impact 
bond market efficiency. In contrast, stock markets show evidence of weak form 
efficiency implying that long-term sovereign credit ratings positively affect equity market 
efficiency in Africa. 
 
Thus, the empirical findings in this thesis show that the operations of credit rating 
agencies and their sovereign credit ratings appear to be less important in the operation 
of stocks and bond markets in Africa. Governments should however take cognizance of 
iv 
 
the long-term information exchange between investors and borrowers, and the 
consequential nature of credit ratings to proactively manage the risks of negative 
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Traditionally, sovereign borrowing for national governments across the world have been 
through bilateral agreements between countries, loans from multinational financial 
institutions and floating sovereign securities on capital markets. According to the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report  (2015), 
sovereign borrowing through selling bonds on both international and domestic capital 
markets has grown to become an attractive and relatively easy way for central 
governments to access capital for structural developments rather than borrowing from 
supernational organisations such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (Vernazza, 2014). The IMF reports that national governments have become 
the largest capital market borrowers, and their credit standing serves as a key 
benchmark for the world’s capital markets (Arezki et al., 2011). Sovereign debts, 
globally, have been steadily increasing in the past 20 years as national governments 
have been issuing foreign currency bonds in order to finance infrastructure and 
stimulate economic growth (Mateev, 2012). Investors, therefore constantly seek an 
accurate understanding of sovereign default risk to assess sovereigns’ creditworthiness 
when setting a required return (Elkhoury, 2008). Thus, Sovereign Credit Rating1 (SCR) 
has become important for both emerging and developed nations. 
 
In the 1990s, unfavourable economic and financial conditions led many African 
countries to undertake economic reforms. With the support of IMF and the WB, 
structural adjustment programmes were rolled aimed at achieving private-sector-led 
growth through a market based system (Beegle et al., 2016). Financial liberalisation 
was a significant component of these reforms, with countries granting their central 
                                                          
1 Cantor and Packer (1996) define SCRs as assessments of the relative likelihood that a borrowing 
government will default on its obligations. Governments generally seek credit ratings to ease their own 
access to international capital markets, where most investors, particularly from developed countries, 




banks autonomy to structure their monetary policy, liberalise interest rates, abolish 
direct allocation of credit and most importantly, develop a conducive environment for 
proper functioning of financial markets (Carmen and Ioannis, 2003). Many analysts 
were optimistic that Africa’s economy could double its growth trend in the new 
millennium, recommending African countries to embrace more open financial policies to 
improve access to international capital markets (Sachs and Warner, 1997).  
 
Today, more than two decades after the initiation of liberalisation in most African 
countries, the financial reforms appear to have had limited effect on the Africa's 
economies, mainly because they failed to adequately deal with structural and 
institutional issues in the sector (Joffe, 2015). Consequently, capital to finance private 
sector projects is still unavailable; and when it is available, the cost of credit is beyond 
the reach of the economically active population, thus constraining private sector growth 
(Kose et al., 2009). Hence, liberalization did not close the gap in the provision of 
services by the formal sector (Collier, 2014). Kasekende (2015) further emphasises that 
the removal of barriers to entry did not necessarily introduce competition because new 
financial institutions are usually small and fragile. In the same spirit, Makina (2005) 
points out that, governments’ exit from the financial sector control did not necessarily 
remove patronage networks because government owned financial institutions were 
replaced by highly connected private banks with oligopolistic behaviour, providing lines 
of credit to politically connected corporates and individuals.   
 
African governments have also failed to make significant progress in liberalizing capital 
account transactions, maintaining controls over capital receipts and outflows, and 
controlling portfolio investment (Carmen and Ioannis, 2003; Fowowe, 2013). Following 
the weak financial sector support, corporate lending is still heavily geared towards the 
short end of the market and few institutions engage in long-term lending (Zins and Weill, 
2016). On the other hand, banks have been avoiding funding informal sectors, citing 
excessive risk exposures (Ergun and Ozlen, 2012). This situation in turn creates 
disintermediation and financial inefficiencies, thus reducing the effectiveness of 





In Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America in contrast, liberalization has led to financial 
deepening as measured by the credit and monetary aggregates (Fowowe, 2013). 
Carmen and Ioannis (2003) argue that, despite failing to deliver positive outcomes as 
expected, financial market independence remain the most attractive feature of the 
African markets. Thus, Carmen and Ioannis advocate that cleaning the financial system 
after decades of overregulation is a gradual process which can also be very costly 
considering that central banks need recapitalization. Kasekende (2015) adds that the 
success of the financial reforms also depends on political willingness to take hard 
decisions aimed at strengthening financial services, technology, infrastructure, 
efficiency, monetary policy management and corporate governance in critical 
institutions. 
 
Despite these constraints, Africa remains one of the world’s fastest-growing continents 
with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 6 percent, expected to be maintained up to 
2023 (Young, 2013). In recent years, most African nations have seen improved 
governance associated with political stability, and strengthened regulatory and legal 
systems (Mcmillan  and Harttgen, 2014). Fatnassi et al. (2014) however attribute the 
continent’s economic growth to sovereigns’ access to international capital markets. 
Hence, the continent has increasingly moved into the global limelight as a promising 
investment destination despite preconceived risks of investing in its turbulent 
environment (Flor  and Hesel, 2015). 
 
Capital flow has been increasing despite a number of negative fundamentals such as; 
illiquid markets, high political risk, currency volatility, commodity price shocks, climate 
change and disease outbreaks (Massa, 2009). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows to 
Africa increased from less than US$ 15 billion in 2001 to about US$ 57 billion in 2014, 
with declines in 2009 and 2010 due to the global financial crisis (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2015). Net portfolio equity inflows 
grew from approximately US$7 billion in 2001 to reach US$ 16 billion in 2010. Bond 




negative in 2008 due to the global financial crisis (World Bank, 2015).  
 
Approximately 38 percent of the capital flow into African markets has been through 
sovereign debt, which constitutes debt instruments issued by the national government 
of a country; usually denominated in a foreign currency (Mu et al., 2013). The bond 
markets have been steadily growing in recent years with most countries benefiting from 
greater access to financing and deepening global financial markets, though the local 
debt markets remain under-developed in terms of depth and breadth (Joffe, 2015). 
Africa’s bond (local and Eurobond) markets have witnessed one of the greatest periods 
in bond issuance with approximately $15 billion floated by Sub-Saharan region 
governments between 2011 and 2013 (Wallace and Sivabalan, 2015). Global investors 
have been moving their capital into African bond markets in search of high yields given 
the current low interest-rate environment in many of the developed markets, which has 
lured many governments to issue large bonds to finance their funding deficits, with 
almost all the bond issues being over-subscribed (Patel, 2014). Figure 1.1 shows the 
total of sovereign bonds issued by each African country with a sovereign rating as at 
December 2014. 
 
Figure 1.1: Total Eurobond Issuance for each African country (US$Billion) 
 















On the other hand, many African countries have unstable economies, and consequently, 
their governments are often forced to issue sovereign bonds in United State Dollars 
(US$) (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2010). Hence, as can be seen from Table 1.1 below, 
governments have been incurring significant foreign currency denominated external 
debts, exposing their position to exchange rate fluctuations (Joffe, 2015) and default risk 
(Wallace and Sivabalan, 2015). Consequently, the sovereign bonds need to be issued 
at a discount to compensate for these associated risks (Stulz, 1999). 
 
In addition to US dollar denominated bonds, many African countries have also started 
issuing Eurobonds, with 28 African countries issuing a combined US$447 billion 
Eurobonds as at December 2014 (Masetti, 2015). However, Pretorius and Botha (2014) 
argue that high levels of government debt results in lower levels of private investment 
leading to lower future economic growth once the debt reaches significant levels of 
around 90 percent of GDP. Hence, total domestic government borrowing position of 
each specific country needs to be considered to ensure that additional government debt 
will not have a negative impact on the long-term economic growth of the country. The 
IMF (2016) further urge governments to build proper yield curves to enable the 
development of corporate bond markets and of local currency domestic debt markets, 















Table 1.1: Sovereign rated external debt (US$ Billions) 
Country 2013 2014 Country 2013 2014 
Angola 24.00 28.62 Lesotho 0.89 0.90 
Burkina 
Faso 2.56 2.85 Libya 6.03 5.24 
Benin 2.37 2.64 Morocco 39.85 43.99 
Botswana 2.43 2.26 Mali 3.42 3.63 
DR Congo 6.08 6.56 Mauritius 10.92 11.83 
Congo 3.45 3.76 Malawi 1.56 1.88 
Ivory Coast 11.29 13.03 Namibia 5.31 5.99 
Cameroon 4.92 5.78 Nigeria 18.67 20.93 
Cape Verde 1.48 1.62 Rwanda 1.69 1.78 
Egypt 45.75 41.32 Seychelles 2.71 2.82 
Ethiopia 12.56 15.55 Senegal 5.22 6.54 
Gabon 4.32 4.74 Uganda 4.36 4.97 
Ghana 15.83 17.20 Tunisia 26.83 27.66 
Gambia 0.52 0.55 South Africa 137.10 145.10 
Kenya 13.47 17.16 Zambia 5.60 6.73 
 
A sovereigns’ credit profile depends on a number of economic, social, and political 
factors that underlie their sovereign ratings. Cantor and Packer (1996) outline eight 
variables that are relatively significant in determining sovereign ratings because they 
are repeatedly cited in the three international credit rating agencies’ reports. An 
unfavourable change in these factors leads to credit downgrading, which is a negative 
change in the rating of a government’s credit standing (Bissoondoyal-bheenick, 2005). 






Table 1.2: Determinants of SCRs 
Variable Measurement Description 
 
Per capita income 
Measures the average income 
earned per person in a given 
country in a specified year. 
The greater the potential tax-base of the 
borrowing country, the greater the ability 




The monetary value of all the 
finished goods and services 
produced within a country's borders 
in a year. 
A relatively high rate of economic growth 
suggests that a country’s existing debt 




A sustained increase in the general 
price level of goods and services in 
an economy per year. 
A high rate of inflation points to structural 




The difference between 
government tax revenue and its 
spending. 
A large fiscal deficit absorbs private 
domestic savings and suggests that a 
government lacks the ability to tax its 
citizenry to cover current expenses or to 
service its debt. 
 
External balance 
Exports of goods and services 
minus imports of goods and 
services. 
A large current account deficit indicates 
that the public and private sectors 





The total debt a country 
(government, corporations or 
citizens) of that country owes to 
foreign creditors.  
A higher debt burden should correspond 
to a higher risk of default. 
Economic 
development 
An increase in the capacity of an 
economy to produce goods and 
services, compared from one 
period to another. 
Once countries reach a higher level of 
economic development, the chances of 
defaulting are low. 
 
Default history 
The failure or refusal of the 
government of a sovereign state to 
pay back its debt partly or in full. 
A country that has defaulted on debt in 
the recent past is widely perceived as a 
high credit risk. 
 
SCRs are determined by a credit rating agency (CRA)2 which rates a debtors’ ability to 
repay their debts on time and assesses the likelihood of default (Pukthuanthong-Le et 
                                                          




al., 2007). There are also discrete short-term and long-term credit ratings, which 
measures the likelihood that the rated entity may default within one year (short-term) or 
more (long-term). However, the credit rating methodology varies from one CRA to the 
other, making it difficult to objectively identify these qualitative criteria. Thus, identifying 
the relationship between two agencies’ criteria and actual ratings is difficult, in part, 
because some of the criteria are not quantifiable (Cantor and Packer, 1996). Table 1.3 
presents the sovereign rating methodologies applied by all the three international rating 
agencies. 
 
Table 1.3: Sovereign Credit Rating methodologies 
Standard and Poor's Moody’s Fitch 
Ratings seek to capture the 
probability of occurrence of 
default 𝜌(𝑑) not the severity of 
default. They provide no 
assessment of expected time in 
default, mode of default 
resolution or recovery values 
more generally. 
Rating focus on expected loss 
𝐿e, which is a function of both 
probability of default and 
expected recovery rate, 𝑟𝑒, after 
default has occurred; 
 𝐿𝑒  =  𝜌(𝑑). (1 − 𝑟𝑒) 
These are hybrid ratings, 
focusing only on the probability 
of default until the point when 
default occurs and 
differentiating on the basis of 
expected recovery rates after 
default has occurred. 
Source: Bhatia (2002) 
 
The above methodologies show that the information published by CRAs is largely 
subjective and its precision depends on individual agency’s methodology (Bhatia, 2002). 
Despite the variation in rating methodologies, the main objective of rating agencies is to 
provide a rating watch and a rating outlook on debt issuers, debt obligations and also 
debt instruments (Zheng, 2012). Hence, the credit rating information serves as guidance 
to average investors especially in asymmetric markets. Frydman and Schuermann 
(2008) assume therefore that, an average investor seek CRAs’ opinion and make 
decisions based on it. 
 
Gande and Parsley (2004) assert that financial markets are driven by new and relevant 
information and that information efficiency is one of the vital fundamentals for the 




acknowledge that CRAs play a key role in financial market transactions but question the 
relevancy of the information provided to the market. Given the complex nature of most 
financial products (Weernink and Weernink, 2011), providing objectively accurate 
information on rating watches and outlooks is difficult (Kräussl, 2000; Chee et al., 2015; 
Dmitrieva et al., 2015). 
 
Thus in summary, over the last two decades, financial constraints have been a major 
impediment towards exploitation of Africa’s growth potential. However, globalization has 
pushed the continent to liberalise financial markets to enable development and 
stimulate economic growth. This had also opened new lines of credit for developing 
countries to access international markets through sovereign borrowing. Hence, 
sovereign borrowing has grown to become an attractive and relatively easy way for 
central governments to access capital for economic developments, doing away with 
traditional borrowing from supernational institutions. However, Africa’s sovereign debt is 
perceived to be risky by international investors for a number of reasons, among them; 
inefficient markets, information asymmetry, political instability, lack of policy clarity, weak 
regulatory systems, negative external balances, and fiscal deficits, as such it is 
classified as high-yield debt. International investors therefore constantly seek an 
accurate understanding of sovereign default risk to assess sovereigns’ creditworthiness 
of Africa’s securities when setting a required return. Thus, the role of sovereign rating 
agencies in providing credit ratings has become important. However, questions have 
been raised on whether credit rating changes is new and relevant information with the 
ability of move financial markets or not, a subject still highly debatable.  
 
1.1.1 Africa’s Sovereign Credit Ratings 
South Africa was the first African country to receive a sovereign rating in 1994, followed 
by Tunisia in 1995, Mauritius and Egypt in 1996. South Africa was also the first issuer of 
cross-border debt, and to date it is the only country with a sizable debt market in Africa 
(Ntswane, 2014). Senegal requested a sovereign rating in 2000 followed by Botswana, 
and by 2003, thirteen sovereigns had received credit ratings including Ghana, 




(UNDP) initiative (Billmeier and Massa, 2007). Table 1.4 below sets out the number of 
times a country’s sovereign rating has changed from the first sovereign rating up to 
2014. 
 
Table 1.4: Number of African Countries’ Sovereign Rating Changes 
Country Year first Rated Moody's S&P's Fitch 
Angola 2010 6 2 8 
Burkina Faso 2004 - 3 - 
Benin 2004 - 4 2 
Botswana 2003 5 1 - 
DR Congo 2013  - 1 -  
Congo 2013  - 3 4 
Ivory Coast 2014  -  - 5 
Cameroon 2003  - 1 14 
Cape Verde 2003 -  4 10 
Egypt 1996 16 10 53 
Ethiopia 2014  -  - 3 
Gabon 2007  - 5 9 
Ghana 2003  - 3 45 
Gambia 2002  - -  3 
Kenya 2007 -  1 11 
Lesotho 2002  - -  14 
Libya 2009 -  -  4 
Morocco 1999 4 3 13 
Mali 2004  -  - 1 
Mauritius 1996 9  -  - 
Malawi 2003  -  - 4 
Namibia 2005 1  - 12 
Nigeria 2006  - 6 13 
Rwanda 2006  - 4 10 
Seychelles 2010  - -  10 
Senegal 2000 3 3 -  
Uganda 2005  - 3 9 
South Africa 1995 11 5 64 




Zambia 2011  - 3 8 
Total  62 71 342 
                              
Governments often seek sovereign ratings in pursuit of broader objectives such as 
fostering deeper local capital markets, attracting foreign direct investment and 
supporting private sector access to the global capital markets (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2001). Hence, credit ratings and published empirical research plays an 
important role in supporting greater public-sector financial transparency (S&P, 2010).  
 
1.1.2 Effects of SCRs on Africa’s Stock Exchange Markets 
The number of Africa’s active stock exchanges rose from just eight in 1989 to twenty 
nine as at December 2014, with a total market capitalization of approximately US$ 2.4 
trillion (Billmeier and Massa, 2007). The development of stock markets in Africa has 
boosted domestic savings, increasing the quantity and quality of investment from both 
domestic and international investors (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009). Well functioning 
stock markets have enhanced the operations of domestic financial systems in general 
and capital markets through the growth of sovereign ratings which also increased 
transparency (Yartey, 2008). Table 1.5 shows the level of capitalisation and the 






Table 1.5: Africa’s stock markets capitalisation 
     
2013 2014 





 Algeria Algiers Stock Exchange SGBV 1997 5 0.147 -  
 Botswana 
Botswana Stock 
Exchange BSE 1989 44 4.78 4.4 
 Cameroon Douala Stock Exchange DSX 2001 2 0.28 0.3 
 Cape Verde 
Bolsa de Valores de Cabo 
Verde BVC 2005 4 0.089 0.081 

















Bourse Régionale des 
Valeurs Mobilières BRVM 1998 39 10.5 11.7 




















 Egypt Egyptian Exchange EGX 1883 247 61.5 70.03 
 Ghana Ghana Stock Exchange GSE 1990 35 29.4 20.11 
 Kenya 
Nairobi Securities 
Exchange NSE 1954 64 20.6 25.57 
 Libya Libyan Stock Market LSM 2007 7 3.04 -  
 Malawi Malawi Stock Exchange MSE 1995 14 13 15.74 
 Mauritius 
Stock Exchange of 





SE 1929 81 54.8 53.44 
 Mozambique 
Bolsa de Valores de 
Mozambique BVM 1999 3 1 -  
 Namibia Namibia Stock Exchange NSX 1992 34 136.9 148.48 
 Nigeria Nigerian Stock Exchange NSE 1960 223 114.2 116.4 
 Rwanda Rwanda Stock Exchange RSE 2008 5 1.9 1.93 
 Seychelles 
Seychelles Securities 




 Somalia Somalia Stock Exchange   2012 -   - -  
 South Africa 
Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange JSE 1887 402 970.5 1150.5 
 Sudan 
Khartoum Stock 
Exchange KSE 1994 54 1.8 2.1 
 Swaziland 
Swaziland Stock 
Exchange SSX 1990 10 -  -  
 Tanzania 
Dar es Salaam Stock 
Exchange DSE 1998 17 10.46 12.8 
 Tunisia Bourse de Tunis BVMT 1969 56 8.6 9.32 
 Uganda 
Uganda Securities 
Exchange USE 1997 17 8.3 9.49 
 Zambia Lusaka Stock Exchange LuSE 1994 16 10.2  - 
 Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange ZSE 1948 64 5.4 4.33 
 
According to AIM Africa (2015), since 1995, Africa’s stock markets have been among 
the best-performing capital markets in the world despite their small size and low liquidity 
and high volatility. In 2004, six African countries (Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, 
Mauritius and Nigeria) were among the world’s 10 best-performing stock markets, while 
in 2005, Egypt, Uganda and Zambia were in the top five. In 2006, Malawi out-performed 
every other market in the world. However, the shock waves of the global financial crisis 
significantly affected Africa’s financial development and performance, negatively 
affecting key drivers of stock market development leading to tightened credit conditions, 
increased risk aversion, gloomy growth prospects and reduced foreign investors’ 
appetite for investment in African markets.3 The average performance of African stock 
markets was captured in the All Africa Standard and Poor Index (launched in 2008) as 




                                                          
3Nigeria stock exchange, for example, fell 46 percent in 2008, becoming the world’s worst performing 





Figure 1.2: All Africa’s S&P Stock Index 
Source: Standard & Poor’s 
 
Despite this robust performance, Africa’s equities markets have not been spared by the 
global financial crisis, which caused equity investors to withdraw their funds, leaving 
only the South African, Nigerian, Kenyan, and Mauritian stock exchanges active 
(Ntswane, 2014). Billmeier and Massa (2007) highlight that besides a lack of size; post 
crisis African stock markets (with the exception of South Africa) are characterized by a 
high degree of illiquidity. The number of African countries receiving SCR from the three 
major rating agencies has been steadily growing as shown in Figure 1.3. 
 
Figure 1.3: The growth of SCRs in Africa 
 



































Despite an increase in average capitalization levels in most African bourses, a number 
of exchanges still operate manual systems which are not equipped to handle sizeable 
capital inflows (Yartey and Komla, 2007; Afego, 2015). Hence, stock markets have not 
been performing efficiently, raising concerns about their feasibility as a source of 
finance given the huge costs and the poor financial structures (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 
2009). This lack of efficiency severely reduces the attractiveness of Africa’s stock 
markets for equity investors (Mlambo and Biekpe, 2007; Ajao and Osayuwu, 2012; 
Phan and Zhou, 2014).  
 
Indicators of stock market development show that on average, 25 percent of listed 
companies are not actively traded creating pockets of inefficiencies (Mohtadi and 
Agarwal, 2001; Odera, 2012). Most African stock exchanges have very low turnover 
ratio of less than 5 percent compared with around 29 percent in global stock market 
turnover (Luchtenberg and Vu, 2015). Despite the availability of sovereign rated 
financial securities, low liquidity implies low business volume and greater difficulty in 
supporting markets with a country’s own trading system and market analysis 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). In addition to information inefficiencies and 
periodic illiquidity, many African stock markets are still small and often dominated by a 
handful of large corporations4. This has left most exchanges vulnerable to manipulations 
from these huge corporations and increased exposure to insider trading (Jayakumar et 
al., 2012). 
 
Trading activity is further impeded by outdated trading, clearing and settlement systems, 
which can take months to complete a single transaction. This has created large gaps 
between buy and sell orders, ultimately eroding public confidence in the integrity of 
stock exchanges (Heerden Van et al., 2013). Slow information production hampers 
activity and turnover, and renders financial integration difficult because most markets do 
not have central depository systems, and some restrict foreign participation. Such 
                                                          
4For example, the conglomerate Dangote Group makes up about 30 per cent of the Nigerian Stock 





bottlenecks have induced inactivity in secondary markets of credit rated securities 
(Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009). 
 
Investors who buy into African securities are very cautious and sensitive to new 
information because of transactional lags combined with information asymmetry and 
lack of transparency (Odera, 2012). Hence, SCR changes are expected to unveil new 
(private) information about a country and thus they may fuel stock price booms or 
downturns. A sovereign downgrade, being more important for fear of losses, ignites a 
stock market downturn because most rational investors perceive a downgrade as a 
negative market future prospect. Such news has capacity to trigger a market panic as 
investors coordinate to a new equilibrium (Senbet and Otchere, 2008). Pukthuanthong-
Le et al. (2007) however report that, in emerging markets, investors usually respond to 
false signals from a sovereign’s placement on credit watchlist.5 The magnitude of a 
stock market’s reaction to a SCR is therefore based on investor’s sentiment to 
transparency and transaction lags (Yartey and Komla, 2007).  
 
Pinches and Singleton (1978), Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), Klimavičienė (2011) and Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick and Brooks (2012) examined the effect of SCRs on stock market find mixed 
evidence. Pinches and Singleton (1978), Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) find significant 
evidence of negative stock price reactions to credit rating downgrades but no evidence 
of significant reactions to rating upgrades. In contrast, Dichev and Piotroski (2001), 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), Klimavičienė (2011) and Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and 
Brooks (2012) find statistically significant evidence stock market reaction to both SCR 
downgrade and upgrade announcements under different environments. 
 
1.1.3 Effects of SCRs on Africa’s Debt Markets 
Most African countries have been relying on foreign donors and loans from international 
                                                          
5 An announcement made by CRAs to alert investors that a country’s credit rating is under review with a 
possibility of  change. Though when a country is added to a credit watch does not necessarily mean it will 





financial institutions to supply part of their foreign currency needs, as well as to finance 
part of their domestic investments (Patel, 2014). Major donor aid to Africa has been 
declining since 2008, breaking a long trend of annual increases starting around 2000 
(Masetti, 2015), as evident in Figure 1.4 below, which shows the official development 
assistance. Disregarding years of exceptional debt relief, this was the first drop in aid 
flows since 1997 (Beegle et al., 2016). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD)6, has been tightening their budgets by streamlining aid levels 
as a way of encouraging economic independence, increase trade and curbing 
corruption (Moyo, 2009).  
 
Figure 1.4: Africa’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) in US$ Billion 
 
Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee 2015 data. 
 
Infrastructure development has been pointed out as a necessary factor for economic 
growth (Wallace and Sivabalan, 2015). Africa’s governments often cite a lack of 
adequate funding and resources as a significant impediment to exploiting their country’s 
growth potential because national budget provisions are insufficient to fund 
infrastructure needs and support economic growth (Mu et al., 2013). Rapid growth, 
better economic policies, low commodity prices, and low global interest rates saw a 
sharp rise in the demand for international sovereign bonds issued by African countries 
                                                          
6 An international economic organisation of 34 first world countries aimed to stimulate economic progress 












(Wallace and Sivabalan, 2015). The issuance of international sovereign bonds is part of 
a number of African countries’ strategies to restructure their debt, and establish 
sovereign benchmarks to help develop the sub-sovereign and corporate bond market 
(KPMG International, 2015). These fundamentals have invariably forced African 
governments to improve financial discipline and transparency through meeting minimum 
requirements for capital market borrowing (Ntswane, 2014).  
 
Though African bond markets are still in their infancy, there has been high activity in 
domestic primary markets compared to secondary markets (Heerden Van et al., 2013). 
The debt markets have however been dominated by government securities, mostly of 
short duration, mainly because corporate debt markets are largely non-existent, with the 
exception of South Africa and to a limited extent some West African markets, such as 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon, Senegal and Nigeria (Beegle et al., 2016).  
 
The low interest rate environment that prevailed when the sovereign bond market was 
launched in Africa is set to continue due to low commodity prices, low oil prices and 
droughts, which makes it harder for oil-producing states, resources-dependent countries 
and agro-based economies to service their debts (Jorion and Zhang, 2010). In the 
medium term, heady economic growth may not continue if debt proceeds are not 
adequately managed and used for current productive spending. This concern has been 
driving Afro-sovereign bond market pessimists to closely watch sovereign rating 
changes (Olabisi and Stein, 2015). Sovereign rating announcements have therefore 
been an important information source for active investors who set to adjust their 
portfolio structures through the sovereign ceiling channel (Almeida et al., 2014).  
 
Although company specific variables (such as accounting variables) are important in 
explaining credit risk profile assigned to a company, sovereign ratings both act as a 
ceiling for corporate ratings and have direct implications on the borrowing costs incurred 
by corporates when participating in the international debt market. Thus, if the sovereign 
is poorly rated, the corporates may be limited in their ability to secure attractive funding 




African sovereign bonds raises a number of questions regarding short-term and 
medium-term sustainability of bond flows to the region (Collier, 2014). Recent trends 
and developments on the global economy indicate that push factors are becoming less 
favourable to African economies; record-low interest rates that prevailed in the United 
States are set to increase, and risk appetites of foreign investors may decline 
accordingly (Mcmillan and Harttgen, 2014). 
 
1.1.4 Summary 
The low yields in developed financial markets have pushed international investors to 
shift their focus to developing markets for high yields driven by high economic growth 
prospects, thus placing Africa on the spotlight. In addition, the presence of international 
institutional investors has also boosted market depth and breath, and the quality and 
quantity of investments in Africa. However, these international investors prefer 
internationally rated securities because of perceived risk from transactional lags, illiquid 
secondary markets combined with information asymmetry and lack of transparency. 
This has compelled African countries that plan to float US dollar and Eurobonds to seek 
SCRs. Thus, a sovereign rating announcement has become one of the major sources of 
new and tradable information, and a crucial step in Africa’s financial market 
development. When a country’s sovereign rating is announced it is expected to unveil 
new information about the shift in fundamental factors that affects a country’s 
microeconomic environment. Investors are therefore expected to adjust their portfolios 
accordingly; particularly in the event of a sovereign downgrade, which heightens the 
fear of losses and thus may ignite a stock market downturn, and macroeconomic and 
socio-political instability; a phenomenon Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) have dismissed 
as investors’ knee-jeck response to false signals that are not backed by fundamentals. 
 
1.2 Thesis Statement 
A sovereign credit rating is among the most important fundamentals considered by 
investors when determining their required return in securities pricing (Mateev, 2012). 
When a sovereign credit standing is downgraded, bondholders adjust their expected 




(Pukthuanthong-Le et al., 2007). This situation pushes financial securities’ prices down 
depending on individual investor’s risk perception and tolerance. Average investors 
therefore regard CRAs as new information sources about the state of the 
creditworthiness of a nation, and they thus use the information as a benchmark to 
determine their required returns (Creighton et al., 2007). In addition, CRAs also have a 
perceived role in predicting sovereign credit outlooks, which provides investors with 
information to trade with caution (Masciandaro, 2013). Matolcsy and Lianto (2007) and 
Ikram and Nugroho (2014) add that SCRs provide quality assurance to unsophisticated 
investors about inherently complex financial products making it easier for them to make 
informed investment decisions.  
 
However, the information conveyed by CRAs has constantly come under scrutiny from 
academics and finance practitioners, citing gross mistakes and inaccuracy which have, 
in some cases, been blamed for triggering financial crises (Li et al., 2004; Şensoy, 
2013; Vernazza, 2014). These weaknesses include flaws in the credit rating model 
inputs (Baghai et al., 2014), insufficient due diligence in the credit rating process 
(Konijna and Rijkena, 2011), insufficient consideration of market and macroeconomic 
developments in assigning rating to sovereign debt instruments (Kräussl, 2005), failure 
to take account of structured securities’ interdependencies and inadequate disclosure of 
the SCR models and model assumptions (Elkhoury, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, CRAs blame sovereign defaults on unexpected market shocks and 
unprecedented economic declines that are difficult to predict (Gande and Parsley, 
2004). Furthermore, CRAs argue that they are not legally bound by their SCRs because 
it is merely their opinion and thus they cannot be held liable under the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution (Baghai et al., 2014). Therefore, over-reliance by investors on 
sovereign ratings constitute negligence on their part when analysing investment options 
(Masciandaro, 2013). However due to information asymmetry in African markets, most 
investors rely on publicly available information to make major investment decisions 





Hence, regardless of the questionable information sufficiency in credit rating 
announcements, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks (2012) claim that Africa’s financial 
markets tend to react to SCR announcements by the three international CRAs.  Agarwal 
et al. (2015) add that the economic consequences of these sovereign rating actions is 
significant as they affect the efficiency and stability of capital markets within and across 
countries. Agarwal et al. also posit that in some cases, there is a ‘linguistic tone’ in the 
rating reports which contains new information beyond the credit rating actions. Thus, 
based on the preceding discussion, this thesis empirically investigates the following 
thesis statement: 
 
Africa’s markets show statistically significant evidence that sovereign rating reports 
contain new tradable information and sovereign credit rating announcements impacts 
stock and bond markets differently. In addition, when credit rating announcements are 
made, there is a spillover effect to neighbouring countries’  financial markets that share 
similar fundamentals. Lastly, SCRs positively impact the efficiency form of African 
financial markets and thus the informational role of credit rating institutions in shaping 
market efficiency is significant. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
This study investigates the effects of the information provided by CRAs on African 
financial markets to determine whether SCR announcements contain material 
information that influences the secondary market securities pricing model and debt 
markets’ interest rates. The above thesis statement is explored through the following 
four research questions.   
 
1.3.1 Research question 1: Do sovereign rating announcements influence excess 
bond and equity returns? 
The liberalisation of African markets in recent years (Makina, 2005) elevated the role of 
CRAs in the international economy, a subject of ongoing debate (Creighton et al., 
2007). Sovereign rating agencies have been heavily criticised within the context of 




financial crises and they are too slow to react (Morseth and Norgaard, 2011) even when 
signs of impending crises are widely visible (Amstad and Packer, 2015). However when 
CRAs react, their announcements trigger further market panics and overreactions (Li et 
al., 2004). These arguments are largely based on the assumption that sovereign rating 
announcements actually provide financial markets with new information (Jorion and 
Zhang, 2010), even though the empirical evidence hitherto relating to this issue is still 
inconclusive. Thus, the importance of sovereign rating news is still highly debated in 
emerging markets. 
 
Research to date has focused on the impact of credit rating announcements at the 
company level. In general, it has been found that rating downgrades are informative as 
compared to upgrades, which are not (Hand et al., 1992; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; 
Matolcsy and Lianto, 2007). The few studies completed to date have produced mixed 
results, providing ambiguous evidence that rating actions impact security prices (Cantor 
and Packer, 1996; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks, 2012; Alsakka and Gwilym, 
2013; Ntswane, 2014). The impact of sovereign rating announcements on financial 
markets is important for investors in understanding of the price discovery process, 
particularly in relation to the type of information that financial markets incorporate into 
asset prices (Odders-White and Ready, 2006). As investment portfolios are being 
internationalised, those responsible for managing investment capital are facing the need 
for greater and more accurate information regarding country risk and how a country risk 
re-assessment can impact their portfolios (Gande and Parsley, 2004). Since sovereign 
ratings function as a major country risk indicator, it is also important to have a good 
understanding of the impact that sovereign rating announcements have on financial 
asset prices (Hooper et al., 2008). 
 
Thus in addition to the first primary question, this study also investigates the following 
sub-questions:  





(ii) Is there a relationship between sovereign rating announcements and stock 
returns? 
 
1.3.2 Research question 2: What is the effect of a SCR on bond and equities 
markets? 
It is widely accepted that stocks and bonds do not move in the same direction as rising 
stock prices are associated with rising bond yields and falling bond prices (Stivers and 
Sun, 2002). It is argued that investors commonly sell bonds to raise money to buy 
stocks and sell stocks to raise money to buy bonds, which affects the prices of both 
asset classes (Maslov and Roehner, 2004). Hence, stocks and bond prices move in 
opposite directions because of their inverse responses to macroeconomic fundamentals 
(such as interest rates and inflation) (d’Addona and Kind, 2006), while fighting for the 
same money from investors (Ncube and Brixiov, 2015).  
 
A sovereign rating change situation occurs when CRAs feel that the future economic 
prospects of a country have changed due to a material and fundamental shift in its 
macro-environment (Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982). A ratings upgrade (downgrade) 
implies that the borrower’s credit risk profile has improved (deteriorated), which would 
reduce (increase) the required rate of return on its debt, thereby increasing (reducing) 
its security price. The required return, is the minimum rate of return an investor will 
accept for an investment, which fairly compensate the level of risk in the investment. In 
security valuation, it is the required return that is used to value security prices using 
discounted cash flow analysis. Hence, a sovereign rating downgrade (upgrade) is 
considered to be negative (positive) information by the market (Hand et al., 1992; 
Ammer and Clinton, 2004; Mateev, 2012) whereby, a SCR announcement should lead 
to either a positive (upgrade) or negative (downgrade) stock market and bond market 
reaction. However, empirical evidence of this effect on both stock and bond markets is 
still inconclusive, as Zaima and McCarthy (1988) and Goh and Ederington (1993) argue, 
it is possible that sovereign rating downgrade announcements do not necessarily have 
negative implications for stockholders because investors can transfer funds from bonds 





The hypothesis that bonds and stocks react negatively (positively) to SCR downgrades 
(upgrades), whereby a downgrade (upgrade) leads to both stocks and bonds reacting in 
the same direction thus raises three sub-questions: 
(i) Do stocks and bonds react negatively (positively) to a sovereign credit downgrade 
(upgrade) announcement? 
(ii) How do stockholders and bondholders adjust their required return following a SCR 
announcement?  
(iii) What is the association between Africa’s bond and stock returns following SCR 
announcements? 
 
1.3.3 Research question 3: What is the effect of SCR spillover on neighbouring 
countries’ financial markets? 
Africa’s financial markets have become increasingly integrated into the global financial 
market (Andrianaivo and Yartey, 2009). There have been interrelationships in markets 
fundamentals so that if a credit rating changes in one country, there is evidence of 
changes in the aggregate market returns of other countries (Corbet, 2014). The 
magnitude of the spillover effect is a result of geographic proximity (Ferreira and Gama, 
2007), emerging market status (Gande and Parsley, 2005), type of announcements 
(Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999), the source country experiencing the rating change 
(Kalotychou et al., 2014), and the rating agency from which the announcements 
originate (Arezki et al., 2011). 
 
Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Arezki et al. (2011) confirm that geographic distance is 
inversely related to the spillover impact whereby sovereign rating announcements have 
a more pronounced effect in countries nearer to each other. However, this finding is still 
contested for three reasons. First, Flores (2010) argues that negative spillover effects 
cannot be explained by fundamental linkages and similarities between countries 
because of asymmetry in the sovereign debt market's treatment of positive and negative 
information. Second, Christopher et al. (2012) argue that if investors view the stock 




from the downgraded country’s stock market in favour of other stock markets in the 
region. Additionally, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2012) also posit that investors are more 
inclined to withdraw funds from the surrounding regional markets as well as the 
downgraded market, causing its regional bond market co-movement to rise. Lastly, 
Boninghausen and Zabel (2013) report that negative spillover effects from sovereign 
downgrades are only pronounced for countries within the same region. However, 
Longstaff et al. (2011) contested that, when there is a sovereign credit improvement, 
international bond investors shift funds away from other bond markets in the region in 
favour of the affected market and this leads to a fall in regional correlations. Hence, 
responses of neighbouring financial markets to a change in a country’s sovereign rating 
may arise from contagion, herding or speculative activities. Thus, the third question 
being investigated is divided into two sub-questions:  
(i) Does a change in one country’s credit rating cause significant spillover effects on 
other sovereign credit rated countries’ financial markets and, 
(ii) Under what economic and market conditions are spillover effects, if any, 
significant? 
 
1.3.4 Research question 4: Do SCRs positively affect capital market efficiency? 
There is general consensus that a credit rating is one of the major external forces that 
influence financial markets by imposing financial discipline on market participants 
(Duygun et al., 2016) and contribute to market efficiency by providing accurate, clear 
and reliable assessments of the solvency of financial market participants (Ekins and 
Calabria, 2012). Thus, the function of credit ratings is to enhance transparency and 
efficiency in financial markets by reducing the information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders (Gande and Parsley, 2014). In contrast, other studies argue that 
the informational effects of rating agencies on financial markets is irrelevant in 
developed markets because they are efficient (Fama, 1965; Fama, 1970; Ojah and 
Karemera,1999; Norden and Weber, 2004; Hooper et al., 2008). Furthermore, Schorno 
and Wittry (2011) add that the significant decline in the reputation of CRAs following the 
global financial crisis suggests that their role in influencing financial market efficiency is 




efficiency because security issuers may use ratings to increase information asymmetry 
through "rating shopping" from agencies that assign high ratings in order to reduce 
borrowing costs. It is thus hypothesised that, if credit ratings enhance financial market 
efficiency, then inefficient markets should become more efficient in the long-term 
following credit rating announcements. 
 
Although the literature on African financial market efficiency has been growing, to date, 
studies that test the effects of SCR announcements on financial market efficiency are 
rare. This study thus seeks to answer the following two sub-questions:  
(i) Does the level of market efficiency change following sovereign credit 
announcements?  




There are a few limitations with this research that are related to data and the 
methodologies. 
 
1.4.1 Data Limitations 
The SCRs announcements, daily stock and bond market indices data used in all the 
empirical chapters is subject to the following limitations. First, there are relatively few 
SCR events in Africa compared to those in developed economies. Although the period 
of analysis is 20 years, in the first 10 years, only less than half of the sample countries 
had been credit rated. Until 2014, only 30 out of the 54 African countries had received 
credit ratings from one (or more) of the three international rating agencies, usually 
because the countries do not have functioning bond and/or stock markets. Furthermore, 
the simultaneous announcements of SCRs by the three international rating agencies in 
response to the same fundamental changes at different times might have different 
impact on financial markets that could be difficult to discern. In addition, the occurrences 
of other confounding events such as civil unrests, strikes, political and economic turmoil 






Second, approximately a quarter of the listed companies are not actively traded, which 
creates pockets of inefficiences, and very low transaction turnover ratios (Luchtenberg 
and Vu, 2015), which translate to low liquidity. The thin trading which is dominated by a 
few large corporates exposes most exchanges to manipulation and insider trading, 
which distort the indices returns data (Jayakumar et al., 2012).  
 
Third, the debt market that provides platforms for secondary trading of sovereign bonds 
is largely non-existent in almost half of the sovereign rated countries. This severely 
constrains both liquidity and efficiency in African financial markets, making credit rating 
announcements less relevant.  
 
Lastly, Africa’s financial markets are characterized by limited information, a lack of 
transparency, low institutional quality and poor regulatory frameworks. This could  
potentially distort the relationship between credit ratings announcements and Africa’s 
financial market securities (Patel, 2014; Ravi and Hong, 2014; Smith and Dyakova, 
2014).  
 
1.4.2 Methodology Limitations 
There are some methodological limitations to the empirical analyses used to investigate 
the research questions in the following chapters that are briefly described as follows. In 
Chapter 2, the event study method is applied to examine the behaviour of African 
financial market following SCR announcements. However, the application of event 
studies in the analysis and inference of long-term effects is debatable because its 
proponents, Brown and Warner (1985), recommend it as analysis best suited for 
assessing short-term responses to an event. However Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) 
and Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) argue that there is precision in estimating the 
market models for longer horizons. Thus, they recommend using an event study method 
for assessing the impact of any change in market fundamentals even for long-term time 




conditional variances to estimate volatility clustering around SCR events. The GARCH 
model has limitations in that its parameters are well specified under relatively stable 
market conditions (Corhay and Rad, 1996) but may fail to capture some highly irregular 
phenomena, extreme market fluctuations, such as market swings and rebounds, and 
other unprecedented events that lead to significant structural changes.  
 
In Chapter 3, DCC-GARCH examines the relationship between stocks and bond returns 
following SCR announcements. Althought the DCC-GARCH models can detect possible 
changes in conditional correlations over time by capturing the dynamic investor 
behaviour in response to news and innovations (Zhang and Chan, 2009), it may not fully 
capture the outliers observed in asset return series. The Granger Causality test is 
applied in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In Chapter 3 it is used to analyse the net effect of 
sovereign ratings on both stocks and bond returns, in Chapter 4 to examine SCR 
spillovers on neighbouring countries’ financial markets, and in Chapter 5 to investigate 
the semi-strong efficiency in incorporating sovereign rating announcements. The 
Granger causality results however do not show the reaction time and magnitude of 
spillover effects across countries and financial markets, and the sensitivity of the type 
and nature of the assets being traded in each of the regional financial markets. In 
addition to the Granger Causality test, Chapter 4 also uses Impulse Responses to 
assess the effect of credit rating shocks on security returns and the response of 
neighbouring countries’ bonds and stock markets to an impulse in another country in the 
same region. There are however chances of misidentification of impulses (Koop et al., 
1996), which my result in distortions and errors in the responses. 
 
Finally in Chapter 5, the Ljung–Box Q test and Runs test is used to examine the weak 
form efficiency, and the variance ratio test is used to examine the random walk 
hypothesis. The Engle-Granger Cointegration test is further applied to investigate the 
semi-strong efficiency in incorporating sovereign rating announcements. Althought the 
Ljung-Box test is known to be robust especially in finite samples (Burns, 2003), it may 
sometimes fail when the distribution of sample data is extremely long-tailed (Stoffer and 




autoregression disturbances are conditionally homoskedastic and the model regressors 
are strictly exogenous (Cumby and Huizinga, 1992), which is not the case in financial 
market data that is usually overlapping and often shows the presence of conditional 
heteroskedasticity in the error process. The Runs test also suffers from the potential 
insensitivity to departures from randomness for run lengths in evaluating the 
independence of disturbances in time series regression models (Ley and Paindaveine, 
2013). It also has the wrong “type 1 error” 7  rate (Baringhaus and Henze, 2016)  
because it does not distinguish where runs occur in a sequence, it makes no predictions 
regarding what might happen if other frequencies were observable, and it ignores the 
possibility of any sort of classification error (random or systematic).  
 
The variance ratio test, which is regarded by Kim and Kim (2010) as a stronger random 
walk test, ignores the joint nature of testing for the random walk hypothesis. Thus, it has 
been argued that the variance ratio statistics draws misleading conclusions when time-
varying volatility is present in the data (Charles and Darne, 2009). Lastly, the Engle-
Granger Cointegration test has limitations in the estimation of the long-run cointegration 
equilibrium regression models (Engle and Granger, 1987), which in practice means that 
it is possible to find that one regression shows that the variables are cointegrated, 
whereas reversing the order shows no cointegration. 
  
1.5 Merit of the Research and  Contribution to Literature 
The study of credit rating effects on financial markets is a relatively new area of study in 
Africa, arising in the early 1990s as emerging markets began to attract the attention of 
international institutional investors. This thesis makes four major contributions to the 
financial markets and credit ratings literature in emerging markets.  
 
First, this study is amongst the first to statistically explore the relevance of SCR in the 
securities pricing model using African data. Although the literature on credit ratings and 
financial markets in developed countries has been growing, studies that test the effects 
                                                          




of SCR announcements on financial markets in emerging countries are still sparse. This 
thesis is thus based on a less examined sample, which draws new evidence on the 
relationship between SCR and financial markets. The dynamic nature of Africa’s 
emerging capital markets and its limited links with the global markets creates 
information asymmetry. African markets are thus characterized by limited information, 
high-risk assets, liquidity challenges, relatively few participants, lack of transparency, 
low institutional quality, and greater uncertainty. Hence, generalizing Africa’s financial 
markets as equal to other regional emerging markets could be detrimental and thus this 
study draws conclusions from new and specific data.  
 
The second contribution of this study is the expanded range of empirical tests that are 
applied to investigate each research question. In contrast, most studies in the literature 
commonly use just one test; for example, the key studies of Gande and Parsley (2004), 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), Ferreira and Gama (2007), Flores (2010), and 
Boninghausen and Zabel (2013) investigate the impact of sovereign ratings changes on 
financial markets using only the event study method.  
 
Third, this study is amongst the first to empirically examine the impact of SCRs on 
bonds and equity markets using sovereign rating announcements by all the three 
international CRAs (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch). Most pioneering studies 
such as Weinstein (1977), Pinches and Singleton (1978) and Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001) analyse financial markets reaction to rating announcements made by Moody’s, 
the relatively modest of the three rating agencies. Other formative studies on SCRs 
announcements such as Konijna and Rijkena (2011), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and 
Brooks (2012) and Agarwal et al. (2015) use credit ratings announcements from 
Standards and Poor’s, the oldest provider of credit ratings since 1860. A number of 
other important studies such as Reisen and von Maltzan (1998), Li et al. (2004) and 
Kraussl (2005) used rating data from both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s which are 
widely regarded as the two major sovereign rating agencies that accounts for 





Forth, generally the analyses of the impact of SCR announcements in the majority of 
studies are centred around credit rating upgrades and downgrades between rating 
notches, sidelining changes in credit rating outlooks and addition to credit watchlist. 
Major studies on this topic such as Zaima and McCarthy (1988), Goh and Ederington 
(1993), Goh and Ederington (1999), Kim and Nabar (2003), Leonard and Olinsky 
(2013), Gande and Parsley (2014) and Flor and Hesel (2015) ignore the impact of credit 
rating outlooks and addition to credit watchlist in their analyses. Thus this study 
contribute to literature by expanding the scope of analysis to incorporate the impact of 
credit rating outlooks and addition to credit watchlist, which are also SCR 
announcements. Furthermore, this study examines the effects of SCR changes on both 
the stock and bond markets rather than just focusing on the impact on either equities or 
bond markets. This is uncommon in the literature as most seminal studies such as 
Weinstein (1977), Hertel (2013) and Crosta (2014) only focus on the bond market whilst 
Pinches and Singleton (1978), Griffin and Sanvicente (1982), Dichev and Piotroski 
(2001), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), Klimavičienė (2011) and Bissoondoyal-
Bheenick and Brooks (2012) focus on the stock market.  
 
 
Finally, the findings of this thesis could be used for policy formulation because if a 
sovereign rating change is found to be relevant information to capital markets, then it is 
by extension critical to policy-makers as well. A significant change in a sovereign credit 
profile will affect the cost of borrowing for the government, corporates and individuals. 
By extention, this has a net effect on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), external debt 
levels, exchange rates, fiscal balance and ultimately, household disposable income. 
Furthermore, monetary authorities are increasingly using the information contained in 
the prices of these assets to gauge market growth, inflation expectations and market 
views on economic prospects. Hence, understanding the relationship between stocks 
and bond returns in relation to credit ratings has a direct impact on policy formulation 
and implementation, and investors’ asset allocation and risk management strategies. 
Therefore, it is crucial for fiscal and monetary policy-makers to understand the effects of 





1.6 Layout of the study 
This thesis is structured as a set of inter-linked chapter-based studies with each chapter 
investigating a research question. The four primary research questions are thus covered 
in four chapters that proceed as follows. Chapter 2 investigates if sovereign rating 
change announcements influence excess bond and equity returns. A combination of an 
event study method and GARCH technique is applied to investigate the credit rating 
puzzle to determine how investors respond to credit rating announcements. Chapter 3 
explores the net effect of sovereign ratings on both stocks and bond returns using a 
combination of Granger Causality and DCC-GARCH. 
 
Chapter 4 applied both the Granger Causality test and the Impulse Responses to 
assess the spillover effect of credit rating shocks on security returns and the response 
of neighbouring countries’ bonds and stock markets to an impulse in another country in 
the same region. Thenafter, the Ljung–Box Q test, Runs test, Engle-Granger 
Cointegration test, Variance Ratio test and the Granger Causality test are used to 
examine the weak form efficiency, and the variance ratio test is used to examine the 
impact of SCRs on the efficiency of bond and equity markets. Finally, Chapter 6 then 
concludes the study with a summary of the key findings, implications, and 















DOES SOVEREIGN RATING CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT INFLUENCE 
EXCESS BOND AND EQUITY RETURNS? 
 
2.1 Summary abstract 
This chapter examines whether new sovereign credit rating announcements are 
valuable and relevant information to bond and equity markets in 30 African countries 
that received a sovereign credit rating during the period 1994 to 2014. The results of 
applying a combination of GARCH models and event study techniques show that the 
financial markets do not significantly react to SCR announcements. These findings 
suggest that there is a very weak relationship between sovereign credit rating changes 
and security yields in African markets, possibly because these African markets are 
already perceived to be risky. Hence, it can be concluded that sovereign credit rating 
announcements are largely irrelevant information to financial markets in low credit rated 




In the late 1980's and early 1990’s, the rapidly deteriorating economic and financial 
conditions in African countries as a result of political conflicts arising from colonial 
imbalances, climate change induced droughts, shortages of foreign exchange, and 
falling commodity prices (Overseas Development Institute, 1982) forced many 
economies to undertake a process of financial liberalization (Kenny and Moss, 1998). 
These structural frameworks were aimed at moving away from a command economy 
towards market based economic systems that would develop and foster functional 
financial markets and thus stimulate private sector-led economic growth (Creighton et 





Whilst liberalization enhanced the competitiveness and improved the efficiency of 
financial markets, it also increased investors’ risk exposure due to market volatility 
(Kose et al., 2009). These innovations led to the birth of many complex derivatives and 
structured financial products (for example; asset backed securities, options, forwards, 
etc.), which require experts to evaluate their risk profiles (Causevic, 2003). Hence, 
investors have come to rely on expert advice and recommendations when making 
decisions about these assets. Average investors therefore regard CRAs as new 
information sources about the state of the creditworthiness of a nation, and they thus 
use the information as a benchmark to determine their required returns and bond yields 
(Creighton et al., 2007), which is the discounting factor in security prices. The 
uncertainty in financial assets has thus elevated the role of CRAs in the international 
economy as sources of relevant information required for informed trading (Makina, 
2005) and by helping to reduce the creditworthiness information asymmetry between 
markets and investors (Elkhoury, 2008).  
 
Basel II further cemented the importance of rating agencies by incorporating the ratings 
of CRAs into the rules for setting credit risk weights (Hooper et al., 2008). However, the 
failure of CRAs to predict major events such as the 1998 Asian crisis, the bankruptcies 
of Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat, and the 2008 financial crisis has raised questions 
concerning their rating processes, accountability, and ability to predict and respond to 
financial crises (Elkhoury, 2008; Morseth and Norgaard, 2011; Amstad and Packer, 
2015). Furthermore, when CRAs change a country’s credit rating profile, their 
announcements may trigger market panics and over-reactions (Li et al., 2004) as 
sovereign ratings provide financial markets with new information (Jorion and Zhang, 
2010).  
 
Although the literature on SCRs and financial markets in developed countries has been 
growing, studies that test the effects of SCR announcements on financial markets in 
emerging countries are still sparse. This chapter examines whether a sovereign rating 
announcement influences excess bond and equity returns in 30 African countries that 




financial market and SCR literature. First, it uses an under-researched sample so as to 
draw new evidence on the relationship between SCR and financial markets. Second, it 
is amongst the few studies that empirically examine the impact of SCR changes on 
financial markets using sovereign rating announcements by all the three international 
CRAs (Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s and Fitch). Lastly, this chapter examines the 
effects of SCR changes on both the stock and bond markets rather than just focusing 
on the impact on either equities or bond markets. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature devoted to the 
information content of a SCR report, the associated information asymmetry, the cost of 
capital and abnormal return effects, Section 2.3 then describes the sovereign rating 
data and Section 2.4 devises the GARCH and event study approaches used to conduct 
the analysis. The findings are discussed in Section 2.5 and the study then concludes 
with a summary of the key findings in Section 2.6. 
 
2.3 Literature review 
Examinations of the effects of sovereign rating changes were first explored in the 1970s 
when a new paradigm of financial innovation was adopted by financial institutions and 
securities broker-dealers who sought to soften capital and liquidity requirements. The 
associated complexity of financial markets and the growth in the complexity of financial 
instruments then inspired this seminal body of literature on the assessment of 
creditworthiness.  
 
2.3.1 Information Content of a SCR Report 
Among the first to study SCR impacts was Weinstein (1977), who conducts an event 
study using monthly United States bond data over the period from 1962 to 1974, but 
finds no significant abnormal returns caused by SCR news announcements. Pinches 
and Singleton (1978) examine monthly stock prices data and also find no evidence of 
upward or downward drift in the cumulative abnormal returns before or after the month 
of the rating announcements. Thus, they subsequently argue that the information 





Notably, Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) are acknowledged as among the first to apply an 
event study method on SCR to an emerging country. Examining Turkey’s stock market 
using monthly data covering the period from 1970 to 1980, they find that in contrast to 
Weinstein (1977) and Pinches and Singleton (1978), there is significant evidence of 
negative stock price reactions to credit rating downgrades but no evidence of significant 
reactions to rating upgrades.  
 
However, it can be argued that there may be particular information content present in 
the SCR report that affect financial markets. Thus, Cantor and Packer (1996) examine 
the determinants of SCR and its impact on borrowing costs. Using a model comprising 
the eight variables8 that are repeatedly cited in rating agency reports as determinants of 
sovereign ratings. They observe that the more the number of variables included in a 
SCR report, the greater its influence on financial markets. Complementary to Cantor 
and Packer, Muragu (1990), Hand et al. (1992) and Dhillon and Johnson (1994) further 
report that the inclusion of the determinants in a SCR report depends on the CRAs’ 
opinions, which is highly qualitative and subjective. Hence, the three CRAs rarely assign 
the same rating grade to a sovereign. These studies thus indicate that SCRs reports 
effectively summarize crucial macroeconomic information. However, a key limitation of 
these studies is that the quantitative models cannot explain all the variations in cross-
country ratings because there are possibly other qualitative social and political 
considerations that are excluded when determining a SCR.  
 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) conduct an event study on a sample of all credit ratings 
assigned by Moody's and S&P's during the period 1987 and 1996. Their results show 
that stocks and bonds only respond positively to changes in SCRs downgrade reports, 
especially in emerging economies, thus supporting Cantor and Packer’s (1996) 
contention that negative sovereign rating announcements significantly raise sovereign 
bond spreads and stock returns. Thus, Reisen and von Maltzan conclude that the bond 
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and stock market volatility is driven by CRAs downgrade announcements in the 
countries concerned while there is insignificant change in yield when sovereign upgrade 
is announced. Although these findings imply that SCR reports contain information of 
concern to investors, they do not address why financial markets show inconsistent 
abnormal returns after a sovereign rating downgrade is announced. 
 
Hence, Agarwal et al. (2015) apply Naïve Bayesian algorithms to test the hypothesis 
that credit rating reports contain new default-related information beyond credit rating 
actions (such as credit rating changes, credit watch, and outlook) using 3046 rating 
actions from S&P covering the period of 1998 to 2010. The results find evidence that 
SCR reports do contain new information beyond the credit rating action itself, which 
Agarwal et al. call a linguistic tone9. They subsequently argue that it is possible that 
technical analysts could possibly use the linguistic tone to predict future rating changes.  
 
The results of these studies show that the hypothesis that SCR reports contain 
information of concern to investors is still inconclusive. While earlier studies argue that 
the information content of a SCR report is weakly significant, later studies suggest that 
SCR reports contain new default-related information beyond credit rating activities in the 
form of a ‘linguistic tone’, which technical analysts may use to predict future rating 
changes at the expense of average investors. However, this then raises the potential 
risk of information asymmetries because average investors without technical expertise 
cannot discern that linguistic tone. 
 
2.3.2 Information Asymmetry 
In recent decades, the increase in financial sophistication has resulted in the creation of 
complex financial instruments, whose risk cannot be easily quantified (Lambert et al., 
2012). Issuers of these instruments, together with finance professionals design 
strategies to reduce risk and maximize opportunities because they are experienced. 
They thus have access to more information about the securities than those who invest 
                                                          





in them, producing information asymmetry (Armstrong et al., 2011). Therefore, 
asymmetric information creates an imbalance of power in financial transactions, which 
can cause transactions to go awry through adverse selection (Lu et al., 2010), moral 
hazard (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994), or information monopoly (Ravi and Hong, 2014).  
 
Hence, CRAs act as information intermediaries that independently produce new 
information and verify public announcements on the borrowers’ creditworthiness, thus 
correcting informational imbalances between issuers and investors (Brown et al., 2009). 
This is achieved through their valuation role by gathering, analyzing, and disseminating 
information relevant for assessing credit quality and making the results of their analyses 
widely available to market participants (Frost, 2007). Thus, CRAs bridge the information 
gap between issuers of securities and investors by measuring credit risk profiles of 
issuers (Rhee, 2015).  
 
Dichev and Piotroski (2001) investigate the European long-term stock return 
movements following a credit rating change using Fama–MacBeth regressions to test a 
sample of 4700 Moody’s sovereign rating announcements over the period of 1970 to 
1997. They find significant abnormal returns for stocks that are not included in 
computing weighted indexes. Securities that are not part of a weighted index are not 
constantly subject to analysts’ scrutiny. Hence, information about these securities is not 
frequently published, limiting the ability of investors and prospective investors to make 
informed decisions. Klimavičienė (2011) examines the OMX Baltic10 All-Share index 
data for the period 2000 to 2009 using ordinary least squares. They find that there is 
price impact of negative events that is several times larger than that of positive events, 
which they call an asymmetric reaction. Hence, further to Dichev and Piotroski (2001), 
Klimavičienė (2011) posits that abnormal returns are a product of an asymmetric 
reaction especially after a sovereign downgrade.  
 
These studies however, do not take into account that, in developing countries 
information asymmetry goes beyond analyst coverage in computing weighted indexes. 
                                                          




Thus, Kraussl (2005) uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in an event study analysis on 
S&P and Moody’s rating actions between 1997 and 2000, and finds that SCR 
downgrades generate a strong financial market reaction in emerging market economies. 
In order to further examine the possible reasons for these reactions, Erbas (2005) 
examines 28 emerging sovereigns’ capital flows and regulatory rankings to investigate 
the associations between institutional quality rankings and portfolio investment. Erbas 
then finds that SCR’s effects may be stronger in emerging markets because of lack of 
transparency, low institutional quality and greater uncertainty. Hence, Erbaş concludes 
that emerging markets are susceptible to thorough rating agencies’ evaluations and 
because of information asymmetry in emerging markets, SCR changes generate 
stronger market reactions accordingly. 
 
It has therefore been shown that SCR change generate a stronger market reactions in 
emerging markets compared to developed markets. However there is no consensus on 
the empirical reasons why this is so, with some literature citing information asymmetry 
whilst others argue that it is the nature of institutional quality and transparency. Thus, 
CRAs bridge the information gap between issuers of securities and investors by 
measuring credit risk profiles of issuers, and thus correct informational imbalances. 
Hence, some studies posit that securities that are not constantly subject to analysts’ 
scrutiny usually have limited information and thus limit the ability of investors to make 
informed decisions. It therefore follows that financial securities with high information 
asymmetries are perceived to be high risky and consequently attract a higher cost of 
capital.  
 
2.3.3 Cost of Capital 
It is a fundamental principle of financial economics that high risk assets should offer 
high returns (Fama and French, 1993). This risk-return tradeoff underlies the conceptual 
framework of asset pricing and investment decisions in efficient markets because 
investors pay a premium for bearing additional credit risk (Stulz, 1999). On these 
grounds, it is logical to conclude that SCR announcements directly affect the credit risk 





Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) study the impact of changes in sovereign ratings and 
outlooks on stock prices change by estimating a market model for an event study 
methodology on a comprehensive database of 34 countries, covering emerging and 
developed regions over the period 1990 to 2000. They find significant increase in cost of 
capital following a sovereign downgrade caused by high inflation, low fiscal balance, 
and high sovereign debt. Discounting expected cash flows with a high cost of capital 
reduces stock values. Pukthuanthong-Le et al. however do not address the effects of a 
rating change on investors’ appetite to hold a rated security.  
 
Kisgen and Strahan (2010) thus test the hypothesis that regulation-based credit rating 
directly affect investors’ required return, bond yield and firm’s cost of capital using 47 
stocks and 90 bonds rated by the three international CRAs between 2001 and 2005. 
Their results show that as hypothesized, regulation-based credit ratings directly affect 
investors’ required return, bond yields (especially around the investment-grade cutoff), 
and firm’s cost of capital. If regulation recommends that securities should obtain credit 
ratings, investors will be biased towards rated securities.  Their results thus suggest that 
the effects of a SCR announcement on the cost of capital may not be explained by 
simple tradeoff theories where firms balance financial distress costs against tax benefits 
of debt financing. Hence, downgraded securities would suffer a larger increase in its 
cost of capital than would be expected solely from the implied increase in probability of 
firms’ distress.  
 
Furthermore, Ratha et al. (2011) estimate a regression model specified with eight 
explanatory variables common in the three CRAs models to assess the financial market 
reaction to SCR for unrated emerging economies. They report that bond yield 
movements have a higher association with SCR announcements than stock price 
movements. A possible reason for this dynamic is because the bond yield is linked to 
credit risk, thus making it more susceptible to SCR announcements (which confirms 
Fama and French, 1993) while  stocks respond by smaller margins to SCR 




class (Lamont, 2014). Hence, Ratha et al. conclude that CRAs provide financial markets 
with new tradable information which directly impact cost of borrowing.  
 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks (2012) assess the impact of sovereign rating 
announcements on the stock market returns by estimating four market models11 in an 
event study methodology to test abnormal returns using a sample of all the rating 
announcements for US, UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Croatia, Austria 
and Norway for the period 1975 to 2010 from S&P’s. They find statistically significant 
evidence that only SCR downgrade announcements result in an increase in the cost of 
capital and not vice-versa. Conversely, Morseth and Norgaard (2011) dispute that even 
SCR upgrade announcements affect cost of capital in developed financial markets, 
although their impact may sometimes not be symmetrically discernible. Contrary to 
Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) and Kisgen and Strahan (2010), who generally conclude 
that SCR announcements has a bearing on cost of capital through potential financial 
distress, Morseth and Norgaard (2011) argue that there is a negative impact on stock 
return connected to all positive rating announcements, although it is difficult to find a 
plausible economic reason behind this rather than subjective qualitative aspects 
(Muragu, 1990). An inherent weakness in these studies is the assumption that financial 
markets are semi-strong efficient when reacting to rating unfavourable announcements, 
whereas in Africa’s emerging markets, only the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) 
shows evidence of weak form efficiency while the others are non-efficient (Jefferis and 
Smith, 2005; Ajao and Osayuwu, 2012; Ntim et al., 2011). 
 
The empirical studies on the cost of capital effects indicate that SCR announcements 
directly affects the credit risk profile of a country, and hence the cost of capital, 
ultimately affecting security values. Critics counter however, that the effects of a SCR 
announcement on cost of capital may not be explained by a risk-return tradeoff, but 
rather by subjective qualitative aspects. Thus, qualitative factors may explain the 
inconsistency in investors’ adjusted required returns in response to the same SCR 
                                                          





announcements. Hence, the varying response in cost of capital to announcements in 
SCR upgrades and downgrades generates excess returns because the cost of capital is 
the discounting element in determining security prices.  
 
2.3.4 Abnormal Returns 
A significant and growing body of literature has investigated the impact of a credit rating 
announcement on financial markets through the presence of abnormal returns during 
the event publication period (Ikram and Nugroho, 2014). One of the notable study by 
Mateev (2012) investigates evidence of abnormal returns during SCR announcements 
using OLS to estimate abnormal returns in  an event study methodology on a sample of 
nine emerging market economies (Bulgaria, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia) over the period 1998 to 2007. He 
reports that bond yield spreads show evidence of positive abnormal returns whilst 
stocks show negative abnormal returns in response to a country’s downgrade. 
Conversely, Mateev find no statistically significant evidence of abnormal returns in both 
bond and stock spreads of economies whose sovereign ratings are upgraded. 
 
However, Hertel (2013) argues that abnormal returns are solely a result of speculation 
rather than a fundamental reaction. Using the cumulative abnormal returns of US 
denominated utility bonds rated by Standard and Poor’s during the period 2000 to 2006, 
Hertel finds that, similar to Mateev (2012), there is significant evidence of abnormal 
returns on downgrade related announcements and no reliable abnormal returns for 
bond upgrades. Thus, investors are speculative about the downside risk that emanate 
from sovereign downgrades, which generate abnormal returns. Hence, Hertel concludes 
that abnormal returns are significantly stronger for credit downgrades towards 
speculative grade.  
 
Contrary to Hertel (2013)’s conclusion, Jansen and Nikiforov (2015) argue that it may be 
inaccurate to assume that the majority of market participants are speculators, because 
speculators are temporary and opportunistic. Jansen and Nikiforov use 207,693 




years 1984 to 2014 to test the hypothesis that speculators impact trading volume 
around information events using univariate, multivariate and robustness analyses. They 
find that speculators are much less committed to long-term trading in a specific stock 
because their trading decisions are not based on time-consuming fundamental analysis 
but rather on short-term speculative profits. Investors therefore do not stay in one 
market and thus cannot consistently influence abnormal returns because they only trade 
around information events for the short-term price momentum they generate rather than 
the intrinsic value of assets. 
 
Similarly, Konijna and Rijkena (2011) question whether sovereign watchlist additions 
and outlook assignments can be classified as a credit rating event with default related 
information indicating possible future rating changes. Most studies on the effects of 
SCR announcements on financial markets test the significance of sovereign downgrade 
and upgrade while ignoring the possible effects of watchlist and outlook contributions to 
a sovereign change. Konijna and Rijkena thus investigate the extent to which watchlist 
and outlook information contributes to investors’ expectations using an estimate default 
prediction model and outlook announcements from S&P between 1991 and 2005. Their 
results show that assigning a watch for downgrade or a negative outlook already leads 
to an immediate significant negative abnormal return reaction upon announcement. 
Hence, the actual SCR change announcement has a less pronounced effect when 
preceded by a watchlist addition.  
 
Despite the finding of Konijna and Rijkena (2011), Crosta (2014) questions whether 
investors might use credit watchlists and outlooks to ‘smooth’ ratings changes. Applying 
a composite marginal likelihood approach to estimate a multi-year ordered probit model 
for each of the three major CRAs of 90 developing countries for the years 2002 to 2013, 
Crosta finds significant abnormal bond returns following negative watch 
announcements. He further observes that abnormal returns in response to watch and 
outlook changes are higher for countries whose credit rating is closer to the investment-
speculative grade boundary, which Costa called a ‘rating-sensitive boundary’. His 




watchlists and outlooks are a crucial source of information that can reliably be used as a 
tool to anticipate future rating movements that might be detrimental for specific rating-
sensitive investors, such as mutual funds and insurance companies. Therefore, rating-
sensitive investors can lighten their exposure in risky securities before future actions by 
smoothing their portfolio transition. 
 
More recently Baum et al. (2016) apply GARCH models to examine the sovereign rating 
announcements from Moody’s, S&P and Fitch CRAs during the Eurozone debt crisis of 
2010–2012. Baum et al. find that SCR announcements do significantly influence 
abnormal returns whereby CRA downgrades, watchlist and outlook announcements 
impact the value of security prices and also increase price volatility. They thus conclude 
that abnormal returns and volatility are a result of investors’ rebalancing of their security 
portfolios to reduce their exposure to riskier borrowers when new SCR announcements 
are made.  
 
Thus in conclusion, the literature on the impact of SCR announcements and the role of 
credit ratings in addressing information asymmetry on stock and bond returns is still 
inconclusive. Furthermore, to date, no study has been conducted on African markets, 
which are characterized by limited information, high risk assets, liquidity challenges, 
relatively few participants, lack of transparency, low institutional quality, and greater 
uncertainty. It is thus hypothesised that if SCR’s are valuable information to financial 
market investors, then they should adjust their portfolios after such announcements, 
thus causing excess returns in bonds and stock markets. Furthermore, if SCR 
announcements impact financial markets, then CRAs may be contributing to the stability 
of financial markets in emerging countries. 
 
2.4 Data Description 
The analysis of SCR influence of financial markets in this study makes use of all SCR 
announcements, daily bond yield and daily stock returns data for the period 1 January 
1994 (when Africa’s first SCR was assigned to South Africa) to December 2014. The 




any or all of the three CRAs (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) which dominate 
the SCR industry.12  
 
As the analysis focuses on the impact of a SCR announcement on financial markets, 
countries that do not have sovereign ratings have been excluded.  Hence, the analysis 
covers a sample of 30 African countries that have sovereign ratings as at December 
2014. These include Angola, Burkina Faso, Benin, Botswana, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Morocco, Mali, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and 
Zambia. However, of the 30 countries that have sovereign ratings six have no functional 
stock exchanges but they have been included in the sample as they have active bond 
markets and a sovereign credit ratings. The event of interest is any sovereign rating 
news announcement13 about any of the 30 African countries from the period 1994 to 
2014, which is published on respective websites by any or all of three international 
CRAs. The SCR announcements data is also cross compared with the SCR events 
published by Tradingeconomics14 and Countryeconomy15 to confirm credibility and data 
reputation. 
 
The movements in stock returns capture the impact of a sovereign announcement on 
the stock market, thus the stock index in each country is used to estimate the market 
returns over the sample period. For the Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières 
(BRVM), which serves eight West African countries, a change in each country’s rating is 
examined in relation to the overall stock market index. On the other hand, the S&P 
Africa 10-year sovereign bond index (USD) is used as benchmark to calculate normal 
bond market returns. In countries that issue multiple sovereign bonds at different times, 
the representative bond with the most time-series observations is chosen to insure 
greater consistency throughout the sample. The sovereign bond yield and stock return 
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data was collected from Bloomberg and Reuters. 
 
Consistent with the factors highlighted in the literature, the analysis also includes the 
overall state of the economy measured by interest rates and gross domestic product 
(GDP). Both quarterly GDP and quarterly central bank repurchase interest rates data 
was collected from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). These 
macroeconomic factors capture a country’s economic activity and growth, which 
generate income that could potentially influence the analysis of SCR impacts. Interest 
rate changes directly influence business and household credit extension and interest 
expenses, and thus creditworthiness.  
 
2.5 Methodology 
To analyse the effects of sovereign rating announcements on financial market, the study 
uses an event study to examine the dynamic response of capital markets around the 
time of sovereign rating announcements in accordance with Campbell et al. (1996), 
Kothari and Warner (2007) and Dutta (2014). The analysis use capital markets to 
represent the financial markets as they represent long-term and relatively low volatility 
in asset prices. The study considers a sovereign credit announcement as an “event” 
and then examines if security prices before and after the event display abnormal returns 
in excess of their expected return (Fama et al., 1969). The change in sovereign stock 
returns is the index return for sovereign i at time t (𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡), which is determined using the 
following equation:  
 
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
 𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝑖𝑡−1
)                                                                                                                                  (2.1) 
 
Where 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is the index for sovereign 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 is the index for sovereign 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡 − 1. 
 
To calculate change in sovereign bond returns (BYit) the following equation is applied to 





𝐵𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 (
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1
)                                                                                                                           (2.2) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the bond yield for sovereign 𝑖  at time 𝑡  and 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is the bond yield for 
sovereign 𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 1. 
 
Following the methodology in Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(2000), Morset and Nørgaard (2011) and Mateev (2012) who have also investigated the 
effects of credit rating announcements using event studies, the S&P value-weighted All 
Africa index is used as the benchmark for calculating normal market returns. The S&P 
All Africa index is preferred because it is a comprehensive benchmark for the African 
continent constructed in US dollars, combining the constituents of the S&P Pan Africa, 
S&P South Africa Composite and S&P Zimbabwe BMI, covering companies listed in 13 
countries: Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The index is weighted by float-
adjusted market capitalisation and is Africa oriented as most of its listed companies 
operate purely in or derive the majority of their revenue from the African continent. To 
estimate the expected returns, the market model is applied. If we let the market index 
return be conditional expectation 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡), to estimate expected returns for sovereign 𝑖 at 
time 𝑡,  the market model is specified as follows:  
 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                                        (2.3) 
 
Given that 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0, 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑗) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  
 
Where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the stochastic error term, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are model parameters estimated by 
ordinary least squares regression, and 𝐸(𝑅𝑚𝑡) is expected market return at time 𝑡. 
 
To complement the market model in estimating expected returns, the study also 




econometric technique to estimate volatility clustering around SCR events. Unlike the 
market model, the GARCH model captures volatility clusters in returns from the reaction 
to the announcements of stock and bond markets of the rated country. As 




2 =  𝜔 + 𝛼1𝑢𝑡−1
2 … … … … . . +𝛼𝑝𝑢𝑡−𝑝
2 + 𝜙1𝜎𝑡−1
2 … … … … . +𝜙𝑞𝜎𝑡−𝑞
2            (2.4) 
 
𝜎𝑡








                                                                       (2.5)  
 
Where 𝜔, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are non-negative are constants equal to 1,  
𝛼𝑡 and  𝜙𝑡 are unknown coefficients, 𝑢𝑡−𝑝
2  are lagged errors, and  𝜎𝑡−𝑞
2  are lagged 
volatilities. 
 
The GARCH parameters are estimated by the Method of Maximum Likelihood (Reusens 
and Croux, 2015). The analysis also run the model using both the student-t and the 
GED distributions, to examine if they have significant effect on the results. It is 
hypothesised that if the GDP and interest rates (in the variance equation) are significant 
in the GARCH multivariate model, then their influence on bond and stock returns (in the 
linear equation) are significant. Thus they have exogenously significant influences on 
the volatility of capital market returns. As recommended in Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2003) and Sigworth (2007), the estimators of the GARCH model assumes that the 
residual term follows a standard normal distribution, as often applied in GARCH(1,1) 
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Once the parameters are estimated, predicted returns in the sovereign rating event 
window can be calculated by entering in the market returns. The abnormal return of a 
sovereign  𝑖, on a trading day 𝑡 (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡), is an index produced by Kothari and Warner 
(2007), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks (2012) and Hertel (2013) as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                           (2.7) 
 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return for a sovereign 𝑖’𝑠  stock index at time 𝑡 ,  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual return for a sovereign 𝑖’ s bond index at time 𝑡 , and  
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected return for a sovereign 𝑖 at time 𝑡. 
 
An event window period of 21 trading days16  around the SCR news is applied to 
estimate the expected return for both bond yield and stock returns. The 21 day event 
window is the average event window recommended by Kothari and Warner (2007) that 
allows the full effect of the information announcements to be included when assessing 
event reactions.  
 
After determining abnormal returns (ARs), if the influence of the event during the event 
window is not exclusively on the event date itself, it may be necessary to calculate the 
Average Abnormal Return (AAR) and the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR). These 
are used to assess the aggregate effect of the abnormal returns. The two analyses are 








                                                                                                                     (2.8) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅it = ∑ (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡−1)
+10
𝑡=−10
                                                                                                       (2.9) 
 
                                                          




Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return of a sovereign 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑁 is the sample size, 
which is the number of days in the event window. 
 
To test the significance of the event impact on the financial markets, t-statistics are 
calculated whether the sample returns significantly differ from expected return for all the 
abnormal returns within the event window (as in studies by Erbaş, 2005; Klimavičienė, 
2011; Mateev, 2012; Hertel, 2013; Ikram and Nugroho, 2014; Cooke and Bailey, 2015). 
The greater the magnitude of the t-statistic (either positive or negative), the greater the 
evidence that a SCR announcements have significant impacts, while the closer the t-
statistic is to 0, the more likely there is no significant impact. The time-series t-test of 





=   




                                                                      (10) 
 
Where 𝑡𝛼  is the student t-test at ∝ significance level, and 𝑆𝑡𝑑(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the standard error 
of abnormal returns of sovereign 𝑖 at time 𝑡. In line with the estimation of the market 
model in equation 3, the standard deviation is measured over the estimation window for 
the time series t-test. 
 
2.6 Empirical Results 
The results of the panel unit root tests presented in Table 2.1 show that the four series 
(10-year sovereign bond index, S&P benchmark bond index, country stock index and 
S&P All Africa stock index) are stationarity at the 1 percent level. Thus, the unit root test 
results show that the statistics of the series are time invariant, which fulfils the main 









Table 2.1: Panel Unit Root Test Results 
                  







S&P all Africa 
stock index 
                  
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -295,713 *** -339,784 *** -61,3595 *** -154,132 *** 
                  
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -273,2 *** -288,422 *** -66,566 *** -154,41 *** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  1037.91 ***  442.096 ***  2238.03 ***  2367.20 *** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  836.051 ***  442.096 ***  1467.38 ***  294.731 *** 
                  
*** represents significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 2.2 below presents the results of the GARCH multivariate model and as can be 
seen, the influence of interest rates and GDP on both the country stock and 10-year 
sovereign bond indices are significant. These results show that interest rates and GDP 
(the major variables reflecting the overall performance of an economy (Kaminsky and 
Schmukler, 2001; Hull et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2016)) have exogenously significant 
influences on the volatility of capital market returns. Additionally, both the ARCH and 
GARCH parameters are significant, which shows that volatility in financial markets is 
approximately a result of both internal and external variance. However, the GARCH 
parameters (coefficients) shown in Table 2.2 lie within the normal range prescribed by 
Corhay and Rad (1996) and Zivot and Wang (2006). For daily data, the GARCH 
reaction parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽  usually ranges below 0.98 (for relatively stable market) 
and above 0.98 (for a nervous market). This suggests that though there is significant 
external volatility from interest rates and GDP within the 21-day SCR event window, 
their combined variance pressure on security prices is not enough to significantly 
influence financial market stability. The S&P All Africa Index’s insignificant and small 
coefficient indicates that it does not significantly explain announcement responses of 
the country stock index. Hence, there is an insignificant association between a country’s 
stock index and the S&P All Africa Index, possibly reflecting the nascent state of Africa’s 





Table 2.2: GARCH Mean and Variance Regression  
              
Country Stock Index   10-Year Sovereign Bond Index 
              
C 0,815     C 0,005   
  2917,316 ***     5463,512 *** 
S&P All Africa Index 0,001     S&P Benchmark Index 0,013   
  0,883       224,315 *** 
              
Variance Equation:   Variance Equation: 
              
C 0,096     C 0,000   
  2088,600 ***     944,811 *** 
RESID(-1)^2 0,950     RESID(-1)^2 63,894   
  5,375 ***     4237,506 *** 
GARCH(-1) 0,001     GARCH(-1) 0,001   
  3,698 ***     99,084 *** 
GDP 0,958     INTEREST 0,001   
  -76,787 ***     83,257 *** 
INTEREST 0,965     GDP 0,007   
  -76,461 ***     -724,298 *** 
              
R-squared 0,393     R-squared 0,002   
Adjusted R-squared 0,393     Adjusted R-squared 0,002   
S.E. of regression 0,439     S.E. of regression 0,099   
Log likelihood 7794,845     Log likelihood 200436,100   
              
z-Statistic in italics. *** represents significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Having gained insight into the stationarity and external volatility behaviour of the 
variables, the discussion next turns to the results of the event study that sought to 
determine if financial markets react to SCR events announcements. Table 2.3 below 
presents a summary of SCR events announcements used to test the significance of 
abnormal returns (AR) in the 21-day event windows. The AR is averaged to give a 
general outcome of statistical significance using the t-test. The table shows that the 
average abnormal returns test statistics are not significant at the 5 percent (1.96) 
confidence interval within the 21-day window for all the countries except South Africa. 
This result could be because of the well-developed regulatory and legal framework in 
South Africa (Heerden Van et al., 2013), and the relatively larger stock exchange (the 




(Zhou and Sornette, 2009), which allows the country’s stock exchange and debt 
markets to offer leading technology, surveillance and quick settlements (Yartey, 2008). 
The results in Table 2.3 generally find no evidence of upward or downward drift in 
abnormal returns after a SCR announcement. It can therefore be argued that the 
information value of a SCR in African countries other than South Africa is too weak to 
significantly influence bond and stock prices, possibly because most of these financial 
markets are grossly underdeveloped with sporadic trading activities (Billmeier and 
Massa, 2007; Massa, 2009). 
 
While the average ARs for thirteen countries are significant at the 10 percent level 
(1.645)17, this may be a result of a combination of factors such as the Libyan Civil War, 
which caused the Libyan Financial Market to close in February 2011; some countries 
having no stock exchanges18; or a lack of liquidity19 and thus trading volume, which does 
not allow SCRs to be reflected in stock prices. The remaining ten countries20 show no 
sign of abnormal returns even at 10 percent significant level within the event window. 
These results are contrary to Cantor and Packer (1996), Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) 
and Agarwal et al.,  (2015) who find that stocks and bonds respond significantly to the 
announcements of changes in SCR downgrade in emerging economies but may reflect 
the structural deficiencies in these African financial markets, such as inadequate 
oversight and lack of adaptive regulatory structure21. Hence, these findings imply that 
SCR reports do not contain information of concern to investors in the ten countries with 
insignificant abnormal returns. 
 
 
                                                          
17 These countries are Botswana, Cape Verde, Egypt, Ghana and Lesotho, Libya, Morocco, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tunisia and Zambia. 
18 These include Ethiopia, DRC, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, and Lesotho. 
19  This could include countries that form part of the West African regional stock exchange Bourse 
Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières SA (BRVM), which includes Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), 
Benin, Mali, Senegal, Guinea, Bissau, Niger and Togo. 
20 Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Benin, Congo Republic, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, and 
Uganda. 
21 For example, Cameroon does not have an index because of a high number of failed trading. Since the 
establishment of Cameroon’s Douala Stock Exchange (DSX) in 2001, the exchange only had two listed 




Table 2.3: Summary of SCR events and average Abnormal Returns (AR) t-test 
     No. of  No. of  No. of  No. of  Average 
Country (Stock Index) Country (Bond Index) Downgrades Upgrades Outlooks Watchlist Abnormal 
 Returns-
t-test 
BSE (DCIBT) Botswana (SPFIBWU) 1 - 4 - 1,95* 
DSX Cameroon (SPFIEGC) 1 1 5 - 1,45 
BVC Cape Verde (SPSCBCV) 2 - 6 - 1,76* 
  Benin (SPFIBWN)            
BRVM (BRVMCI) Burkina Faso (SPFIEGB) 2 - 6 1 1,55 
  Senegal (SPFISNU)           
- Congo Republic 
(SPSCBCR) 
1 1 - - 1,05 
EGX 100 (EGX100) Egypt (SPFIEGU) 11 3 30 2 1,73* 
GSE (ASIX) Ghana (SPFIGHU) 2 1 6 - 1,86* 
- Gambia (SPFIKQGM) 2 - - - 1,24 
- Lesotho (SPFILSU) - 1 - - 1,77* 
LSM Libya (SPIFLYU) 4 - - - 1,87* 
NSE (NASI) Kenya (SPFIKEU) - - 2 - 1,22 
MSE (MALSMV) Malawi (SPFIMAU) 1 1 1 - 1,36 
SEM (MDEX) Mauritius (SPFIMUU) 1 - 2 3 1,5 
CasaSE (MASI) Morocco (SPFIMOU) 1 - 2 - 1,75* 
NSX(OVRLNM) Namibia (SPFINAU) - - 2 - 1,74* 
NSE (NGSEINDEX) Nigeria (SPFINGU) 1 1 4 - 1,91* 
RSE (ALSIRW) Rwanda (SPFIRWU) - 3 3 - 1,79* 
SSE Seychelles (SPFISYU) - 3 - - 1,77* 
JSE (FTWIZAFL) South Africa (SPFIZAU) 5 5 17 1 1,96** 
BVMT (TUNINDEX) Tunisia (SPFITNU) 9 4 6 2 1,93* 
USE (ALSIUG) Uganda (SPFIUGU) 1 - 3 - 1,06 
LuSE (LASILZ) Zambia (SPFIZMU) 2 - 4 - 1,94* 
              
* represents significance at 1 percent level (>2.575),  
** represent significance at 5 percent level (>1.960), and  
*** represents significance at 10 percent level (>1.645) 
 
The next step of the analysis is to test the significance of the returns using the AR t-test 
on the credit rating announcements. The results set out in Table 2.4 below show that a 
few countries with a BBB rating class react significantly negative in response to a SCR 
downgrade announcement (when they were thus downgraded from BBB+ to BBB), 
including Mauritius, Tunisia and South Africa (at the 5 percent (-1.96) significance level); 
and Namibia, Morocco and Mauritius (at the 10 percent (-1.645) significance level). The 
remaining countries do not show significant evidence of abnormal returns when a SCR 




that are already perceived to be risky (below investment grade and almost perennially 
on the CRA’s watchlist), do not react significantly to SCR downgrade announcements. 
This accords with Michaelides et al. (2015) and Mohapatra (2016), who report that SCR 
announcements generate stronger market reactions in markets that are susceptible to 
information asymmetry, such as in emerging market economies. 
 
Table 2.4 further shows that there has been a relatively few number of SCR upgrades 
announcements, suggesting that in Africa, once a sovereign is downgraded, upgrading 
thereafter is difficult. In addition, almost all SCR upgrades show no significant sign of 
abnormal returns both at the 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels. This is also 
consistent with Dallocchio et al. (2006) and Mateev (2012) who observed no significant 
abnormal returns after a SCR upgrade announcements. A possible reason for this result 
is that investors tend to be more cautious about downside risk and passive on the 






Table 2.4: SCR Significance Test Results 
  Sovereign Credit Downgrades Significance Scale 
Credit Rating Scale for  [<-1.96] [-1.96;-1.65] [-1.64;-1.28] [-1.27;1.27] [1.28;1.64;] [1.65;1.96] [1.96]> 
Fitch/S&P (Moody)               
A (A2) to A- (A3) - - 1 - - - - 
A- (A3) to BBB+ (Baa1) - - - 1 - - - 
BBB+ (Baa1) to BBB (Baa2) 2 1 1 1 - - - 
BBB (Baa2) to BBB- (Baa3) - - 2 2 - - - 
BBB- (Baa3) to BB+ (Ba1) - - 3 4 - - - 
BB+ (Ba1) to BB (Ba2) - - 3 2 - - - 
BB (Ba2) to BB-(Ba3) - - 3 2 - - - 
BB- (Ba3) to B+(B1) - - - 3 - - - 
B+ (B1) to B (B2)  - - - 2 - - - 
B (B2) to B- (B3) - - - 2 - - - 
B- (B3) to CCC+ (Caa1) - - - 1 - - - 
CCC+ (Caa1) to CCC (Caa2) - - - 1 - - - 
                
  Sovereign Credit Upgrades Significance Scale 
Credit Rating Scale for [<-1.96] [-1.96;-1.65] [-1.64;-1.28] [-1.27;1.27] [1.28;1.64;] [1.65;1.96] [1.96]> 
 Fitch/S&P (Moody)               
A- (A3) to A (A2)   - -  1 -  -  -  - 
BBB+ (Baa1) to A- (A3)  - - -  - -  -  - 
BBB (Baa2) to BBB+ (Baa1)  -  - - 1 -  -  - 
BBB- (Baa3) to BBB (Baa2)  -  - - -  -  -  - 
BB+ (Ba1) to BBB- (Baa3)   -  -  - 1  -  -  - 
BB (Ba2) to BB+ (Ba1) -  - - 2 -  -  - 
BB-(Ba3) to BB (Ba2)  -  - - 1 -  -  - 
B+(B1) to BB- (Ba3)  -  - - 2 -  -  - 
B (B2) to B+ (B1) -  - - 2 1 2  - 
B- (B3) to B (B2) -  - - 1 2  -  - 
CCC+ (Caa1) to B- (B3)  -  - - 1 1  -  - 
                
>+/- 2.575 represents significance at 1 percent level  
>+/- 1.960 represent significance at 5 percent level, and  
>+/- 1.645 represents significance at 10 percent level  
 
The effects of a SCR negative outlook announcement are shown in Table 2.5 below. Out 
of the 92 SCR negative outlook changes, only 8 events show significantly negative 
abnormal returns at the 5 percent level and 46 at the 10 percent significance level. 
These results suggest that a negative outlook has a significant impact on the majority of 
African financial markets, possibly because assigning a negative outlook is a signal of 
an impending downgrade (Konijna and Rijkena, 2011; Crosta, 2014; Baum et al., 2016). 




when preceded by a negative outlook. 
 
However, for the same SCR negative outlook announcement presented in Table 2.5, 
there are 4 events that show a significantly positive reaction at the 10 percent 
significance level. These significantly positive abnormal returns following a negative 
outlook announcement are contrary to Konijna and Rijkena (2011) and Crosta (2014)’s 
findings that a SCR downgrade and a negative outlook announcement leads to an 
immediate significant negative abnormal return reaction upon announcement. This 
suggests that the positive abnormal returns could be driven by other fundamental 
economic variables rather than the rating announcements, or by  speculation about the 
SCR change before the announcement dates thus pushing the security returns in the 
opposite direction (Hertel, 2013; Jansen and Nikiforov, 2015).  
 
The results for the positive outlook presented in Table 2.5 indicate that African countries 
had a total of 9 SCR positive outlook announcements during the period 1994 to 2014, 
with only 4 events showing significantly negative abnormal market reactions at the 10 
percent level. The remaining 5 outlook events show insignificant returns at the 10 
percent significance level, which indicates that the market is not moved by positive 
outlook announcements; and therefore, there are no abnormal returns. Unlike previous 
studies by Konijna and Rijkena (2011), Hertel (2013), Crosta (2014) and Baum et al. 
(2016) who combine both positive and negative outlooks in their analysis, this study 
observes that positive outlooks are not relevant information to investors, and thus there 
are no significant excess returns for the positive outlooks. Hence, the results imply that 






Table 2.5: SCR Outlook Significance Test Results 
      
 
        
  Sovereign Credit Negative Outlook Significance Scale 
Credit Rating Scale for [<-1.96] [-1.96;-1.65] [-1.64;-1.28] [-1.27;1.27] [1.28;1.64;] [1.65;1.96] [1.96]> 
Fitch/S&P/Moody               
Positive to Stable  - 4 21 18 5 2 -  
Stable to Negative 1 2 19 15 4 1 -  
Under review (Watch) 1  - 6 8 5 1 -  
                
  Sovereign Credit Positive Outlook Significance Scale 
Credit Rating Scale for [<-1.96] [-1.96;-1.65] [-1.64;-1.28] [-1.27;1.27] [1.28;1.64;] [1.65;1.96] [1.96]> 
Fitch/S&P/Moody               
Negative to Stable - 4 - 1 - -  - 
Stable to Positive -  - 4  - -  -  - 
                
>+/- 2.575 represents significance at 1 percent level  
>+/- 1.960 represent significance at 5 percent level, and  
>+/- 1.645 represents significance at 10 percent level  
 
Thus in summary, the results show that the observed pattern of credit rating 
announcements provide weak and inconsistent informational content to Africa’s 
emerging financial markets. The information value of a SCR in African countries other 
than South Africa is too weak to significantly influence bond and a stock prices. In 
addition, the extent of the market reaction varies depending on the type of credit rating 
information. Evidence suggests that the effect of SCR upgrades and positive outlook 
changes on both bond and stock markets is insignificant whilst a downgrade and 
negative outlook has a weakly significant impact on the majority of African financial 
markets, possibly because investors are more conscious about the downside risk and 
passive on the upside. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined whether a sovereign rating announcement influences excess 
bond and equity returns in 30 African countries that received a SCR during the period 
1994 to 2014. The results of GARCH and event study analysis finds that the African 
financial markets are weakly sensitive to SCR announcements, which implies that there 
is no significant evidence of excess market returns influenced by sovereign credit rating 




ratings do not significantly change the African capital markets because they are already 
perceived to be risky markets, and thus attract mostly passive and long-term investors. 
Most of the African countries’ SCRs are below investment grade and consequently 
suffer from illiquidity challenges. These results further suggest that both foreign and 
domestic investors in African financial markets are resilient when investing in low growth 
economies that have uncertainties associated with sub-investment grade credit ratings. 
Thus, these results indicate that the hypothesis that CRAs may be contributing to the 
instability of financial markets in emerging countries (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001; 

















WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF A SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATING ON BOND 
AND EQUITIES MARKETS? 
 
3.1 Summary abstract 
This chapter investigates the net effect of sovereign credit rating announcements on 
long-term foreign currency denominated bonds and stock markets in 19 African 
countries over the period of 1994 to 2014. Using a combination of Granger Causality 
tests and Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) models, the results show that there is 
a positive relationship between Africa’s stock and bond markets, but weak positive 
associations between sovereign credit ratings and bond and stock markets. These 
results imply that both stocks and bonds react negatively (positively) to sovereign credit 
downgrade (upgrade) announcements. The chapter further finds that sovereign rating 
changes affect bond prices more than stock prices because of the volatility in the 




Historically, rising stock prices are associated with rising bond yields and falling bond 
prices (Stivers and Sun, 2002) because investors commonly sell bonds to raise money 
to buy stocks and sell stocks to raise money to buy bonds (Maslov and Roehner, 2004). 
Hence, stocks and bond prices move in opposite directions because of their inverse 
responses to macroeconomic fundamentals and thus the type of securities that 
investors buy reflects their level of confidence in the future of a country’s economy 
(Zaima and McCarthy, 1988). For example, when investors are optimistic about future 
economic growth prospects, they invest more in stocks, which offers a higher return in 
the long-term but are perceived to be a riskier asset class because they are volatile in 
the short-term and there is no guarantee of positive returns. In contrast, when they are 




a fixed rate of return, which may only increase if the country’s risk profile increases and 
thus their prices are less volatile than stock prices (Chen et al., 2014). However, over 
the last decade, stocks and bond prices have begun to show signs of a positive 
correlation, possibly as a result of quantitative easing (Favero et al., 2010) and low 
inflation expectations, which influence securities prices through their interest rate 
component (Rankin and Idil, 2014). The movements of stock and bond prices is also 
affected by portfolio reallocation whereby capital flows across countries’ borders as 
foreign investors invest or divest from both stocks and bonds. 
 
On the other hand, the efficient market hypothesis argues that financial markets are 
driven by investors’ reactions to new information (Fama, et al., 1969). Thus, investors 
reduce their required rate of return when new information is positive and vice-versa 
(Alexeev and Tapon, 2011). Hence, a sovereign rating downgrade (upgrade) is 
considered to be negative (positive) information by the market (Hand et al., 1992; 
Ammer and Clinton, 2004; Mateev, 2012) whereby, a SCR announcement should lead 
to either a positive (upgrade) or negative (downgrade) stock market and bond market 
reaction. However, empirical evidence of this effect on both stock and bond markets is 
still inconclusive, as Zaima and McCarthy (1988) and Goh and Ederington (1993) argue, 
it is possible that rating downgrades do not necessarily have negative implications for 
stockholders because investors can transfer funds from bonds into stocks when a 
country is downgraded.  
 
Relevant studies report conflicting evidence and inconsistent conclusions with regard to 
the relationship between the three variables of sovereign credit ratings, bond markets 
and stock markets. It can be hypothesised that if stocks and bond prices move in 
opposite directions because of their inverse responses to macroeconomic fundamentals 
(Stivers and Sun, 2002; Maslov and Roehner, 2004), then a SCR downgrade (upgrade) 
should lead to a negative (positive) reaction from either bonds or stock prices. On the 
other hand, if a sovereign rating downgrade (upgrade) is considered to be negative 
(positive) information by both the stocks and bond markets (Hand et al., 1992; Ammer 




negative (positive) reaction from both bonds or stock prices. Hence, this chapter 
contributes to the SCR literature by examining the relationship between three variables; 
sovereign credit ratings, bond market and stock market using developing countries data 
so as to determine how each one react to a change in the other. 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between SCR announcements, stocks returns 
and bond returns in 19 African countries over the period of 1994 to 2014, this chapter 
uses Granger Causality test and Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) models to 
answer the following three questions: (i) do stocks and bonds react negatively (positive) 
to a sovereign credit downgrade (upgrade); (ii) how do stockholders and bondholders 
adjust their required return following a SCR change, and (iii), what is the association 
between Africa’s bond and stock returns following SCR announcements? The remainder 
of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the literature devoted to 
investigating the net effect of SCR announcements on bond and stock markets, and the 
association between stocks and bonds in the context of credit rating changes. Section 
3.3 then describes the stock returns, bond returns and sovereign rating data. Section 
3.4 next presents the Granger Causality and Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
Generalised Autoregression Conditional Heteroskedasticity (DCC-GARCH) 
methodologies used to conduct the analysis. The findings are discussed in Section 3.5, 
and the study then concludes with a summary of key findings in Section 3.6.  
 
3.3 Literature Review 
Over the last decade, a large body of literature has explored the impact of SCR 
changes on financial markets, but only a few studies have been devoted to investigating 
the net effect of SCR announcements on bond and stock markets, and very few have 
examined the effect on markets in Africa. This literature review proceeds as follows. 
First, studies that are devoted to investigating whether bonds and stock returns react 
positively (negatively) to SCR upgrades (downgrades) are discussed. Thereafter, the 
literature on the association between stocks and bonds in the context of credit rating 
changes are explored. The literature review then concludes with a summary of studies 





Amongst the first to argue that stockholders do not react negatively to sovereign 
downgrades are Zaima and McCarthy (1988), who apply a wealth redistribution analysis 
on Standard and Poor's credit rating announcements between 1980 to 1981. They 
report that sovereign rating downgrades are accompanied by positive stock returns and 
widening bond spreads. Hence, they conclude that if a SCR changes, financial market 
reactions are a result of investors redistributing their wealth from bonds to stocks 
because a sovereign downgrade increases the default risk premium, bond yields, and 
investors’ required return; which affects the bond prices more than stock returns.  
 
Goh and Ederington (1993) concur with Zaima and McCarthy (1988) in arguing that a 
downgrade does not necessarily have negative implications for stockholders. However, 
Goh and Ederington further classify the rating downgrades into two classes: 
downgrades due to a country’s deteriorating economic prospects and downgrades due 
to an increase in sovereign debt. They apply an event study methodology to investigate 
reactions of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) following Moody's announcements 
between 1984 and 1986. The results show that downgrades caused by deteriorating 
economic prospects have negative implications for stockholders because it reflects 
CRA’s expectations of the sovereign’s future income. In contrast, downgrades because 
of increased sovereign debt has a positive effect because it is generally a response to 
past known debt increases. Thus, when bonds are downgraded because the rating 
agencies foresee an increase in leverage, investors transfer funds from bonds to stocks, 
which cause bond returns to fall and stock returns to rise. 
 
Dhillon and Johnson (1994) test the effects of economic productivity by examining how 
stock and bond prices reacted to 11 140 rating changes occurring between 1978 and 
1987. They apply the mean-adjusted returns methodology to analyse bond and stock 
returns and find that a downgrade as a result of decreased productivity growth drives 
both the bonds and stocks down. Thus, the results support the findings of Goh and 
Ederington (1993) that both debt and stock markets are conditioned by expectations. 




based on projections, forecasts and expections of inside information, then both bonds 
and stocks react in the same direction.  
 
Goh and Ederington (1999) apply an event study method to 1526 bond rating changes 
by Moody's between 1984 and 1990 to investigate whether downgrades caused by 
deteriorating economic prospects have negative implications for both stockholders and 
bondholders because it reflects CRA’s expectations of the sovereign’s future income. 
Their results find that the stock market reacts negatively (positively) to rating 
downgrades (upgrades) at the lower (higher) end of the rating scale such as at the 
substantial risk (prime) grade. Therefore, they conclude that the rating category, 
together with investors’s expections and the economic status of a nation determines the 
reaction of security-holders to credit rating changes.  
 
Similary, Kim and Nabar (2003) hypothesise that there is a cost imposed on bonds and 
stocks by sovereign downgrades information conveyed by CRAs. Their analysis uses 
the 184 stocks listed on NASDAQ and bond rating downgrades from Moody’s Bond 
Survey for the period 1991 to 1995. The results of cross-sectional analysis support the 
cost imposition hypothesis as they find that firms’ stock returns are positively related 
with their institutional stockholdings. Their findings suggest that, companies that have 
low-to-no institutional stockholding generate stronger negative stock and bond reactions 
because the rating agency becomes an important information provider. Also, in 
accordance with the pecking order of capital structure (Myers and Majluf, 1984), these 
companies are usually unable to generate enough cash internally, hence they turn to 
debt funding. Thus, they conclude that both bonds and stock returns of companies with 
high market-to-book values and high debt-to-equity ratios react significantly negative to 
bond downgrades.  
 
Additionally, Leonard and Olinsky (2013) find support for Linciano (2004) after 
examining the impact of a bond downgrade on stock prices using an event study 
methodology on 20 271 downgrades from the three major rating agencies on publicly 




the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P500) index between 2001 and 2011. Both studies find 
no statistically significant stock market reactions following a rating downgrade. However, 
Leonard and Olinsky argue that equity investors do not react significantly to downgrade 
announcements because the risk is already reflected in the company’s stock prices 
while Linciano posits that stock prices do not respond immediately after a downgrade 
but rather gradually, which becomes statistically significant over time.  
 
Gande and Parsley (2014) hypothesise that the most likely action investors take after a 
SCR downgrade is to transfer funds from bonds to stocks as bond yields and interest 
rates increase because of increased risk exposure whilst equity values decrease due to 
rising cost of capital. To test their hypothesis, Gande and Parsley examine the variance 
of firms’ future cash flows to determine how they respond to sovereign bond rating 
downgrades. In line with Goh and Ederington (1993) and Zaima and McCarthy (1988), 
the results affirm their hypothesis and thus they conclude that stockholders are 
inherently holding an option on the value of the firm with an exercise price equal to the 
par value of the firm's debt. Therefore, an increase in the variance of the firm's cash 
flows pushes investors to redistribute funds from bonds to stocks.  
 
Harumi and Tatsuyoshi (2015) find support for studies by Zaima and McCarthy (1988), 
Goh and Ederington (1993) and Gande and Parsley (2014) after examining the 
relationship between stock and bond returns. Using a smooth transition regression 
(STR) model to examine the volatility index (VIX), short rate and yield spread on the 
S&P 500, Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) and Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 
monthly data for the period 1991 to 2012, they find that when a sovereign rating profile 
is downgraded, stocks respond positively as investors engage in an intensive ‘flight-to-
quality’ behaviour, withdrawing from bonds to stocks and thus causing stock (bond) 
prices to rise (fall). However, they further find that the reaction is not constant over-time 
as the business cycle fluctuations have significant effects on risk management and 
asset allocation. Hence, some mean-reverting reactions of stock and bond returns after 
a downgrade may be observed. Thus, they argue that the reason behind a sovereign 





The majority of studies analysed so far have shown that sovereign rating downgrades 
are accompanied by positive stock returns and widening bond spreads as investors 
redistribute their wealth between stocks and bonds. However, as will be explored below, 
other studies counter that the reaction of each class of securities following a credit 
downgrade depends on the association between them. Thus, a number of studies have 
recently observed that there is evidence of a positive association between stocks and 
bonds following sovereign downgrades, further raising concerns of high portfolio risk 
amongst portfolio managers when a market variable such as sovereign rating changes. 
Conversely, other studies argue that the stock-bond association is time variant, and 
depends on the credit rating information announced. Despite conflicting evidence on the 
stock-bond association, portfolio investors usually prefer a mix of bonds and stocks for 
diversification (Rua and Nunes, 2009).  
 
Flor and Hesel (2015) argue that there are differential relationships between SCR 
downgrades and intra-regional stock-bond return correlations, which are largely due to a 
common-lender effect in financial markets. Applying ordinary differential equations to 
analyse the differential relationship between SCR downgrades and intra-regional stock-
bond return correlations, they find that similar to Shiller and Beltratti (1992), Campbell 
and Ammer (1993), Chan et al. (1997), Engsted and Tanggaard (2001), Stivers and Sun 
(2002), Guidolin and Timmermann (2005) and Andersen et al. (2007), there is a positive 
stock-bond return association. However, they further argue that sovereign upgrades are 
commonly associated with periods of monetary easing as the return correlation tends to 
rise accordingly; while downgrades trigger monetary tightening, leading to a decrease in 
the stock-bond association. Thus, they conclude that the positive stock-bond 
relationship is largely driven by the common discount rate effect between bond and 
stock market variables. 
 
In contrast to the studies discussed above, another body of literature argues that the 
relationship between bond and stock returns is mostly negative, as funds are 




stock and bond returns generally do not have a statistically significant association 
because the collective behaviour of investors loses some of its effect over time. Using 
quasi-experimental approach on the U.S. 10-year Treasury yields and the New York 
stock market index during the period 1954 to 2003 to test the reaction between stocks 
and bonds in response to a SCR change, they observe that stock returns have a strong 
correlation, but the negative stock-bond return correlations following market shocks fade 
away in over time. Thus, they argue that the decreasing stock-bond association points 
to a drastic change in the behaviour of investors following fundamental news 
dissemination. Hence, investors respond to sovereign downgrades by selling all their 
risky assets (such as stocks) to buy non-risky assets (such as Treasury bills and bonds) 
because of increase in credit risk. 
 
Another set of studies further argues that the relationship between stocks and bond 
returns following a sovereign rating change depends on exogenous conditions. 
Andersen et al. (2007) argue that negative news such as sovereign downgrades only 
have a positive (negative) impact on the stock-bond relationship during economic 
expansions (contractions). They use structural GARCH and Lucas models to investigate 
the correlation between stock and bond returns and the effects of macroeconomic news 
announcements on the S&P500, FTSE100 and 30-Year United States (US) Treasury 
bond from 1998 to 2008. Their analysis shows that there is significant evidence that 
there are cashflow and discount rate effects which influence the stock-bond correlations, 
triggered by sovereign rating changes. Furthermore, they argue that the cashflow effect 
(discount rate effect) is usually more pronounced during economic contractions 
(expansions) resulting in low-to-negative (positive) stock-bond return correlations. 
Hence, they conclude that equity markets react differently to the same news depending 
on the state of the economy compared to bond market reactions. 
 
Following Maslov and Roehner (2004)’s conclusion, Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) 
hypothesize that there are country cross-asset effects caused by interactions between 
rating changes and securities returns, which triggers the collective behaviour of 




an event study technique on a comprehensive database of 34 countries covering the 
major regions in the world over the period 1990 to 2000 to examine the financial market 
impact of changes in ratings of one type of security on other assets. The results show 
that investors respond significantly to a downgrade across asset classes in times of a 
relatively healthy economy (as proxied by low inflation, high liquidity, low current 
account and low foreign currency debt), thus confirming their hypothesis. Hence, in 
accordance with Andersen et al. (2007), Pukthuanthong-Le et al. conclude that stocks 
outperform bonds during economic expansions whereas bonds outperform stocks 
during economic contractions, but either way there is a negative return correlation. 
 
Johnson et al. (2013) counters that when inflation falls, it is not necessarily true that 
stock and bonds returns become negative because every business has its own cycle. 
Using an error correction model, they analyse the behaviour of the 10-year US Treasury 
bond yield against the S&P50022 over the period from 1927 to 2013. They find that in 
the short run, the stock-bond correlation is negative as long as the business cycle 
dominates the effects of rates and inflation; whereas in the long run, the correlation may 
be higher and even positive due to the influence of inflation, risk aversion, and the 
smoothing of business cycles. Hence, they conclude that credit downgrades are among 
the key drivers of macroeconomic risk, and are thus responsible for a significant portion 
of the dynamics of stock-bond returns correlation.  
 
In addition to whether stocks and bond returns have a positive or negative reaction to 
ratings changes, another group of studies investigates whether the stock-bond 
relationship is time variant. Ilmanen (2003) examines the correlation of U.S. stock and 
bond returns from 1929 to 2001 using regression equations, GARCH models and 
Granger causality tests following downgrade events. The results show that the stock-
bond correlation is positive, except for the periods of 1929 to 1932, 1956 to 1965, and 
1998 to 2001. Furthermore, he finds that the underlying causes of positive and negative 
stock-bond return correlations are economic and monetary policy cycles, inflation rates, 
and volatility shocks. Therefore, he argues that there is a positive causality from bond 
                                                          




prices to stock prices resulting in positive stock-bond correlation as falling bond yields 
also cause discount rates to fall, whilst causality from stock prices to bond prices is 
negative. He concludes that in times of monetary easing, a positive correlation is 
evident because the prices of both bonds and stocks rise, whereas they decrease 
during monetary tightening. Hence, the changing stock-bond correlation is a sign of 
changing causality between the stock and bond markets following a sovereign 
downgrade.  
 
Following Ilmanen (2003)’s recommendations, Christopher et al. (2012) investigates the 
transitory effects of SCRs on time-varying stock and bond market correlations by 
employing a bivariate GARCH (1,1) model with Engle’s three-stage dynamic conditional 
correlation (DCC) estimation methodology covering a sample 19 emerging countries 
over the period 1994 to 2007. Similar to Ilmanen (2003) and Andersson et al., (2008), 
Christopher et al. finds that stock and bond market co-movements within a region 
respond heterogeneously to sovereign ratings information. However, they argue that 
there is usually significant capital flight if a country with higher foreign currency debt is 
downgraded as investors are sensitive to default risk emanating from foreign currency 
debt. Thus, Christopher et al. concludes that investors shift their funds from 
downgraded countries with high foreign currency debt into the surrounding neighbouring 
countries within the region with low foreign currency debt. 
 
Thus in summary, the central theme of these studies is that bond and stock market 
returns are conditioned by investors’ expectations. And the state of economy during 
sovereign rating action determines the security that performs best. Therefore, sovereign 
downgrades do not necessarily have negative implications for all security-holders. 
Given that the relationship between stock and bond returns has always been of interest, 
one group of literature concludes that the positive or negative correlation between 
stocks and bonds is driven by stock market uncertainty emanating from sovereign rating 
actions. Conversely, other studies observe time variant stock-bond return correlations 
because markets react differently to the same news depending on the type of news and 




bond and stock returns, investors still prefer a mix of bonds and stocks as an asset 
allocation strategy to diversify their portfolios and enhance their overall portfolio 
performance. 
 
3.4 Data Description 
The empirical analysis makes use of the daily bond yield, daily stock returns and 
sovereign ratings announcements of 19 African countries that received a SCR by any or 
all of the three largest CRAs (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) over the period 
of 1994 to 2014.23 Whilst there are 30 African countries with SCRs, 6 of them were 
excluded from the sample as they do not have both functional stock exchange and 
active bond market whilst the analysis requires data on both capital markets. To 
examine the net effect of credit rating announcements, the empirical analysis follows 
Afonso et al. (2011) by linearly transforming the rating symbols used by the three 
international rating agencies from ordinal rating scales into numbers. Table 3.1 below 
shows the rating scales used by the three international rating agencies whereby a 
higher credit rating denotes a lower probability of default and vice versa. Although S&P 
and Fitch use different symbols from Moody’s in assessing sovereign risk, the 










                                                          
23 These include Burkina Faso, Benin, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, 





Table 3.1: S&P, Moody's and Fitch rating system 
Characterization of debt 
and issuer Rating Linear transformation 
  S&P Moody's Fitch  
Highest quality AAA Aaa AAA 23 
High quality 
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 22 
AA Aa2 AA 21 
AA- Aa3 AA- 20 
Strong payment capacity 
A+ A1 A+ 19 
A A2 A 18 
A- A3 A- 17 
Adequate payment capacity 
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 16 
BBB Baa2 BBB 15 
BBB- Baa3 BBB- 14 
Likely to fulfil obligations, 
ongoing uncertainty 
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 13 
BB Ba2 BB 12 
BB- Ba3 BB- 11 
High credit risk 
B+ B1 B+ 10 
B B2 B 9 
B- B3 B- 8 
Very high credit risk 
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+ 7 
CCC Caa2 CCC 6 
CCC- Caa3 CCC- 5 
Near default with possibility 
of recovery 
CC Ca CC 4 
  C 3 
Default SD C DDD 2 
  D  DD 1 
    D 0 
 
Furthermore, so as to consider other sovereign rating announcements, such as rating 
outlooks and addition to credit watchlist (under review), a change in a rating outlook to 
positive (negative) is accounted for by adding 0.5 (-0.5) to one credit rating notch, while 
a positive (negative) credit watch is accounted for by adding 0.25 (-0.25) to one rating-
notch. The data for the three independent variables is analysed at first difference to 
capture changes over time. 
 




sovereign bond indices, which track the performance of both local and foreign currency-
denominated sovereign bonds. The index is designed specifically for Africa’s emerging 
debt markets. To measure stock market performance, the daily S&P value-weighted 
stock indices denominated in United States dollars is used. These stock indices are 
weighted by float-adjusted market capitalisation and are African-oriented (the majority of 
listed companies operate purely in or derive the majority of their revenue from the 
African continent). The daily index returns accurately capture asset co-movements at a 
higher frequency in line with Zaima and McCarthy (1988), Goh and Ederington (1993), 
Kim and Nabar (2003) and Christopher et al. (2012). The bond and stock market data 
was obtained from Bloomberg and Reuters, while the SCR data was obtained from the 
respective credit rating websites. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
The analysis of the net effect of sovereign ratings on both stocks and bond returns 
makes use of the Granger causality test (Granger, 1988) to investigate the possible 
causal relationships between the factors. It is hypothesized that if foreign currency 
denominated bond (stock) returns Granger cause stock (bond) returns, then investors 
prefer to buy bonds (stocks), which they sell when a sovereign rating is downgraded to 
raise funds to buy stocks (bonds). Hence, bonds (stocks) react negatively (positive) to a 
sovereign credit downgrade (upgrade). As Granger (1988) proposed, the study tests the 
following hypothesis for identification of a causal effect of the stock market on the bond 
market and vice versa: 
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑡+1  ∈ 𝐴|Ω𝑡)  ≠ 𝑃(𝑌𝑡+1  ∈ 𝐴|Ω−𝑥(𝑡))                                                                              (3.1)  
 
Where 𝑃 is the probability, 𝐴 is the set of security returns, 𝛺𝑡 is the information available 
at time t in the market, and 𝛺−𝑥(𝑡) is the modified market where the information Ωt is 
excluded. 
 












+ 𝜀1𝑖                                                                     (3.2) 






+ 𝜀2𝑖                                                                     (3.3) 
 
Where 𝑛 is the number of lags that adequately models the dynamic structure, 𝜀𝑖 are 
white noise error terms, 𝑥 represents stock returns, 𝑦 represents bond returns, and βi 
are constant coefficients. 
 
Thereafter, to determine whether the model satisfies best fit requirements, the F-statistic 
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                              (3.4) 
 
Where ?̅?𝑖 denotes the sample mean for country i, 𝑛𝑖 is the number of observations for 
each country, ?̅? is the overall mean of the data, 𝐾 is the number of countries, and 𝑁 −
𝐾 and 𝑁 − 1 are degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. 
 
Having examined the causal relationships among the factors, the next step of the 
analysis is to investigate the associations between stocks and bond returns using the 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation analysis, a multivariate Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (DCC-GARCH) model proposed by Engle (2002) in 
accordance with D’Addona and Kind (2006), Andersson et al., (2008), Peng and Deng 
(2010) and Gusset and Zimmwemann (2015). Examining the association between stock 
and bond returns is important in understanding the direction of their response when 
market fundamentals change. Thus, it is hypothesized that if the relationship between 




same direction in response to the same sovereign rating change.  
 
The advantage of using the DCC-GARCH model is that it detects possible changes in 
conditional correlations over time, which also captures the dynamic investor behaviour 
in response to news and innovations. It further estimates correlation coefficients of the 
standardized residuals and directly accounts for heteroskedasticity. Thus, the DCC-
GARCH model estimates the time varying correlation in stock and bond returns better 
than constant correlation. As recommended by Peng and Deng (2010), the DCC-
GARCH (1, 1) is a more accurate dynamic correlation process, which is determined as 
follows; 
 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                          (3.5)                                                                             
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽𝑖𝜎𝑖𝑡−1
2                                                                                                  (3.6) 




                                                                                                                                     (3.8) 
 
Where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 represents the return on asset i at time t, 𝜎𝑖𝑡 is the conditional volatility of asset 
i at time t, 𝜎𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the time 𝑡 conditional covariance between assets 𝑖 and 𝑗, and 𝜎𝑖𝑗 is the 
unconditional expectation of the cross product 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑗𝑡. 
 
3.6 Empirical Results 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the panel unit root tests, which show significant 
evidence that the residuals of the three series (10-year sovereign bond index, SCR and 
country stock index) are first difference stationary at the 1 percent level. Hence, their 
joint probability distribution remains constant when shifted in time (Lee et al., 2010), 
which indicates that the processes are mean-reverting and stochastic shocks have 







Table 3.2: Panel Unit Root Test Results 
 
10-year sovereign 
bond index Sovereign credit rating Country stock index 
  t-Statistic Probability t-Statistic Probability t-Statistic Probability 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -119.846  0.000*** -1.28 0.100 -151.154  0.000*** 
       Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin 
W-stat  -149.893  0.000*** -0.532 0.297 -148.316  0.000*** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  2905.270  0.000*** 51.787 0.026***  2985.220  0.000*** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  313.152  0.000*** 50.513 0.034***  313.152  0.000*** 
              
*** represents significance at 1 percent level 
 
The next step of the analysis is to test the causality between credit rating and securities 
returns using the Granger Causality test (Granger, 1988). The results set out in Table 
3.3 below show that the null hypothesis of no Granger causality running from the 
country stock index to the 10-year sovereign bond index can be rejected at the 1 
percent significance level. However, there is no significant evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that the 10-year sovereign bond index does not have a unidirectional 
Granger causal relationship with the country stock index. Thus, the results indicate that 
there is unidirectional causality running from stocks to bonds but not in reverse, which 
suggests that a change in stock prices provide a cue to investors to take a position in 
the bond markets. This result contrasts with Maslov and Roehner (2004) who used a 
quasi-experimental approach to study the U.S. financial market, and report that 
investors commonly prefer bonds first. The contrasting finding could be a result of the 
long-term revenue growth rate, simple business models and consistently high 
profitability in most Africa listed companies (Hou et al., 2013; Mu et al., 2013; Mcmillan 
and Harttgen, 2014), which drives stock returns up. 
 
Furthermore, the test finds no significant evidence of Granger causality between credit 
ratings and the stock index. This result accords with Linciano (2004) and Leonard and 
Olinsky (2013) who argue that equity investors do not react significantly to sovereign 




prices. Kenny and Moss (1998) and Wallace and Sivabalan (2015) further argue that 
investors have the perception that African stocks are risky because of political 
uncertainty, excessive economic booms and busts, and policy inconsistency. Thus, 
Yartey and Komla (2007) suggest that Africa stocks attract capital from risk tolarent 
investors who factor in high risk levels against possible high returns. Similarly, 
Andrianaivo and Yartey (2009) show that investors in Africa have skills to carefully 
evaluate economic and financial fundamentals, especially trade and fiscal balances. 
Subsequently, the result of this study find support for Yartey (2010) who argues that in 
Africa, stockholders’ required return accounts for unexpected developments in the 
countries’ political and economic climate. 
 
The results in Table 3.3 also show that the null hypothesis of no Granger causality 
running from the SCR to the 10-year sovereign bond index can be rejected at the 1 
percent significance level. In contrast, there is no evidence to reject the hypothesis that 
the 10-year sovereign bond index does not Granger cause a SCR. Thus, the results 
show that there is unidirectional causality running from sovereign ratings to bonds but 
not in reverse, which suggests that a credit rating change triggers a significant reaction 
in bond yields and prices. This finding accords with Zaima and McCarthy (1988) and 
Goh and Ederington (1993) who argue that a sovereign rating change does not 
necessarily have the same implications for both stockholders and bondholders because 
a sovereign downgrade increases the default risk premium, bond yields, and investors’ 
required return, which thus affects bond prices more significantly than stock returns. 
These findings accord with Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), who argue that the effect of 
a change in a sovereign rating profile is determined by the asset class that investors 
perceive to be safer when seeking to preserve their investment. 
 
Three reasons can be advocated to explain investors’ preference for holding stocks over 
bonds in Africa’s markets. First, investors seek value for their investment (Chen et al., 
2005), and emerging markets stocks, despite their volatility, are cheaper and provide 
higher potential returns than bonds (Estrada, 2009; Hirshleifer et al., 2013). Second, 




percent discount to developed markets stocks due to relatively low profitability (Assefa 
and Mollick, 2014). Lastly, investors are prone to ‘flight-to-quality and safety’, and thus 
they divest from stocks when returns and quality are not consumerate with their risk 
appetite causing prices to fall and investment in safer asset class to increase driving up 
prices accordingly (Harumi and Tatsuyoshi, 2015). 
 
Table 3.3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Lags 2 4 6 8 
 F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  
Z→Y 8.738 0.000* 4.311 0.002* 2.855 0.009* 2.150 0.028* 
Y→Z 0.057 0.944 0.037 0.997 0.040 0.999 0.030 0.999 
Z→X 2.852 0.058 1.669 0.154 1.254 0.275 0.948 0.475 
X→Z 0.319 0.727 0.289 0.885 0.307 0.933 0.280 0.973 
X→Y  14.093 0.000*  7.294 0.000*  5.080 0.000*  5.080 0.000* 
Y→X  0.126 0.882  0.187 0.945  0.300 0.937  0.300 0.937 
X represents country stock index                Y represents 10-year sovereign bond index 
Z represents sovereign credit rating            → represents does not Granger cause 
* represents significance at 5 percent level 
 
In order to gain a more detailed understanding of the causality relationship between  
stocks and bond returns, the analysis further applies the Dumitrescu-Hurlin Panel 
Causality Test (Dumitrescu and Hurlin, 2012)  to examine the homogeneity of causality. 
The results set out in Table 3.4 show that there is no homogenous causality between 
the stock and bond returns. Thus, the results indicate that stock returns across the 
African countries’ stock exchanges cannot be used to explain the variance of bond 
yields in the long-run and vice versa. Similarly, there is homogeneous unidirectional 
causality from country stock index to sovereign ratings only from 6 lags (days) and 
higher, but not in reverse. Furthermore, the results show that the null hypothesis of no 
homogeneous causality running from sovereign ratings to 10-year sovereign bonds for 
higher lags (from 6 days) can be rejected but not vice versa. This finding is in line with 
Andersson et al., (2008) and Christopher et al. (2012), who report that stock and bond 
markets respond heterogeneously to sovereign rating information. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the heterogeneity in causality is driven by regional shift of investors’s 




neighbouring countries  with low foreign currency debt to neutralise their exposure. 
 
Table 3.4 Pairwise Dumitrescu-Hurlin Panel Causality Test Results 
Lags 4 6 8 
 W-Stat. 
Zbar-
Stat. Prob.  W-Stat. 
Zbar-
Stat. Prob.  W-Stat. 
Zbar-
Stat. Prob.  
Z→Y 2.831 -1.705 0.088 3.440 -3.046 0.002* 4.183 -3.933 0.000* 
Y→Z 2.999 -1.459 0.145 7.035 1.228 0.220 7.545 -0.471 0.637 
Z→X 4.467 0.678 0.498 5.834 -0.200 0.842 8.561 0.575 0.566 
X→Z 3.388 -0.893 0.372 3.940 -2.452 0.014* 4.484 -3.623 0.003* 
X→Y  3.997 -0.007 0.995  5.544 -0.545 0.586  6.378 -1.673 0.094 
Y→X  2.982 -1.484 0.138  5.254 -0.890 0.374  6.523 -1.524 0.128 
X represents country stock index               Y represents 10-year sovereign bond index 
Z represents sovereign credit rating            → represents does not Granger cause 
* represents significance at 5 percent level 
 
Lastly, Table 3.5 and Figure 3.1 below presents the results of the DCC-GARCH(1,1) 
test, which analyses the correlations between credit ratings, stock returns and bond 
returns to determine how stockholders and bondholders adjust their required return 
following a SCR change. The estimation results show that the coefficients for all the 
parameters are positive and αi+βi is less than 1. Hence, as suggested in Peng and 
Deng (2010), the results indicate that there is a high persistence in the conditional 
variances. The mean-value of the dynamic conditional correlation coefficients of 0.415 
(mean of 𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛼𝑖 𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛽𝑖) show a positive stock-bond correlation trend, which implies that 
there is a moderate positive linkage between Africa’s stock and bond markets. However, 
the results show a weak positive correlation for both stock-credit rating and bond-credit 
rating (0.311 and 0.160 respectively), suggesting that there is a weak positive linkage 
between SCRs and Africa’s stock and bond markets.  
 
These results concur with Shiller and Beltratti (1992) and Stivers and Sun (2002), who 
point out that there is a positive relationship between changes in credit ratings, and 
stock and long-term bond prices. This is however contrary to d’Addona and Kind (2006) 
and Ncube and Brixiov (2015), who argue that stocks and bond prices move in opposite 




credit ratings, interest rates and inflation). However, Shiller and Beltratti (1992) and 
Stivers and Sun (2002)’s findings are more applicable to Africa’s dynamics for three 
reasons. 
 
First, both Africa’s stock and bond markets are still under-developed (Roberts et al., 
2015) and thus credit ratings play a key information role. Second, institutional investors 
who buy stocks are usually the same investors who buy bonds, so credit ratings shape 
their risk perception on a country’s macroeconomic fundamentals, which generally affect 
both bonds and stocks. Third, SCR changes affect bond prices more than stocks 
because the magnitude of a sovereign downgrade on the default risk premium and bond 
yields is volatile, both in the short and long-run. 
 
Table 3.5: DCC-GARCH Test results 
 
Country stock index and 10-
year sovereign bond index 
Country stock index and 
Sovereign credit ratings 
Sovereign credit ratings and 
10-year sovereign bond index 
Covariance 0.000 0.014 0.007 
Correlation 0.311 0.160 0.081 
t-Statistic 1.970 2.947 4.448 
Probability 0.034 -0.011 0.018 
Parameters Estimates Std. error Estimates Std. error Estimates Std. error 
𝜔𝑖 0.018 2.298 0.578 4.859 0.139 3.419 
𝜙𝑖  0.065 -0.162 0.388 -0.614 0.841 -1.067 
𝛼𝑖 0.111 0.145 0.178 1.212 0.246 1.279 
𝛽𝑖 0.158 -0.060 0.277 -0.495 0.712 -0.930 
𝜎𝑖 0.205 -1.136 0.477 -1.818 1.159 -1.500 
𝛾𝑖 0.251 -0.213 0.677 -1.141 1.606 -2.070 
       𝐷𝐶𝐶𝛼𝑖  0.392 0.533 0.174 0.815 0.256 1.097 
















Figure 3.1 DCC-GARCH test time series plot  
 
Thus in summary, the findings show that, there is unidirectional causality running from 
stocks to bonds as well as from credit ratings to bonds, suggesting that in Africa’s 
emerging markets investors prefer buying stocks first, which they later sell when the 
credit profile of a country changes to raise money to buy bonds. Hence, financial 
markets’ reactions are a result of investors redistributing their wealth between bonds 
and stocks. Despite the conventional perception that stocks are a risky class of asset, 
investors seek value for their investment, for which stocks provide higher returns 
potentially than bonds can. This implies that investors smooth their returns through 
bond-stock portfolio diversification to adequately compensate investors for both inflation 
and risk of default.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the net effect of SCR announcements on foreign currency 
denominated bonds and stock markets in 19 African countries over the period of 1994 to 
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Correlation (DCC) models. The results of the Granger Causality tests find evidence of 
unidirectional causality running from stocks to bonds and from credit ratings to bonds, 
but not in reverse, thus implying that investors prefer to buy stocks first and later sell 
them to buy bonds when a country’s credit rating profile changes. In addition, the results 
show that a change in a SCR causes bondholders to raise their required returns and 
drives bond prices down, which leads to investors then transferring funds from stocks to 
buy cheaper bonds. Therefore, changes in sovereign ratings do not have the same 
implications for both stockholders and bondholders as shown by the weak association 
between SCRs stock market.  
 
The results of the DCC-GARCH tests further show that there is a moderate positive 
relationship between Africa’s stock and bond markets; and a weak positive association 
between SCR changes and bond and stock market movements. This result implies that 
both stocks and bonds react negatively (positive) to sovereign credit downgrade 
(upgrade) announcements, possibly because the type of securities that investors buy 
reflects their level of confidence in the future of a country’s economy. Thus, there are 
three implications arising from these results. First, the state of the economy during 
sovereign rating announcements determines the security that performs best. Second, 
the linkage between stocks and bond returns decline as emerging countries become 
more creditworthy. Finally, it is imperative for African countries to pursue orthodox 
macroeconomic policies to avoid rating downgrades, which will negatively affect 






WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATING SPILLOVERS 
ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES’ FINANCIAL MARKETS?  
 
4.1 Summary abstract 
This chapter investigates the spillover effects of long-term foreign currency sovereign 
credit rating announcements on foreign currency denominated bonds and stock markets 
in 19 African countries during the period of 1994 to 2014. Using a combination of 
Granger causality tests and impulse response function, the results show that there are 
marginal regional sovereign rating spillover impacts but these are quickly absorbed into 
capital markets trading long-term securities. The analysis further shows that there are 
long-term spillover effects in sovereign ratings of other countries in the same region 
from a sovereign rating change in one country. These results imply that the regional 
bilateral linkages between countries serve as channels of capital and sovereign credit 
rating information flow. Thus it is imperative for regional countries to pursue prudent 




Since the advent of the ‘third wave’ of democratization24 (Huntington, 1991) in the early 
1970s, regional and global economies have gradually converged towards a single 
globalised financial market (Christopherson and Clark, 2007). Neighbouring economies 
that share relatively close fundamentals through trade and financial linkages are 
becoming more prone to common shocks that arise from channels of potential 
interconnection (Sun et al., 2010) and the herding behaviour of market participants 
(Kose et al., 2009). Thus, studies on financial contagion have been gaining momentum 
                                                          
24  The post-1974 global democratic expansion when countries made transitions from authoritarian 
(predominantly military) rule and dictatorial regimes to electing democratic governments, which 
significantly outnumbered transitions in the opposite direction. There were however two prior waves 
occurring in 1828-1928 and 1943-1962 separated by reversal waves in the wake of the Great Depression 




since the 1990s, a decade distinguished by the occurrence of several contagious 
financial crises (Baig and Goldfajn, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000). These crises 
often began as country-specific shocks that later spread to affect financial markets in 
other countries (Flores, 2010).  
 
Sovereign rating announcements can generate spillovers into neighbouring countries 
depending on the trade linkages and capital flow channels shared between countries 
(Luchtenberg and Vu, 2015). Literature however presents different and conflicting 
conclusions regarding the contagion and spillover effects of SCR announcements. 
Earlier literature presents evidence showing that SCR announcements unveil new 
relevant information about a country’s creditworthiness which also affect neighbouring 
markets (Fleming et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
2000; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001; Kaminsky et al., 2003). In addition, other studies 
argue that the responses of neighbouring financial markets to changes in another 
country’s sovereign rating arise from contagion, herding or speculative activities of 
market participants (Khan and Park, 2009). Furthermore, others suggest that it is the 
rating agencies that exacerbate crises through their pro-cyclical behaviour (Ferri et al., 
1999) of upgrading countries in good times and downgrading them in bad times (Kiff et 
al., 2010).  
 
In recent years, studies on contagion and spillovers have increasingly focused on 
investigating inter-industry and cross-country spillovers during financial crises 
(Longstaff, 2010; Bekaert et al., 2014; Luchtenberg and Vu, 2015), with only a few 
exploring the effects of sovereign rating events. Other studies argue that geographic 
distance (Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Arezki et al., 2011; Boninghausen and Zabel, 
2013), financial linkages, trade linkages and common characteristics (Ismailescu and 
Kazemi, 2010) determine the magnitude of sovereign rating spillovers as investors find 
channels to shift funds away from the downgraded country’s stock market in favour of 
other stock markets in the region (Christopher et al., 2012). Further investigations by 
Alsakka and Gwilym (2013) and Drago and Gallo (2016) however raise a number of 




depends on investors’ risk appetites, the economic condition of the rated country and 
the number international rating agencies to affirm the credit rating change. Thus, the 
empirical evidence of the spillover effect of a SCR change on both stock and bond 
markets is still inconclusive. 
 
Thus, in order to determine whether an announcement in one country’s SCR has 
spillover effects in other credit rated countries, this chapter applies Causality tests to 
respond to two sub-questions: (i) does a change in one country’s credit rating cause 
significant spillover effects on other sovereign credit rated countries’ financial markets, 
and (ii), under what economic and market conditions are spillover effects significant? 
This chapter is thus structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature devoted to 
investigating the spillover effects of SCR announcements on bond and stock markets of 
other countries. Thereafter, section 4.3 then describes the stock returns, bond returns 
and sovereign rating data. Next, section 4.4 presents the Granger Causality tests used 
to conduct the analysis. Then findings are discussed in Section 4.5, and lastly the 
chapter concludes with a summary of key findings and recommendations in Section 4.6. 
 
4.3 Literature review 
Initial studies focus primarily on investigating the contagious effects of financial crises 
across geographically proximate nations that share macroeconomic risk factors. Among 
the seminal studies is Banerjee (1992), who develops a sequential decision model to 
investigate investors’ herding behaviour which triggers financial contagion and 
spillovers. The results show that the investors’ herding instincts are usually irrational as 
they optimize their portfolios by mimicking others rather than rationally analysing 
fundamentals. Thus, Banerjee concludes that herding behaviour is evidence of multiple 
price equilibriums as investors assume that others have better information than them, 
and thus disregard their own information and follow those deemed more informed.  
 
Investors’ herding behaviour is the opposite of overconfidence (Kukacka and Barunik, 
2013), which occurs when individuals mimic each other rather than use their own 




herd are to seek safety in numbers and the pressure to conform (De Bondt and Thaler, 
1995). Hence, herding can be manifested in various ways: rational herding, where 
market players intentionally mimic the behaviour of the most informed participants in 
times of uncertainty (Devenow and Welch, 1996; Welch, 2000); irrational or intentional 
herding, which is centred on crowd psychology where investors with insufficient 
information and inadequate risk evaluation forego rational analysis and blindly follow 
other investors’ actions (Hirshleifer, 2001); and lastly, spurious herding, when members 
of a group are presented with similar decisions and information, which leads to a 
commonality of outcomes (Gavriilidis et al., 2013). 
 
Kodres and Pritsker (2002) concur with Banerjee (1992) that financial market spillovers 
are driven by investors who transmit idiosyncratic shocks as they rebalance their 
portfolio exposures through other countries' markets. However, Brown et al. (2009) 
further argue that the patterns and severity of financial spillovers depend on the level of 
information asymmetry in each market, the markets' sensitivity to shared 
macroeconomic risk factors, the transfer channels available to investors, and the 
capitalisation in each market.  
 
This literature review proceeds as follows. First, studies devoted to investigating 
whether the nature of credit rating change announcement determines the spillover 
effects are discussed. Thereafter, the literature on the sovereign rating spillover effects 
through trade linkages and capital flow channels is explored. The literature review then 
concludes with a summary of studies that investigate credit rating regional spillovers to 
geographically proximate countries that share common characteristics. 
 
4.3.1 Sovereign downgrades spillovers 
Investigations on the spillover effects of SCR announcements were first explored in the 
late 1990s, when financial liberalisation and globalisation gathered momentum. A 
number of studies argue that the nature of credit rating announcement determines the 
spillover effect. Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) were amongst the first to investigate 




international agreements, credit ratings, economy, policy, politics and capital controls is 
announced. They apply an event studies analysis on the 20 largest 1-day swings in 
stock prices in 9 Asian countries during the Asian crisis from 1997 to 1998 to determine 
whether cross-country spillover stock market volatility was a result of fundamentals 
used by CRAs in assigning SCRs. They find that the cross-country spillover effects 
result from market swings triggered by investor panic during the Asian crisis. Hence, 
they conclude that investors overreact to bad news and herding instincts drive the large 
market swings.  
 
Additionally, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) examine whether financial markets 
spillovers to neighbouring emerging economies are reactions to changes in sovereign 
ratings and outlooks of one country in the region. They apply a combination of event 
studies and panel regression estimates on 16 emerging economies in East Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America between 1990 and 2000. They find significant direct 
cross-country contagion and spillover effects from sovereign rating to neighbouring 
countries. However, their findings suggest that financial markets in countries with lower 
ratings are more affected by rating announcements in higher rated countries, especially 
sovereign downgrades. Thus, investors in lower rated countries incorporate spillovers 
from new sovereign rating announcements in higher rated countries by adjusting their 
required returns to a new equilibrium.  
 
Furthermore, Gande and Parsley (2005) analyse spillover effects on sovereign credit 
spreads from credit rating announcements of one country. They apply event studies to a 
data set of daily market-closing observations of the interest rate spreads of 34 countries 
matched to the United States government bond over the period from 1991 to 2000. 
They find statistically significant spillovers on sovereign credit spreads from negative 
ratings change of other countries while positive ratings change have no discernible 
impact. Their conclusion partially accords with Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) 
whereby sovereign rating spillovers are asymmetric because investors are wary about 
the downside risk rather than upside potential. Hence, the spillovers across countries 





Notably, Ferreira and Gama (2007) extend Gande and Parsley (2005)’s findings by 
investigating sovereign debt rating information spillover not only across countries but 
also across markets. This is accomplished by examining S&P’s credit rating and market 
outlook of 18 developing countries and 11 developed countries with publicly traded US 
dollar-denominated sovereign debt over the period 1989 to 2003. They concur with 
Gande and Parsley (2005) that rating changes in one country incorporate valuable 
information for the aggregate stock market returns of other countries. Hence, the 
evidence indicates that there are sovereign rating spillover effects from negative 
asymmetric reactions that are significantly heterogeneous both across countries and 
markets.  
 
It can however be argued that a sovereign rating downgrade spillover effect possibly 
depends on the sensitivity of the type and nature of the assets being traded in each of 
the affected financial markets. Flores (2010) uses panel regressions to capture the 
immediate effects of rating announcements on sovereign spreads and event studies to 
investigate the behaviour of East Asia, Eastern Europe Latin America’s domestic and 
foreign financial markets for the period 1997 to 2010. The results find that, in 
accordance with Gande and Parsley (2005) and Ferreira and Gama (2007), rating 
announcements affect both domestic and foreign markets. However, Flores further 
shows that sovereign rating announcement spillover effects are stronger in financial 
markets that are dominated by short-term investors that trade in short-term financial 
assets. Thus, Flores findings imply that the sovereign rating spillover effect is 
insignificant in long-term debt markets such as government bonds. 
 
Afonso et al. (2011) apply a combination of Granger Causality and event studies to 
analyse the reaction of 24 European Union sovereign bond yield and credit default swap 
spreads following the 99000 credit rating announcements by Standard and Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch between 1995 and 2010. Their results contrast with Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2001) as they find significant spillover effects from sovereign downgrades of 




ratings and spreads. They thus conclude that negative sovereign rating events usually 
take markets by surprise and thus generates spillover effects that spread from lower 
rated countries to higher rated countries. 
 
In contrast, Arezki et al. (2011) posit that the magnitude of spillover effects depends on 
the size of the downgraded economy and the rating category. Thus, they examine the 
spillover effects of sovereign rating news on the European financial markets during the 
period of 2007 to 2010 using a combination of event studies and the Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) approach. In accordance with the previous studies, they find that 
sovereign rating downgrades have statistically and economically significant spillover 
effects, both across countries and financial markets. However, they further find that the 
magnitude of the spillover effects depends on the type of announcements, the source 
country experiencing the downgrade, and the rating agency from which the 
announcement originates. They thus conclude that sovereign rating downgrades to 
speculative grade for relatively large economies have systemic spillover effects across 
neighbouring countries. 
 
Thus in summary, the literature finds significant evidence of sovereign rating spillover 
effects from rating downgrades, while upgrades have an insignificant and limited 
spillover effect because investors are wary about the downside risk rather than upside 
potential. Thus, the findings suggest that the rating spillovers are asymmetric as 
investors overreact to bad news and herding instincts drive the large market swings. 
Additionally, spillovers depend on the rating grade assigned, the nature of the assets 
being traded, the source country, and the rating agency from which the announcement 
originates. However, if investors react to sovereign rating spillovers, then they should 
move capital across markets and countries borders through capital flow channels and 
market linkages. 
 
4.3.2 Market linkages and capital flow 
Another body of literature on sovereign rating spillovers suggests that the magnitude of 




between countries. Hence, investors react to credit rating announcements by adjusting 
their portfolio capital across markets, which is determined by financial linkages between 
sovereigns (Luchtenberg and Vu, 2015). Thus, credit ratings change could spur financial 
instability due to shared banking regulations, derivative contracts and investment 
mandates in financially integrated environment (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2001). 
 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) estimate panel regressions and event studies using 43 
436 daily observations from 22 emerging economies during the period 2001 to 2008 to 
investigate the reaction of credit default swap spreads to credit rating announcements 
and the cross-border spillover effects in emerging economies. Similarly, Ballester and 
González-Urteaga (2015) apply a Generalized VAR (GVAR) approach to investigate the 
cross-border spillover effects of credit rating events for sovereign credit default swaps in 
Latin America’s emerging economies during 2004 to 2014. Both studies find that 
positive ratings announcements have a higher magnitude of spillovers into other 
emerging derivative markets than negative announcements. In addition, sovereign 
rating upgrades and positive outlooks immediately spill over to other emerging countries 
as they have a greater impact on the credit swap markets through common creditor and 
competition in trade markets transmission mechanisms. However, Ismailescu and 
Kazemi (2010) conclude that the findings suggest that a credit upgrade in emerging 
economies conveys more information for default swaps than a credit downgrades 
whereas Ballester and González-Urteaga (2015) conclude that the impact of 
downgrades is significant in the medium term. 
 
Bissoondoyal-Bheenick (2012) apply event studies on a sample of 17 Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries for the period 1990 to 2001 to examine the 
spillover effects from sovereign ratings announced by both Standard and Poor’s and 
Moody’s for countries that are connected by trade and financial markets links. Contrary 
to the earlier study of Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), Bissoondoyal-Bheenick find 
significant spillover effects in countries that are connected by financial markets links but 
insignificant spillovers amongst countries that share trade links. Hence, he concludes 





There is however no consensus on how sovereign rating spillovers impact financial 
market interdependencies over different time frames. Thus, Claeys and Vašíček (2012) 
analyse bilateral linkages between 16 European Union sovereign bond markets over 
time by estimating the forecast-error variance decompositions VAR between 2000 and 
2011. They find that rating spillovers are heterogeneous, gradually increasing with time 
due to financial and economic integration stimulated by capital account liberalisation, 
financial deregulation, financial innovation and the introduction of monetary unions. 
Thus, Claeys and Vašíček conclude that spillovers and contagion depends on the 
financial and economic integration between countries, which open channels of capital 
and cross-country information flow. 
 
Similarly, Forbes (2012) observe increasing spillovers from negative credit rating events 
after applying correlation and extreme value analysis on a sample of 48 countries 
around the world between 1980 and 2011. However, contrary to Claeys and Vašíček 
(2012), Forbes finds that credit rating spillover effects are intensified by cross-country 
interdependences created by vulnerabilities from more leveraged banking systems, 
greater trade exposure, weaker macroeconomic fundamentals, and larger international 
portfolio investment liabilities. Hence, Forbes argues that countries that share 
interdependent vulnerabilities are more sensitive to cross-country spillovers.  
 
Chen et al. (2016) use panel regression models to examine sovereign rating 
transmission mechanisms on all long term sovereign rating announcements for 103 
countries from S&P between 1989 and 2012 produces spillover effects on the economic 
growth rates of other countries. They find that rating revisions have significant spillover 
effects on annual economic growth rates of other countries, which are transmitted 
through direct and indirect trade and financial linkages. They further argue that when a 
country is downgraded, its terms of trade are negatively affected, which allows other 
countries to benefit economically as the downgraded country becomes less competitive 
in the international market. Conversely, for countries that share bilateral trade 




counterparties through a downturn in economic activities, which reduce income and 
imports by the downgraded country. 
 
Thus in summary, investors adjust their portfolios by moving capital across countries 
and markets following a credit rating announcements. Hence, sovereign rating spillover 
effects depend on the capital flow channels, financial and trade linkages among 
countries. However, the direction of cross-country spillovers is still contentious. Thus, 
the role of sovereign ratings spillovers to financial asset comovements in regional 
bodies that share common characteristics is still debated. 
 
4.3.3 Regional spillovers 
In contrast to the studies discussed above, another body of literature argues that, even 
without direct financial linkages, countries in the same region share common 
characteristics and their geographic proximity make them prone to spillover effects. 
Hence, the geographic distance is inversely related to the spillover impact, whereby 
sovereign rating news have more pronounced effects in countries nearer to each other, 
than more distant countries. 
 
Amongst the studies to pioneered this line of argument of sovereign rating regional 
spillover effects is Kim and Wu (2011), who argue that there are negative regional 
spillover effects when one country’s credit rating improves because the upgraded 
country attracts the region’s bank flows from neighbouring countries. Kim and Wu 
estimate multivariate panel regression models to examine the effect of SCR changes on 
international bank flows from the Group 7 (G7) to a selected 55 emerging countries 
between 1995 and 2008. They find evidence indicating that credit rating 
announcements have a strong regional rating spillover effect and significantly positive 
influences on international bank flows from developed markets. Their evidence 
suggests that foreign (local) currency ratings announcements are more influential for 
bank lending to investment-grade (non-investment-grade) borrowing countries. 
Conversely, excluding Asia and Eastern Europe, credit rating improvements in one 




findings suggest that public debt management strongly affect banking sector financing 
in emerging markets through financial flow from rich to poor countries. 
 
Christopher et al. (2012) examine the transitory effects of SCRs on regional financial 
markets by estimating a combination of three-stage dynamic conditional correlation 
(DCC) and bivariate GARCH model using a sample of 19 emerging countries over the 
period from 1994 to 2007. They find that the response of stock and bond market to 
sovereign ratings within a region is heterogeneous, which accords with Kim and Wu 
(2011). Their results thus suggest that sovereign rating downgrades lead investors to 
shift funds from the downgraded market into neighbouring countries but there are also 
positive rating spillover effects from sovereign rating upgrades. Christopher et al. 
conclude that there are regional transmission channels through which both information, 
capital flows and the influence of negative information is concentrated in countries that 
have higher foreign currency debt ratings than the regional average.  
 
Other studies have questioned whether credit rating announcements from the three 
international rating agencies generate the same magnitude of spillover effects. Thus, 
Alsakka and Gwilym (2013) investigate foreign exchange spillover reactions from SCR 
change by applying event studies to a set of 44 European and Central Asian countries 
rated by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch during the pre-crisis period of 2000 to 2006 and during 
financial crisis between 2007 to 2010. They find strong exchange rate spillover effects 
(the strongest effects from Fitch ratings) to other countries’ exchange rates in the region 
following rating downgrades from all three major agencies. They further observe that 
spillover effects from the second or third rating agency’s announcements are more 
significant than from the first rating agency’s announcements. Alsakka and Gwilym 
further argue that spillover signals from the second and third rating agency’s 
announcements are stronger because of a cumulative confirmatory effect which they 
provide to the first mover rating announcements. Thus, they conclude that the market 
responds immediately and strongly to any rating announcement that confirms prior 





Boninghausen and Zabel (2013) perform a counterfactual analysis with event studies to 
investigate sovereign bond spillovers from all credit rating announcements by Standard 
and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch across 73 developed and emerging debt markets 
between 1994 and 2011. Similarly, Corbet (2014) apply Vector autoregression models to 
investigate the spillover effects of unfavourable sovereign rating announcements on 10 
European countries’ financial markets between 2005 and 2012. Both studies find 
significant spillovers throughout regional financial markets from sovereign downgrades, 
which are associated with an increase in equity returns, cost of insuring debt through 
credit default swaps, and sovereign bond yields. Hence, Boninghausen and Zabel 
(2013) and Corbet (2014) conclude that credit default swaps, equity markets and 
government bonds provide the main financial inter-linkages for sovereign rating 
announcements cross-country spillovers. 
 
However, Kalotychou et al. (2014) argue that spillover effects can be distinguished into 
two mechanisms: fast regional cross-border contagion effects and global common 
shock spillover effects. They apply a combination of event study and the standard multi-
factor asset pricing approaches to examine the cross-border propagation of systemic 
risk from sovereign rating announcements to international sovereign debt market using 
credit default swap spreads for 67 sovereign borrowers in 5 regions (Asia and Pacific, 
Europe, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Middle East and North Africa) from 2002 to 
2013. The results show that the degree to which different regions are affected by a rise 
in the global sovereign risk factor depends on economic fundamentals, and the global 
spillover of credit events works through the global risk factor such as credit crunch or 
bankruptcy. They thus conclude that the global risk and regional vulnerabilities are both 
influenced by investors’ risk appetites, which also depends on economic fundamentals, 
especially the sovereign’s level of government debt. 
 
More recently, Drago and Gallo (2016) estimate regression models and event studies to 
analyse S&P sovereign rating spillover effects on the credit default swaps of 15 
Economic and Monetary Union member states between 2004 and 2015. They find 




following downgrade announcements, which are transmitted through the international 
bank flows between regional member countries. They conclude that the economic and 
financial conditions of rated countries determine the size of the spillover effect. Thus in 
summary, the impact of SCR spillover effects depends on the level of foreign currency 
rating, investors’ risk appetites, the economic condition of rated country and the number 
international rating agencies to confirm the credit rating announcements.  
 
4.3.4 Conclusion 
Hence the review of the literature finds that early studies argue that cross-country 
contagion and spillover effects are asymmetrical and significantly stronger during 
specific regional crisis episodes. Additionally, other studies argue that the impact of the 
spillover effect depends on the rating grade assigned, the nature of assets being traded, 
the source country and the rating agency from which the announcement originates. 
Although the evidence presented is mixed, most studies acknowledge that the 
magnitude of spillover effects depend on the trade linkages and capital flow channels 
shared between countries. However, more recent studies posit that even without direct 
financial linkages, countries in the same region share common characteristics and their 
geographic proximity make them prone to spillover effects. There is therefore an 
ongoing debate on the sovereign rating spillover effects in emerging markets.  
 
Thus, this chapter uses an up-to-date sample of Africa’s emerging markets and all credit 
rating announcements from the three international rating agencies to investigate the 
sovereign rating spillover effects. To date, no study has been conducted on SCR 
spillover impact on African markets, which are characterized by limited information, high 
risk assets, liquidity challenges, relatively few participants, lack of transparency, low 
institutional quality, and greater uncertainty. It is therefore hypothesised that if there is 
statistically significant changes in stock or bond returns in other countries following SCR 
announcements in one country, then there are sovereign credit rating spillover effects. 






4.4 Data Description 
To examine the SCR cross-country spillover effects, the analysis makes use of daily 
bond yield, daily stock returns and foreign currency long-term sovereign ratings 
announcements of 19 African countries that received a SCR by any or all of the three 
largest CRAs (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) over the period of 1994 to 
201425. Following Gande and Parsley (2004), the long-term sovereign rating symbols 
used by the three international rating agencies are linearly transformed from ordinal 
rating scales into numbers corresponding to each rating grade. Furthermore, as 
recommended by Ferreira and Gama (2007) and Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), 
positive (negative) changes in rating outlook and positive (negative) additions to 
watchlists are accounted for by adding 0.5 (-0.5) and 0.25 (-0.25) to one credit rating 
notch to consider these SCR announcements respectively. 
 
The analysis focuses only on long-term foreign currency-denominated ratings because 
they are more liquid and have extensive rating information (Flores, 2010). In addition, 
the foreign currency-denominated daily S&P 10-year sovereign bond index, which track 
the performance of both local and sovereign bonds, and the United States dollar-
denominated Africa-oriented S&P value-weighted stock index are used to measure 
bond and stock market performance respectively. The bond and stock market data was 
obtained from Bloomberg and Reuters, while the SCR and outlook change information 
was obtained from the three rating agencies’ websites. The data is categorized into 
country specific data to explore the possible spillover effects from one country to 
another. Hence, the sample represents five geographically divided regions that could be 
more susceptible to the cross-border spillover effects of rating announcements (North 
Africa, West Africa,  East Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa). Amongst the 19 
countries in the sample analysed, no country falls under the Central Africa region, hence 
the region is excluded. The number and distribution of the SCR actions between 1994 
and 2014 is shown in Table 4.1 below. 
 
                                                          
25 These include Burkina Faso, Benin, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, 





Table 4.1: Summary of SCR events 
Fitch/S&P (Moody) Downgrades Fitch/S&P (Moody) Upgrades 
A (A2) to A- (A3) 1 A- (A3) to A (A2)   1 
A- (A3) to BBB+ (Baa1) 1 BBB+ (Baa1) to A- (A3)   - 
BBB+ (Baa1) to BBB (Baa2) 5 BBB (Baa2) to BBB+ (Baa1)  1 
BBB (Baa2) to BBB- (Baa3) 4 BBB- (Baa3) to BBB (Baa2)  -  
BBB- (Baa3) to BB+ (Ba1) 7 BB+ (Ba1) to BBB- (Baa3)  1 
BB+ (Ba1) to BB (Ba2) 5 BB (Ba2) to BB+ (Ba1) 2 
BB (Ba2) to BB-(Ba3) 5 BB-(Ba3) to BB (Ba2)  1 
BB- (Ba3) to B+(B1) 3 B+(B1) to BB- (Ba3)  2 
B+ (B1) to B (B2)  2 B (B2) to B+ (B1) 5 
B (B2) to B- (B3) 2 B- (B3) to B (B2) 3 
B- (B3) to CCC+ (Caa1) 1 CCC+ (Caa1) to B- (B3)  2 
CCC+ (Caa1) to CCC (Caa2) 1     
  37   18 
Fitch/S&P (Moody) Negative Outlook Fitch/S&P (Moody) Positive Outlook 
Positive to Stable  50 Negative to Stable 5 
Stable to Negative 42 Stable to Positive 4 
Under review (Watch) 21     




The analysis applies the Granger causality test (Granger, 1988) on long-term foreign 
currency rating upgrades and downgrades of rated countries’ stock and bond returns to 
investigate the possible causal relationships among the factors. According to Granger 
(1988), the underlying principles of the test are; the cause happens prior to its effect and 
the cause has unique information about the future values of its effect. This test is thus 
appropriate to investigate the cross-country SCR spillover effects by examining the 
model hypothesis for identification of a causal effect of from one country on another 
variable. It is hypothesized that if a SCR in one country Granger causes stock or bond 
returns in other countries, then there are sovereign rating spillover effects. Hence, 
sovereign rating announcements in one country would affect capital markets of other 
countries. As proposed by Granger (1988), the analysis tests the hypothesis by 
examining the causal effects of the SCR announcements on the stock and bond 





𝑃(𝑌𝑡+1  ∈ 𝐴|Ω𝑡)  ≠ 𝑃(𝑌𝑡+1  ∈ 𝐴|Ω−𝑥(𝑡))                                                                          (4.1)  
 
Where 𝑃 is the probability, 𝐴 is the set of security returns, 𝛺𝑡 is the sovereign rating 
information available at time t in the market, and 𝛺−𝑥(𝑡) is the modified market where the 
SCR information  Ωt  is excluded. The Granger causality test estimates the following 
three regression equations: 
 









+ 𝜀1𝑖                                    (4.2) 









+ 𝜀2𝑖                                   (4.3) 









+ 𝜀3𝑖                                   (4.4) 
 
Where 𝑛 is the number of lags that adequately models the dynamic structure, 𝜀𝑖 are 
white noise error terms, 𝑥  represents sovereign credit rating announcements, 𝑦 
represents stock returns,  𝑧  represents bond returns, and βi  are constant coefficents. 
The F-statistic is therefore applied to test the significance of the Granger causality to 
determine whether the model satisfies best fit requirements. 
 
Having examined the causal relationships among the factors, the analysis next uses 
impulse responses to assess the effect of SCR shocks on security returns, the 
interactions amongst the three variables (SCR, stocks and bond returns), and the 
response of one variable to an impulse in another variable in a system. The impulse 
response analysis quantifies the reaction of every single variable in the model on an 
exogenous shock to the model (Koop et al., 1996) and the reaction is measured for 
every variable at certain times after credit rating announcements. It is hypothesized that 
if there is a reaction by one variable to an impulse in another variable then the latter 




response function 𝜓𝑡  at time 𝑡 is specified as in Khalid and Kawai (2003) with the same 





+   
𝜕𝑥𝑡
𝜕𝜀𝑡
                                                                                                                       (4.5) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑡  and 𝑦𝑡  are stock and bond returns respectively, and 𝜀𝑡  is the impulse from 
SCR series as unit impulses. 
 
The Granger causality test does not determine the relative strength of causality effects 
beyond the selected time span (Koop et al., 1996). Hence, causality tests are unable to 
indicate the response of one variable (endogenous) to an impulse with another 
variables (exogenous) when shocking the residuals (Rajasekar et al., 2014). Thus, the 
impulse response function traces the effect of one unit shock to one of the variables on 
current and future values of all the endogenous variables in a system over various time 
horizons (Rahman and Shahbaz, 2013). Through impulse responses, the positive and 
negative relationship in relation with future periods can be specifically identified. 
 
4.6 Empirical Results 
The results of the group unit root test applied at level to the three series (10-year 
sovereign bond index, SCR and country stock index) are presented in Table 4.2 and 
show that the null hypothesis of the unit root at level form can be rejected. Hence, the 
mean, variance and autocorrelation structure of the residuals of the three series are first 
difference stationary, (I(1)), over time. Thus, the statistical properties are time invariant 
(Lee et al., 2010), which is an underlying assumption in many time series data analysis 









Table 4.2: Group Unit Root Test Results 
Series (Sovereign credit rating, Country stock index and 10-year sovereign bond index) 
  t-Statistic Probability 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t -3.76276  0.0001*** 
   Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -109.754  0.0000*** 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  3805.28  0.0000*** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  676.816  0.0000*** 
      
*** Indicate the significance at 1 percent level.  
 
4.6.1 Granger causality test results 
The next step of the analysis is to test the causality of credit rating spillover to securities 
returns of neighbouring countries using the Granger Causality test (Granger, 1988). 
Table 4.3 below presents the results of the North African regional Granger causality 
tests. As can be seen, the null hypothesis of no Granger causality running from the 
sovereign rating of one country to securities returns in other countries cannot be 
rejected at the 5 percent significance level. However, there is significant evidence to 
reject the hypothesis that there is no causality from SCR announcements in Egypt to the 
Tunisia Country Stock Index (CSI), which suggests that there is a unidirectional 
sovereign rating spillover effect from Egypt to Tunisia’s stock index but not in reverse. 
These results reflect a close relationship between Egypt and Tunisia possibly because 
of the geographical proximity and similarities in their financial markets. Additionally, the 
countries commonly share a similar legal origin based on the francophone civil code. 
The unidirectional causality runs only from Egypt to Tunisia possibly because the two 
countries have the same credit rating, but Egypt’s financial markets are much stronger 
and well established than Tunisia’s. The Egyptian Exchange has 247 active counters 
and has been trading since 1883 compared to the Bourse de Tunis, which has 56 
counters and has been trading since 1969.  Furthermore, the Egyptian stock market 
capitalisation of US$70.03 billion is approximately 7 times more that Tunisia with a 






Table 4.3: North Africa Regional Pairwise Granger Causality Test 
Lags 2 4 6 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  
Egypt SCR→Morocco CSI  0.373 0.688 0.520 0.721 0.418 0.868 
Egypt SCR→Morocco SBI  0.820 0.441 0.424 0.791 0.860 0.524 
Egypt SCR→Morocco SCR 1.751 0.174 0.878 0.476 0.588 0.741 
Egypt SCR→Tunisia CSI 0.137 0.872 0.297 0.880 2.798 0.010*** 
Egypt SCR→Tunisia SBI 0.748 0.473 0.397 0.811 0.740 0.617 
Egypt SCR→Tunisia SCR 0.074 0.929 0.037 0.997 0.027 1.000 
Morocco SCR→Egypt CSI  0.148 0.863 0.183 0.948 0.218 0.971 
Morocco SCR→Egypt SBI  0.084 0.919 0.045 0.996 0.114 0.995 
Morocco SCR→Tunisia CSI 1.886 0.152 1.049 0.380 1.260 0.273 
Morocco SCR→Tunisia SBI 0.276 0.759 0.148 0.964 0.115 0.995 
Morocco SCR→Tunisia SCR 0.047 0.954 0.023 0.999 0.016 1.000 
Morocco SCR→Egypt SCR 0.534 0.587 0.266 0.900 0.178 0.983 
Tunisia SCR→Egypt CSI  0.029 0.972 0.074 0.990 0.378 0.894 
Tunisia SCR→Egypt SBI  0.390 0.677 0.269 0.898 0.132 0.992 
Tunisia SCR→Egypt SCR 2.639 0.072 1.327 0.257 0.889 0.502 
Tunisia SCR→Morocco CSI 2.284 0.102 1.273 0.278 1.255 0.275 
Tunisia SCR→Morocco SBI 0.002 0.998 0.005 1.000 0.010 1.000 
Tunisia SCR→Morocco SCR 0.483 0.617 0.242 0.914 0.162 0.987 
→ represents does not Granger cause       CSI represents Country Stock Index 
*** represents significance at the 1 percent level        SBI represents Sovereign Bond Index 
 
The West African causality results are presented in Table 4.4, and shows that there is 
bi-directional Granger causality from sovereign rating changes between Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Nigeria and Ghana. These effects could possibly be attributed to economic 
integration between the members of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) through the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and the 
West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). These sub-regional blocs are aimed at 
developing regional trade liberalization to creating a common market and coordinating 
macroeconomic policy convergence towards eventually adopting a common currency - 
the Eco (Harvey and Cushing, 2015). Furthermore, there is uni-directional Granger 
causality from a Nigerian and Senegalese sovereign rating announcements to the 
Ghanian stock market, but not in reverse. Thus, these results show that there is 
significant spillover effects from some countries to others in the West African region, 
which further suggests that there is financial integration (Claeys and Vašíček, 2012) 





Table 4.4: West Africa Regional Pairwise Granger Causality Tests  
Lags 2 4 6 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  
 Benin SCR→Burkina Faso CSI 0.232 0.793 0.102 0.982 0.085 0.998 
 Benin SCR→Burkina Faso SBI 0.091 0.913 3.989 0.003** 2.835 0.009*** 
 Benin SCR→Burkina Faso SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Benin SCR→Ghana CSI 0.047 0.954 0.029 0.998 0.038 1.000 
 Benin SCR→Ghana SBI 0.010 0.990 0.015 1.000 0.110 0.995 
 Benin SCR→Ghana SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Benin SCR→Nigeria CSI 0.115 0.891 0.172 0.953 0.135 0.992 
 Benin SCR→Nigeria SBI 0.434 0.648 0.317 0.867 0.287 0.944 
 Benin SCR→Nigeria SCR 6.769 0.001** 3.402 0.009** 2.280 0.034** 
 Benin SCR→Senegal SBI 0.093 0.911 0.077 0.989 0.081 0.998 
 Benin SCR→Senegal SCI 0.007 0.993 0.030 0.998 0.040 1.000 
 Benin SCR→SENEGAL_SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Benin CSI 0.008 0.992 0.535 0.710 0.771 0.593 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Benin SBI 0.106 0.900 0.200 0.939 1.861 0.084 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Benin SCR 11.016 0.000** 5.586 0.000** 3.778 0.001*** 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Ghana CSI 0.036 0.965 0.029 0.998 0.027 1.000 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Ghana SBI 0.192 0.826 0.090 0.986 0.081 0.998 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Ghana SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Nigeria SBI 0.176 0.839 0.106 0.981 0.306 0.934 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Nigeria SCI 0.068 0.934 0.032 0.998 0.043 1.000 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Nigeria SCR 4.670 0.009** 2.344 0.053 1.568 0.152 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Senegal CSI 0.342 0.710 0.162 0.958 0.121 0.994 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Senegal SBI 1.072 0.342 1.589 0.174 1.078 0.373 
 Burkina Faso SCR→Senegal SCR 0.001 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Ghana SCR→Benin CSI 0.321 0.726 2.207 0.066 1.482 0.180 
 Ghana SCR→Benin SBI 0.051 0.951 0.055 0.994 0.133 0.992 
 Ghana SCR→Benin SCR 7.599 0.001** 3.835 0.004** 2.581 0.017** 
 Ghana SCR→Burkina Faso CSI 0.043 0.958 1.332 0.255 0.889 0.502 
 Ghana SCR→Burkina Faso SBI 0.019 0.982 0.148 0.964 0.280 0.947 
 Ghana SCR→Burkina Faso SCR 36.942 0.000** 18.993 0.000** 13.030 0.000 
 Ghana SCR→Nigeria CSI 0.046 0.956 0.099 0.983 0.078 0.998 
 Ghana SCR→Nigeria SBI 0.007 0.993 0.415 0.798 0.328 0.922 
 Ghana SCR→Nigeria SCR 4.236 0.015** 2.125 0.075 1.422 0.202 
 Ghana SCR→Senegal CSI 0.286 0.751 0.156 0.960 0.134 0.992 
 Ghana SCR→Senegal SBI 0.065 0.937 0.034 0.998 0.037 1.000 
 Ghana SCR→Senegal SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Nigeria SCR→Benin CSI 0.164 0.848 0.087 0.986 0.058 0.999 
 Nigeria SCR→Benin SBI 0.038 0.963 0.099 0.983 0.047 1.000 
 Nigeria SCR→Benin SCR 0.183 0.832 0.092 0.985 0.061 0.999 
 Nigeria SCR→Burkina Faso CSI 0.032 0.969 0.497 0.738 0.401 0.879 
 Nigeria SCR→Burkina Faso SBI 2.852 0.058 2.040 0.086 1.581 0.148 
 Nigeria SCR→Burkina Faso SCR 0.003 0.997 0.001 1.000 0.001 1.000 
 Nigeria SCR→Ghana CSI 0.012 0.988 0.776 0.541 2.525 0.019** 
 Nigeria SCR→Ghana SBI 0.580 0.560 0.505 0.732 0.339 0.917 
 Nigeria SCR→Ghana SCR 0.032 0.969 3.727 0.005** 2.482 0.021** 
 Nigeria SCR→Senegal CSI 0.399 0.671 0.221 0.927 1.587 0.147 
 Nigeria SCR→Senegal SBI 0.033 0.968 0.099 0.983 0.068 0.999 
 Nigeria SCR→Senegal SCR 0.001 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Senegal SCR→Benin CSI 0.038 0.962 0.051 0.995 0.044 1.000 
 Senegal SCR→Benin SBI 0.053 0.948 0.180 0.949 0.249 0.960 




 Senegal SCR→Burkina Faso CSI 0.100 0.905 0.067 0.992 0.878 0.510 
 Senegal SCR→Burkina Faso SBI 0.144 0.866 1.355 0.247 1.468 0.185 
 Senegal SCR→Burkina Faso SCR 2.167 0.115 1.086 0.362 0.725 0.629 
 Senegal SCR→Ghana CSI 0.898 0.408 0.615 0.652 2.264 0.035** 
 Senegal SCR→Ghana SBI 0.445 0.641 0.575 0.681 0.833 0.544 
 Senegal SCR→Ghana SCR 2.390 0.092 1.198 0.310 0.800 0.569 
 Senegal SCR→Nigeria CSI 0.073 0.930 0.806 0.521 0.572 0.753 
 Senegal SCR→Nigeria SBI 0.569 0.566 0.278 0.892 0.200 0.977 
 Senegal SCR→Nigeria SCR 1.192 0.304 0.597 0.665 0.398 0.881 
→ represents does not Granger cause       CSI represents Country Stock Index 
*** and ** represent significance at the 1 and 5 percent level respectively      
SBI represents Sovereign Bond Index 
 
The East African causality tests in Table 4.5 below show that there is uni-directional 
Granger causality from a Malawian SCR to a Ugandan SCR, a Rwandan SCR to a 
Kenyan SCR, a Ugandan SCR to a Kenyan SCR and a Ugandan SCR to a Rwandan 
SCR. The inter-linkage between the region’s countries could possibly be a result of the 
political and economic integration through the East African Community (EAC), which is 
a potential precursor to the establishment of the East African Federation (Davoodi et al., 
2013), a proposed federation of its members into a single sovereign state (Ogola et al., 
2015). The EAC already launched the region’s common market for goods, labour, and 
capital with the goal of creating a common currency towards a full political federation 
within the next 10 years. This suggests that sovereign ratings in these countries have 
spillover effects leading to changes in sovereign rating of neighbouring countries in the 
East African region. Further, the results show that sovereign rating announcements in 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Zambia spills over to the Ugandan bond markets. 
However, sovereign rating changes in Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia spill over to 
Mauritius and Malawi stock markets. However, the different spillover directions could be 
possibly be explained by the economic linkages amongst the East African countries 
through trade on the common market protocols, customs unions and cross-border 
banking. Due to country specific challenges and barriers, regional intergration may 






Table 4.5: East Africa Regional Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Lags 2 4 6 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  
 Kenya SCR→Malawi SBI 1.066 0.344 0.628 0.643 0.493 0.814 
 Kenya SCR→Malawi CSI 0.047 0.954 0.129 0.972 0.096 0.997 
 Kenya SCR→Malawi SCR 0.001 0.999 0.001 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Kenya SCR→Mauritius SBI 0.020 0.980 0.017 0.999 0.516 0.797 
 Kenya SCR→Mauritius CSI 3.092 0.046** 2.340 0.053 3.471 0.002*** 
 Kenya SCR→Mauritius SCR 0.020 0.981 0.010 1.000 0.007 1.000 
 Kenya SCR→Rwanda SBI 0.017 0.984 0.009 1.000 0.007 1.000 
 Kenya SCR→Rwanda CSI 0.929 0.395 0.603 0.660 0.445 0.849 
 Kenya SCR→Rwanda SCR 0.007 0.993 0.004 1.000 0.002 1.000 
 Kenya SCR→Uganda SBI 15.317 0.000** 7.976 0.000** 5.286 0.000*** 
 Kenya SCR→Uganda CSI 0.025 0.975 0.041 0.997 0.055 0.999 
 Kenya SCR→Uganda SCR 0.001 0.999 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Kenya SCR→Zambia SBI 0.941 0.390 1.235 0.294 1.873 0.082 
 Kenya SCR→Zambia CSI 0.019 0.981 0.503 0.733 1.344 0.234 
 Kenya SCR→Zambia SCR 2.742 0.065 1.374 0.240 0.917 0.481 
 Malawi SCR→Kenya SBI 1.568 0.209 1.012 0.400 0.896 0.497 
 Malawi SCR→Kenya CSI 0.257 0.773 0.176 0.951 1.254 0.275 
 Malawi SCR→Kenya SCR 2.190 0.112 1.097 0.356 0.732 0.624 
 Malawi SCR→Mauritius SBI 0.742 0.476 0.407 0.803 0.303 0.936 
 Malawi SCR→Mauritius CSI 0.006 0.994 0.071 0.991 0.081 0.998 
 Malawi SCR→Mauritius SCR 0.006 0.994 0.003 1.000 0.002 1.000 
 Malawi SCR→Rwanda SBI 0.004 0.996 0.003 1.000 0.003 1.000 
 Malawi SCR→Rwanda CSI 0.427 0.653 0.229 0.923 0.181 0.982 
 Malawi SCR→Rwanda SCR 1.369 0.254 0.685 0.602 0.458 0.840 
 Malawi SCR→Uganda SBI 11.499 0.000** 6.014 0.000** 4.683 0.000*** 
 Malawi SCR→Uganda CSI 0.002 0.998 0.447 0.775 0.564 0.759 
 Malawi SCR→Uganda SCR 5.128 0.006** 2.574 0.036** 1.723 0.111 
 Malawi SCR→Zambia SBI 0.255 0.775 0.201 0.938 0.369 0.899 
 Malawi SCR→Zambia CSI 0.170 0.844 0.855 0.490 0.568 0.756 
 Malawi SCR→Zambia SCR 0.933 0.394 0.467 0.760 0.311 0.932 
 Mauritius SCR→Kenya SBI 0.259 0.772 0.160 0.958 0.104 0.996 
 Mauritius SCR→Kenya CSI 0.027 0.973 0.063 0.993 0.055 0.999 
 Mauritius SCR→Kenya SCR 0.145 0.865 0.073 0.990 0.048 1.000 
 Mauritius SCR→Malawi SBI 0.205 0.815 0.117 0.976 0.085 0.998 
 Mauritius SCR→Malawi CSI 0.375 0.687 0.187 0.946 0.154 0.988 
 Mauritius SCR→Malawi SCR 0.342 0.710 0.171 0.953 0.114 0.995 
 Mauritius SCR→Rwanda SBI 0.022 0.979 0.012 1.000 0.009 1.000 
 Mauritius SCR→Rwanda CSI 0.124 0.884 0.156 0.961 0.134 0.992 
 Mauritius SCR→Rwanda SCR 0.176 0.839 0.088 0.986 0.059 0.999 
 Mauritius SCR→Uganda SBI 5.188 0.006** 2.705 0.029** 1.796 0.096* 
 Mauritius SCR→Uganda CSI 0.027 0.973 0.097 0.984 0.069 0.999 
 Mauritius SCR→Uganda SCR 0.214 0.807 0.107 0.980 0.072 0.999 
 Mauritius SCR→Zambia SBI 0.416 0.660 0.342 0.849 0.219 0.971 
 Mauritius SCR→Zambia CSI 0.015 0.985 1.666 0.155 1.262 0.272 
 Mauritius SCR→Zambia SCR 0.091 0.913 0.045 0.996 0.030 1.000 
 Rwanda SCR→Kenya SBI 1.231 0.292 0.472 0.757 0.352 0.909 
 Rwanda SCR→Kenya CSI 0.075 0.928 0.609 0.656 0.469 0.832 
 Rwanda SCR→Kenya SCR 9.809 0.000** 4.941 0.001** 3.318 0.003*** 
 Rwanda SCR→Malawi SBI 0.558 0.573 0.279 0.892 0.173 0.984 
 Rwanda SCR→Malawi CSI 4.354 0.013** 2.202 0.066 1.949 0.069* 
 Rwanda SCR→Malawi SCR 0.281 0.755 0.141 0.967 0.094 0.997 




 Rwanda SCR→Mauritius CSI 0.516 0.597 0.257 0.906 0.445 0.849 
 Rwanda SCR→Mauritius SCR 0.017 0.983 0.009 1.000 0.006 1.000 
 Rwanda SCR→Uganda SBI 13.777 0.000** 7.251 0.000** 4.804 0.000** 
 Rwanda SCR→Uganda CSI 0.005 0.995 0.772 0.543 0.880 0.509 
 Rwanda SCR→Uganda SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Rwanda SCR→Zambia SBI 2.299 0.101 1.677 0.152 1.335 0.238 
 Rwanda SCR→Zambia CSI 0.070 0.933 0.031 0.998 0.165 0.986 
 Rwanda SCR→Zambia SCR 2.139 0.118 1.071 0.369 0.715 0.638 
 Uganda SCR→Kenya SBI 0.383 0.682 0.155 0.961 0.126 0.993 
 Uganda SCR→Kenya CSI 1.495 0.224 0.785 0.535 0.687 0.660 
 Uganda SCR→Kenya SCR 3.115 0.045** 1.561 0.182 1.043 0.395 
 Uganda SCR→Malawi SBI 0.591 0.554 1.467 0.209 0.983 0.435 
 Uganda SCR→Malawi CSI 0.121 0.886 0.065 0.992 0.054 0.999 
 Uganda SCR→Malawi SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Uganda SCR→Mauritius SBI 0.323 0.724 0.401 0.808 1.120 0.348 
 Uganda SCR→Mauritius CSI 0.425 0.654 0.192 0.943 0.142 0.991 
 Uganda SCR→Mauritius SCR 0.010 0.990 0.005 1.000 0.003 1.000 
 Uganda SCR→Rwanda SBI 2.685 0.068 1.344 0.251 0.895 0.497 
 Uganda SCR→Rwanda CSI 0.527 0.590 0.287 0.887 0.193 0.979 
 Uganda SCR→Rwanda SCR 4.947 0.007** 2.483 0.042** 1.662 0.126 
 Uganda SCR→Zambia SBI 0.294 0.745 0.459 0.766 0.415 0.870 
 Uganda SCR→Zambia CSI 0.067 0.935 16.792 0.000** 11.404 0.000*** 
 Uganda SCR→Zambia SCR 1.392 0.249 0.696 0.594 0.465 0.835 
 Zambia SCR→Kenya SBI 0.088 0.916 0.033 0.998 0.025 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Kenya CSI 0.000 1.000 0.088 0.986 0.061 0.999 
 Zambia SCR→Kenya SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Malawi SBI 4.985 0.007** 2.529 0.039** 1.655 0.128 
 Zambia SCR→Malawi CSI 0.012 0.988 0.016 1.000 0.474 0.828 
 Zambia SCR→Malawi SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Mauritius SBI 0.480 0.619 0.650 0.627 0.456 0.841 
 Zambia SCR→Mauritius CSI 3.213 0.040** 1.620 0.166 1.104 0.357 
 Zambia SCR→Mauritius SCR 0.046 0.956 0.023 0.999 0.015 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Rwanda SBI 0.002 0.998 0.002 1.000 0.001 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Rwanda CSI 1.668 0.189 0.899 0.464 0.607 0.725 
 Zambia SCR→Rwanda SCR 0.007 0.993 0.004 1.000 0.002 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Uganda SBI 8.990 0.000** 4.658 0.001** 3.072 0.005*** 
 Zambia SCR→Uganda CSI 0.095 0.909 0.047 0.996 0.035 1.000 
 Zambia SCR→Uganda SCR 0.047 0.954 0.023 0.999 0.016 1.000 
→ represents does not Granger cause       CSI represents Country Stock Index 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively         
SBI represents Sovereign Bond Index 
 
With regards to the Southern Africa, the causality test results presented in Table 4.6 
below show that there is uni-directional causality from a Botswana SCR to the South 
Africa SBI, a Namibian SCR to the South African SBI, and a Botswana SCR to a 
Namibian SCR, which indicate that there are credit rating spillovers between these 
markets. These findings could be a result of the close linkage between the Botswana 
and Namibian economies to the South African economy. In addition, the Namibian dollar 




interest rates also move closely in line with South Africa (Muchapondwa and Stage, 
2013).  
 
Table 4.6: Southern Africa Regional Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Lags 2 4 6 
Null Hypothesis F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  F-Statistic Prob.  
 Botswana SCR→Namibia CSI 2.094 0.123 1.314 0.262 0.917 0.481 
 Botswana SCR→Namibia SBI 0.498 0.608 2.077 0.081 1.893 0.078* 
 Botswana SCR→Namibia SCR 4.208 0.015** 2.111 0.077 1.412 0.206 
 Botswana SCR→South Africa CSI 0.112 0.894 0.123 0.974 0.190 0.980 
 Botswana SCR→South Africa SBI 6.962 0.001** 3.537 0.007** 2.405 0.025** 
 Botswana SCR→South Africa SCR 1.003 0.367 0.512 0.727 0.349 0.911 
 Namibia SCR→Botswana CSI 0.858 0.424 0.503 0.734 0.440 0.853 
 Namibia SCR→Botswana SBI 0.020 0.980 0.014 1.000 0.012 1.000 
 Namibia SCR→Botswana SCR 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
 Namibia SCR→South Africa CSI 0.873 0.418 0.961 0.428 1.053 0.389 
 Namibia SCR→South Africa SBI 11.694 0.000** 6.121 0.000** 4.172 0.000*** 
 Namibia SCR→South Africa SCR 0.728 0.483 0.372 0.829 0.254 0.958 
 South Africa SCR→Botswana CSI 0.657 0.519 0.212 0.932 0.329 0.922 
 South Africa SCR→Botswana SBI 1.179 0.308 0.631 0.640 0.441 0.852 
 South Africa SCR→Botswana SCR 0.245 0.783 0.123 0.974 0.082 0.998 
 South Africa SCR→Namibia CSI 0.080 0.923 0.066 0.992 0.053 0.999 
 South Africa SCR→Namibia SBI 0.755 0.470 0.977 0.419 1.688 0.120 
 South Africa SCR→Namibia SCR 0.424 0.655 0.212 0.932 0.142 0.991 
→ represents does not Granger cause       CSI represents Country Stock Index 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1, 5, 10 percent level respectively         
SBI represents Sovereign Bond Index 
 
Table 4.7 below presents results of an ordered probit model employed to test the 
robustness in the Granger Causality test. As can be seen, the results show that 
coefficients are positive but not significant, therefore an increase in the predicting 












Table 4.7: Probit Regression Results 
LR 𝜒2 22.09 
  
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.044 
Prob. > 𝜒2 0.001 
  
Log likelihood 23.84 
Parameters Coef. Std. Err. Prob. 95% Conf. interval 
SCR 0.273 0.179 0.038 0.002 0.021 
CSI 0.409 0.193 0.128 0.078 0.086 
SBI 0.015 0.647 0.017 0.022 0.772 
CSI represents Country Stock Index 
SBI represents Sovereign Bond Index 
 
4.6.2 Impulse responses 
The graphical results of the stock and bond indices impulse responses to Cholesky’s 
one standard deviation sovereign rating shock are presented in the Appendices. The 
results indicate that when a sovereign rating is shocked by one standard deviation, the 
regional stock and bond markets generally respond by less than 1 percent and this 
effect fades away within four days of a sovereign rating announcement. Thus, the 
regional sovereign rating spillover impact is very small and its effects are quickly 
absorbed into stock and bond markets prices. 
 
The cross-country impulse responses from a sovereign rating shock in one country to 
the sovereign ratings in other countries in the region are also marginal but persists for 
more than 10 periods. These effects could possibly be attributed to regional financial 
and economic integration (Braun and Raddatz, 2007) associated with capital account 
liberalization (Eichengreen et al., 2011), financial deregulation, and financial innovation 
(Causevic, 2003); as well as with monetary unions (Bayar et al., 2013) such as the CFA 
franc in West and Central Africa, the dinar in North Africa and the rand 26  indexed 
currencies in Southern and Eastern Africa. Thus, the sovereign rating shock originating 
from the any of the countries in the same region is transmitted to all other countries’ 
credit ratings. As suggested by Claeys and Vašíček (2012), the bilateral linkages 
between these countries open the channels of capital and cross-country information 
flows that determine sovereign rating spillovers and contagion. Hence, the results show 
that Drago and Gallo (2016)’s finding that a spillover effect on financial markets 
                                                          




following credit rating announcements transmitted through the international bank flows 
between regional member countries also applies to countries in Africa. 
  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the spillover effects of long-term foreign currency SCR changes 
on financial markets of neighbouring countries in 19 African countries grouped into five 
geographical regions during the period 1994 to 2014. The results of the Granger 
Causality tests find significant evidence of sovereign rating spillover effects in capital 
markets trading long-term securities such as stocks. Thus, investors consider regional 
countries’ credit rating profiles as a whole rather than on an individual country basis. 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that in accordance with Christopher et al. (2012), 
there are regional transmission channels through which both information and capital 
flows. Thus, investors shift funds from downgraded lower sovereign rated countries to 
higher rated countries, which generate spillover effects in the region’s neighbouring 
countries.  
 
Impulse response analysis further shows that the regional sovereign rating spillover 
impacts are marginal and are quickly absorbed into stock and bond markets prices. 
However, the cross-country impulse responses - from a sovereign rating shock in one 
country to the sovereign ratings in other countries in the same region - are also marginal 
but persist over longer time periods.  
 
Thus, there are five implications arising from these results. First, the regional bilateral 
linkages between countries serve as channels of capital and SCR information flow. 
Second, the regional sovereign ratings are susceptible to member countries’ 
unfavourable macro-economic conditions arising from varied economic policies, 
financial resources, infrastructure, institutional strength, and political stability. Third, the 
disparities in the levels of economic development of African states negatively affects the 
objectives of regional economic integration. Lastly, the success of the common market 
areas depends on the degree to which member countries align their national policies 




analysis suggest that it is imperative for regional countries to pursue developmental 
macroeconomic policies that will enhance cooperation and integration, and to avoid 




APPENDICES: IMPULSE RESPONSES 
 
Appendix 4A: North Africa Region  
 




















1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.830% 0.000% 0.000% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.161% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.010% -0.007% -0.001% 16.791% 0.002% 0.005% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% -0.279% -0.228% -0.228% 
3 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 16.757% -0.009% 0.047% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.278% -0.227% -0.228% 
4 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 16.727% -0.018% 0.089% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.279% -0.227% -0.230% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.695% -0.028% 0.128% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.279% -0.228% -0.232% 
6 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.663% -0.038% 0.168% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.281% -0.228% -0.236% 
7 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.631% -0.048% 0.208% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.283% -0.229% -0.241% 
8 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.599% -0.058% 0.247% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.285% -0.230% -0.246% 
9 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.568% -0.068% 0.286% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.288% -0.231% -0.253% 
10 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 16.536% -0.078% 0.325% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.291% -0.233% -0.260% 
 





















1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 17.623% 0.000% 
  -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.010% 0.000% 0.000% -0.238% -0.168% 0.000% 
2 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.016% -0.002% 17.597% -0.007% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.337% -0.292% -0.239% 
3 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% 0.016% 17.577% -0.019% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.337% -0.292% -0.239% 
4 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.002% 0.035% 17.560% -0.025% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.337% -0.292% -0.241% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.056% 17.540% -0.027% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.338% -0.292% -0.244% 
6 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.076% 17.521% -0.029% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.339% -0.293% -0.248% 
7 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.096% 17.501% -0.031% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.341% -0.293% -0.253% 
8 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.117% 17.482% -0.034% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.344% -0.294% -0.259% 
9 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.137% 17.462% -0.036% 




10 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.157% 17.443% -0.038% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.349% -0.297% -0.274% 
 





















1 -0.018% 0.024% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% 0.000% 0.003% -0.013% 19.147% 
  -0.076% -0.076% 0.000% -0.011% -0.011% 0.000% -0.259% -0.259% -0.183% 
2 -0.005% -0.016% 0.000% 0.003% -0.004% -0.008% 0.002% -0.014% 19.102% 
  -0.076% -0.076% -0.076% -0.011% -0.011% -0.011% -0.366% -0.366% -0.317% 
3 -0.002% 0.000% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.009% -0.021% 19.042% 
  -0.005% -0.004% -0.007% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.365% -0.365% -0.317% 
4 -0.002% 0.000% -0.005% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.015% -0.025% 18.986% 
  -0.005% -0.004% -0.006% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.365% -0.364% -0.318% 
5 -0.003% 0.000% -0.002% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.023% -0.030% 18.930% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.006% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.365% -0.364% -0.320% 
6 -0.003% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.030% -0.034% 18.875% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.006% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.366% -0.363% -0.323% 
7 -0.003% 0.000% -0.002% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.037% -0.038% 18.820% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.006% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.367% -0.363% -0.327% 
8 -0.002% 0.000% -0.002% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.045% -0.042% 18.765% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.005% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.369% -0.363% -0.332% 
9 -0.002% 0.000% -0.002% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.052% -0.047% 18.711% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.005% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.371% -0.364% -0.337% 
10 -0.002% 0.000% -0.002% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.059% -0.051% 18.656% 





















Appendix 4B: West Africa Region  
 






















1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 0.015% -0.018% -0.014% -0.013% -0.013% -0.006% -0.005% -0.006% 0.005% 0.000% 
  -0.053% -0.039% -0.039% -0.039% -0.039% -0.014% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 
3 -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.004% 0.000% -0.001% 
  -0.008% -0.008% -0.007% -0.006% -0.004% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% 
4 -0.001% 0.002% 0.000% 0.001% 0.005% -0.001% -0.001% 0.003% 0.001% 0.002% 
  -0.013% -0.010% -0.010% -0.009% -0.009% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% 
5 0.001% 0.002% -0.003% 0.000% 0.000% -0.002% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% -0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 
6 0.000% 0.002% -0.003% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% -0.001% 
  -0.005% -0.004% -0.004% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 
7 0.000% 0.002% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.002% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
8 0.000% 0.002% -0.002% 0.000% 0.001% -0.002% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
9 0.000% 0.002% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.002% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
10 0.000% 0.002% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.002% -0.001% 0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
 























1 16.494% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.031% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.158% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.028% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 16.385% 0.015% 0.025% 0.018% 0.013% -0.006% 0.005% 0.006% -0.065% -0.014% 
  -0.341% -0.223% -0.223% -0.223% -0.223% -0.039% -0.028% -0.028% -0.028% -0.028% 
3 16.268% 0.104% 0.039% 0.014% 0.021% 0.006% -0.005% 0.004% 0.010% 0.002% 
  -0.341% -0.225% -0.224% -0.223% -0.223% -0.008% -0.006% -0.006% -0.005% -0.005% 
4 16.144% 0.180% 0.046% -0.002% 0.011% 0.000% -0.005% 0.003% 0.005% 0.001% 
  -0.342% -0.230% -0.227% -0.222% -0.222% -0.005% -0.004% -0.004% -0.003% -0.003% 
5 16.026% 0.261% 0.058% -0.013% 0.006% 0.000% -0.003% 0.003% -0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.346% -0.238% -0.233% -0.222% -0.221% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.002% -0.001% 
6 15.909% 0.340% 0.071% -0.021% 0.004% 0.001% -0.004% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.352% -0.250% -0.242% -0.223% -0.221% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 
7 15.792% 0.417% 0.084% -0.030% 0.001% 0.001% -0.004% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.360% -0.263% -0.252% -0.225% -0.221% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 
8 15.676% 0.492% 0.098% -0.039% -0.003% 0.000% -0.004% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.371% -0.279% -0.265% -0.227% -0.222% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 
9 15.561% 0.566% 0.114% -0.048% -0.006% 0.000% -0.004% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.382% -0.296% -0.278% -0.229% -0.223% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 
10 15.447% 0.638% 0.130% -0.057% -0.010% 0.001% -0.003% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 






























1 -0.006% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 12.156% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.010% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.164% -0.116% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 -0.001% -0.004% 0.001% 0.000% -0.005% -0.021% 12.000% 0.009% -0.005% -0.026% 
  -0.014% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.276% -0.201% -0.165% -0.165% -0.165% 
3 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.032% 11.837% 0.181% 0.011% -0.020% 
  -0.003% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.274% -0.200% -0.164% -0.163% -0.163% 
4 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.000% -0.042% 11.679% 0.348% 0.009% -0.017% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.273% -0.201% -0.165% -0.162% -0.162% 
5 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.055% 11.521% 0.509% 0.008% -0.017% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.273% -0.205% -0.169% -0.161% -0.160% 
6 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.068% 11.365% 0.669% 0.008% -0.016% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.276% -0.210% -0.174% -0.161% -0.159% 
7 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.079% 11.212% 0.827% 0.008% -0.013% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.280% -0.218% -0.182% -0.161% -0.158% 
8 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.090% 11.060% 0.982% 0.008% -0.010% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.285% -0.227% -0.190% -0.162% -0.158% 
9 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.101% 10.910% 1.135% 0.008% -0.008% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.291% -0.237% -0.199% -0.163% -0.158% 
10 -0.001% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.112% 10.763% 1.285% 0.007% -0.005% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.299% -0.247% -0.209% -0.164% -0.158% 
 























1 0.002% 0.011% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.010% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.013% -0.013% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.010% -0.010% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 0.003% -0.013% 0.000% 0.013% -0.014% -0.003% -0.002% -0.003% 0.000% -0.014% 
  -0.018% -0.014% -0.013% -0.013% -0.013% -0.013% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 
3 0.000% -0.003% 0.003% -0.003% 0.003% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.003% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% 
4 0.001% -0.003% 0.003% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% 
5 0.001% -0.003% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 
6 0.001% -0.003% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
7 0.001% -0.003% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.001% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
8 0.001% -0.003% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
9 0.001% -0.003% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
10 0.001% -0.003% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
































1 0.018% -0.013% 12.985% 0.000% 0.000% -0.004% -0.005% 0.004% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.175% -0.175% -0.124% 0.000% 0.000% -0.008% -0.008% -0.008% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 0.007% -0.008% 12.957% -0.021% -0.005% 0.010% 0.001% -0.001% 0.003% -0.006% 
  -0.296% -0.248% -0.215% -0.176% -0.176% -0.011% -0.008% -0.008% -0.008% -0.008% 
3 0.009% -0.007% 12.941% -0.022% 0.015% 0.000% -0.003% 0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.297% -0.249% -0.216% -0.176% -0.176% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
4 0.011% -0.002% 12.929% -0.027% 0.032% 0.001% -0.002% 0.002% 0.001% -0.001% 
  -0.299% -0.253% -0.219% -0.177% -0.177% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
5 0.017% -0.005% 12.913% -0.030% 0.048% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.303% -0.258% -0.224% -0.178% -0.177% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
6 0.023% -0.007% 12.898% -0.033% 0.064% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.309% -0.266% -0.230% -0.180% -0.178% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
7 0.028% -0.010% 12.882% -0.036% 0.081% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.317% -0.275% -0.238% -0.182% -0.179% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
8 0.033% -0.012% 12.867% -0.039% 0.097% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.325% -0.285% -0.247% -0.185% -0.181% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
9 0.038% -0.014% 12.852% -0.042% 0.114% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.335% -0.297% -0.257% -0.188% -0.183% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
10 0.043% -0.016% 12.837% -0.046% 0.130% 0.000% -0.002% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.346% -0.309% -0.269% -0.191% -0.185% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
 























1 0.005% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.011% -0.003% -0.037% 14.853% 0.000% 
  -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 0.000% 0.000% -0.201% -0.201% -0.201% -0.142% 0.000% 
2 0.007% 0.000% -0.001% 0.015% 0.003% -0.008% -0.014% -0.050% 14.832% -0.025% 
  -0.014% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.339% -0.284% -0.284% -0.246% -0.201% 
3 0.004% -0.003% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.033% -0.029% -0.043% 14.792% -0.017% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.340% -0.285% -0.285% -0.246% -0.202% 
4 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.002% 0.001% 0.096% -0.015% -0.037% 14.751% -0.021% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.342% -0.289% -0.287% -0.247% -0.202% 
5 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.149% -0.016% -0.036% 14.710% -0.020% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.346% -0.295% -0.291% -0.247% -0.202% 
6 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.203% -0.017% -0.034% 14.669% -0.021% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.353% -0.303% -0.297% -0.248% -0.203% 
7 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.256% -0.017% -0.032% 14.629% -0.021% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.360% -0.313% -0.305% -0.250% -0.204% 
8 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.309% -0.017% -0.030% 14.588% -0.021% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.370% -0.324% -0.314% -0.252% -0.206% 
9 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.361% -0.017% -0.028% 14.548% -0.021% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.381% -0.337% -0.324% -0.254% -0.207% 
10 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.412% -0.016% -0.025% 14.508% -0.021% 





























1 -0.012% 0.012% -0.001% 0.006% 0.000% -0.005% -0.003% -0.002% -0.002% 0.000% 
  -0.044% -0.044% -0.044% -0.044% 0.000% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 0.000% 
2 0.018% -0.055% -0.015% 0.003% 0.000% 0.005% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% -0.025% 
  -0.060% -0.045% -0.045% -0.044% -0.045% -0.013% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 
3 -0.005% 0.009% -0.002% 0.004% 0.003% 0.004% -0.002% 0.000% 0.001% 0.003% 
  -0.009% -0.008% -0.007% -0.006% -0.005% -0.003% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% 
4 -0.004% 0.007% -0.004% 0.003% -0.001% 0.002% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.003% 
  -0.007% -0.007% -0.006% -0.004% -0.004% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% 
5 -0.003% 0.005% -0.004% 0.001% 0.000% 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.006% -0.006% -0.005% -0.003% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 
6 -0.003% 0.005% -0.004% 0.001% 0.000% 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.006% -0.006% -0.005% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
7 -0.003% 0.005% -0.004% 0.001% 0.001% 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.006% -0.006% -0.005% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
8 -0.003% 0.005% -0.004% 0.001% 0.000% 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.006% -0.006% -0.005% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
9 -0.003% 0.004% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.003% -0.002% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.006% -0.006% -0.005% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
10 -0.003% 0.004% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.003% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 
  -0.006% -0.005% -0.005% -0.002% -0.002% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 
 













1 0.003% 0.002% -0.013% -0.020% 13.541% 
  -0.183% -0.183% -0.183% -0.183% -0.129% 
2 -0.004% 0.001% -0.003% -0.008% 13.537% 
  -0.310% -0.260% -0.260% -0.259% -0.225% 
3 -0.002% 0.005% 0.001% -0.014% 13.512% 
  -0.311% -0.261% -0.260% -0.260% -0.225% 
4 -0.006% 0.011% 0.002% -0.016% 13.500% 
  -0.313% -0.264% -0.263% -0.260% -0.225% 
5 -0.007% 0.011% 0.000% -0.016% 13.495% 
  -0.318% -0.270% -0.267% -0.261% -0.226% 
6 -0.008% 0.012% -0.001% -0.016% 13.488% 
  -0.324% -0.278% -0.273% -0.262% -0.227% 
7 -0.008% 0.013% -0.001% -0.015% 13.480% 
  -0.332% -0.288% -0.281% -0.264% -0.228% 
8 -0.008% 0.014% -0.002% -0.015% 13.473% 
  -0.341% -0.299% -0.289% -0.266% -0.229% 
9 -0.009% 0.015% -0.003% -0.015% 13.465% 
  -0.352% -0.311% -0.299% -0.268% -0.231% 
10 -0.009% 0.016% -0.004% -0.014% 13.458% 









Appendix 4C: East Africa Region 























1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 -0.001% 0.172% 0.001% -0.035% 0.000% 0.012% 0.003% 0.003% -0.002% 0.020% 
  -0.155% -0.155% -0.155% -0.155% -0.154% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% 
3 -0.003% -0.016% 0.013% -0.017% 0.003% -0.004% -0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.003% 
  -0.014% -0.012% -0.011% -0.016% -0.014% -0.003% -0.003% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003% 
4 -0.002% -0.013% 0.009% -0.007% 0.010% -0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.012% -0.011% -0.009% -0.014% -0.013% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
5 -0.002% -0.010% 0.009% -0.008% 0.013% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.010% -0.008% -0.007% -0.011% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
6 -0.002% -0.010% 0.010% -0.009% 0.013% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.010% -0.008% -0.007% -0.011% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
7 -0.002% -0.010% 0.010% -0.010% 0.012% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.010% -0.008% -0.007% -0.011% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
8 -0.002% -0.010% 0.010% -0.009% 0.012% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.010% -0.008% -0.007% -0.011% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
9 -0.002% -0.010% 0.009% -0.009% 0.012% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.010% -0.008% -0.007% -0.011% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
10 -0.002% -0.010% 0.009% -0.009% 0.012% -0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  -0.010% -0.008% -0.007% -0.011% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
 























1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 13.547% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.129% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 -0.005% -0.008% 0.000% -0.001% -0.003% 13.493% -0.012% 0.000% -0.008% -0.004% 
  -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.224% -0.184% -0.184% -0.184% -0.184% 
3 0.002% 0.003% -0.001% 0.000% 0.002% 13.435% -0.013% 0.000% 0.041% -0.008% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.224% -0.183% -0.183% -0.184% -0.183% 
4 0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 13.379% -0.016% 0.004% 0.079% -0.008% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.224% -0.183% -0.183% -0.185% -0.184% 
5 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 13.324% -0.013% 0.003% 0.132% -0.009% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.225% -0.184% -0.183% -0.187% -0.185% 
6 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 13.270% -0.011% 0.002% 0.184% -0.009% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.226% -0.185% -0.184% -0.190% -0.186% 
7 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 13.216% -0.009% 0.001% 0.234% -0.009% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.229% -0.186% -0.185% -0.194% -0.189% 
8 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 13.163% -0.007% 0.001% 0.284% -0.009% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.232% -0.188% -0.187% -0.198% -0.192% 
9 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 13.109% -0.005% 0.000% 0.334% -0.009% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.235% -0.191% -0.188% -0.204% -0.195% 
10 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 13.056% -0.002% 0.000% 0.384% -0.009% 































1 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.013% 10.084% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.010% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.136% -0.096% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 0.002% 0.010% -0.009% 0.028% -0.003% -0.024% 10.078% 0.001% -0.002% -0.007% 
  -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.193% -0.167% -0.137% -0.137% -0.137% 
3 0.001% -0.001% 0.001% -0.004% 0.000% -0.035% 10.071% 0.007% 0.012% -0.012% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.193% -0.167% -0.137% -0.137% -0.137% 
4 0.001% -0.001% 0.001% -0.005% -0.001% -0.046% 10.067% 0.012% 0.027% -0.017% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.001% -0.194% -0.168% -0.137% -0.138% -0.138% 
5 0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.056% 10.060% 0.018% 0.042% -0.021% 
  -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.195% -0.168% -0.138% -0.140% -0.139% 
6 0.001% 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.067% 10.055% 0.023% 0.058% -0.025% 
  -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.196% -0.169% -0.139% -0.143% -0.141% 
7 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.077% 10.049% 0.028% 0.073% -0.029% 
  -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.198% -0.171% -0.140% -0.146% -0.143% 
8 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.087% 10.043% 0.034% 0.088% -0.034% 
  -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.200% -0.172% -0.142% -0.150% -0.145% 
9 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.097% 10.036% 0.039% 0.102% -0.038% 
  -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.203% -0.174% -0.143% -0.155% -0.149% 
10 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.107% 10.030% 0.045% 0.117% -0.042% 
  -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.206% -0.176% -0.145% -0.160% -0.152% 
 























1 0.000% -0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.010% -0.006% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.004% -0.004% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.010% -0.010% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 0.000% 0.005% -0.001% 0.002% 0.003% -0.006% 0.000% -0.002% 0.005% 0.000% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.004% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% -0.010% 
3 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% 0.000% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
4 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% 0.000% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
6 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
7 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
8 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
9 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
10 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.003% 0.001% 0.000% 0.002% -0.001% 
































1 0.002% 0.132% 20.345% 0.000% 0.000% -0.061% -0.066% -0.041% 0.000% 0.000% 
  -0.275% -0.275% -0.194% 0.000% 0.000% -0.547% -0.547% -0.546% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 -0.012% 0.132% 20.313% -0.030% 0.001% -0.049% -0.047% -0.018% 0.021% 1.283% 
  -0.389% -0.389% -0.337% -0.276% -0.276% -0.551% -0.552% -0.552% -0.548% -0.548% 
3 -0.015% 0.128% 20.279% -0.028% -0.010% -0.021% -0.014% 0.015% 0.050% -0.162% 
  -0.389% -0.389% -0.337% -0.277% -0.276% -0.076% -0.073% -0.071% -0.080% -0.076% 
4 -0.014% 0.128% 20.244% -0.029% -0.012% -0.012% -0.009% 0.011% 0.031% -0.024% 
  -0.390% -0.389% -0.337% -0.279% -0.277% -0.041% -0.037% -0.032% -0.049% -0.043% 
5 -0.012% 0.127% 20.209% -0.028% -0.012% -0.029% -0.005% 0.005% 0.055% -0.022% 
  -0.391% -0.390% -0.338% -0.282% -0.279% -0.034% -0.027% -0.024% -0.039% -0.032% 
6 -0.011% 0.127% 20.175% -0.028% -0.012% -0.023% -0.004% 0.006% 0.053% -0.023% 
  -0.394% -0.391% -0.339% -0.287% -0.283% -0.034% -0.026% -0.023% -0.038% -0.031% 
7 -0.009% 0.126% 20.140% -0.027% -0.012% -0.024% -0.005% 0.006% 0.051% -0.024% 
  -0.397% -0.393% -0.341% -0.294% -0.287% -0.033% -0.025% -0.023% -0.037% -0.030% 
8 -0.008% 0.125% 20.106% -0.027% -0.012% -0.024% -0.005% 0.006% 0.051% -0.023% 
  -0.401% -0.395% -0.343% -0.301% -0.292% -0.033% -0.025% -0.023% -0.037% -0.030% 
9 -0.007% 0.125% 20.071% -0.026% -0.012% -0.024% -0.005% 0.006% 0.051% -0.023% 
  -0.406% -0.397% -0.345% -0.310% -0.298% -0.033% -0.025% -0.023% -0.037% -0.030% 
10 -0.005% 0.124% 20.037% -0.025% -0.012% -0.024% -0.005% 0.006% 0.051% -0.023% 
  -0.412% -0.401% -0.348% -0.320% -0.304% -0.033% -0.025% -0.023% -0.037% -0.030% 
 























1 0.009% -0.006% 0.019% 0.000% 0.000% -0.022% 0.007% 0.016% 11.572% 0.000% 
  -0.049% -0.049% -0.049% 0.000% 0.000% -0.156% -0.156% -0.156% -0.111% 0.000% 
2 0.018% 0.010% -0.008% -0.005% -0.022% -0.020% 0.011% 0.016% 11.555% 0.000% 
  -0.051% -0.051% -0.051% -0.049% -0.049% -0.222% -0.222% -0.222% -0.192% -0.157% 
3 -0.003% -0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 0.007% -0.020% 0.010% 0.017% 11.531% 0.031% 
  -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.015% -0.221% -0.221% -0.221% -0.192% -0.157% 
4 0.004% 0.000% 0.002% -0.003% 0.003% -0.020% 0.007% 0.018% 11.506% 0.056% 
  -0.004% -0.004% -0.003% -0.004% -0.004% -0.222% -0.221% -0.221% -0.193% -0.158% 
5 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.002% -0.020% 0.005% 0.019% 11.483% 0.083% 
  -0.003% -0.003% -0.002% -0.003% -0.003% -0.223% -0.222% -0.221% -0.195% -0.159% 
6 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.020% 0.003% 0.020% 11.459% 0.109% 
  -0.003% -0.002% -0.002% -0.003% -0.002% -0.224% -0.222% -0.222% -0.197% -0.161% 
7 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.020% 0.000% 0.021% 11.435% 0.135% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.003% -0.002% -0.226% -0.223% -0.222% -0.200% -0.163% 
8 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.020% -0.002% 0.022% 11.411% 0.161% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.003% -0.002% -0.228% -0.224% -0.223% -0.203% -0.166% 
9 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.020% -0.004% 0.022% 11.387% 0.187% 
  -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.003% -0.002% -0.231% -0.226% -0.224% -0.207% -0.169% 
10 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.020% -0.006% 0.023% 11.363% 0.212% 

































1 0.002% 0.020% 0.010% 0.007% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.002% 0.000% 
  -0.052% -0.052% -0.052% -0.052% 0.000% -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% 0.000% 
2 0.005% 0.008% 0.013% 0.016% 0.006% -0.002% 0.000% 0.001% -0.001% -0.005% 
  -0.052% -0.052% -0.052% -0.052% -0.052% -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% 
3 0.004% -0.002% 0.005% -0.005% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.002% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.003% -0.005% -0.004% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% -0.002% 
4 0.005% -0.001% 0.004% -0.003% 0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 
  -0.005% -0.004% -0.004% -0.006% -0.005% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
5 0.007% 0.002% 0.003% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.003% -0.004% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 
6 0.006% 0.001% 0.003% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.004% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 
7 0.006% 0.001% 0.004% -0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.004% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 
8 0.006% 0.001% 0.003% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.004% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 
9 0.006% 0.001% 0.003% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.004% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 
10 0.006% 0.001% 0.003% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.001% 
  -0.004% -0.003% -0.002% -0.004% -0.003% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 
 













1 -0.002% 0.006% 0.002% -0.001% 12.282% 
  -0.166% -0.166% -0.166% -0.166% -0.117% 
2 -0.006% 0.008% -0.002% 0.003% 12.257% 
  -0.235% -0.235% -0.235% -0.235% -0.204% 
3 -0.007% 0.040% -0.002% -0.001% 12.233% 
  -0.235% -0.235% -0.235% -0.235% -0.203% 
4 -0.009% 0.063% -0.002% -0.007% 12.203% 
  -0.235% -0.235% -0.234% -0.236% -0.204% 
5 -0.008% 0.091% -0.003% -0.010% 12.180% 
  -0.236% -0.235% -0.235% -0.237% -0.205% 
6 -0.007% 0.119% -0.003% -0.014% 12.155% 
  -0.237% -0.236% -0.235% -0.239% -0.206% 
7 -0.007% 0.146% -0.003% -0.018% 12.131% 
  -0.239% -0.236% -0.236% -0.241% -0.208% 
8 -0.007% 0.173% -0.004% -0.021% 12.107% 
  -0.242% -0.238% -0.237% -0.244% -0.210% 
9 -0.007% 0.200% -0.004% -0.024% 12.082% 
  -0.245% -0.239% -0.238% -0.248% -0.213% 
10 -0.007% 0.227% -0.004% -0.028% 12.058% 






Appendix 4D: Southern Africa Region  




















1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.386% 0.000% 0.000% 
  0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.233% 0.000% 0.000% 
2 0.009% 0.011% 0.073% -0.014% -0.001% -0.001% 24.364% 0.006% 0.015% 
  -0.111% -0.111% -0.111% -0.009% -0.009% -0.009% -0.404% -0.330% -0.330% 
3 -0.007% -0.002% 0.016% 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 24.370% 0.001% 0.039% 
  -0.008% -0.007% -0.008% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.404% -0.330% -0.330% 
4 -0.006% 0.000% 0.008% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.383% -0.002% 0.066% 
  -0.008% -0.008% -0.009% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.406% -0.332% -0.333% 
5 -0.004% 0.000% 0.012% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.372% -0.003% 0.080% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.007% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% -0.408% -0.334% -0.337% 
6 -0.004% 0.000% 0.012% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.358% -0.004% 0.095% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.007% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.410% -0.336% -0.341% 
7 -0.004% 0.000% 0.012% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.346% -0.004% 0.110% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.007% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.413% -0.340% -0.347% 
8 -0.004% 0.000% 0.012% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.333% -0.005% 0.124% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.007% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.416% -0.343% -0.353% 
9 -0.004% 0.000% 0.012% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.321% -0.006% 0.138% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.007% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.420% -0.348% -0.361% 
10 -0.004% 0.000% 0.012% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 24.309% -0.007% 0.153% 
  -0.005% -0.005% -0.007% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.424% -0.353% -0.369% 
 




















1 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 0.024% 0.000% 0.000% 0.010% 18.958% 0.000% 
  -0.012% 0.000% 0.000% -0.017% 0.000% 0.000% -0.256% -0.181% 0.000% 
2 0.012% -0.013% 0.014% 0.036% 0.011% 0.003% 0.013% 18.919% -0.003% 
  -0.012% -0.012% -0.012% -0.017% -0.017% -0.017% -0.362% -0.314% -0.257% 
3 0.001% 0.001% 0.000% 0.001% 0.000% 0.000% 0.045% 18.883% -0.003% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.002% -0.001% -0.002% -0.362% -0.314% -0.257% 
4 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% -0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.074% 18.852% -0.006% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.362% -0.314% -0.258% 
5 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.108% 18.816% -0.002% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.363% -0.315% -0.260% 
6 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% -0.001% 0.000% 0.142% 18.781% 0.001% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.364% -0.316% -0.263% 
7 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.177% 18.746% 0.005% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.365% -0.317% -0.267% 
8 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.211% 18.711% 0.009% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.367% -0.319% -0.272% 
9 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.245% 18.676% 0.012% 
  -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.001% -0.369% -0.322% -0.278% 
10 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.000% 0.279% 18.641% 0.016% 





























1 0.0100% 0.0113% 0.0000% -0.0092% 0.0101% 0.0000% -0.0053% 0.0017% 16.5831% 
  -0.0820% -0.0820% 0.0000% -0.0140% -0.0140% 0.0000% -0.2240% -0.2240% -0.1590% 
2 0.0117% 0.0090% 0.0101% 0.0043% -0.0113% 0.0170% -0.0062% 0.0033% 16.4964% 
  -0.0830% -0.0830% -0.0830% -0.0140% -0.0140% -0.0140% -0.3160% -0.3160% -0.2740% 
3 -0.0039% 0.0094% -0.0022% 0.0017% -0.0012% -0.0012% 0.0059% 0.0072% 16.4220% 
  -0.0062% -0.0053% -0.0062% -0.0014% -0.0012% -0.0011% -0.3150% -0.3150% -0.2730% 
4 -0.0010% 0.0142% -0.0057% 0.0014% 0.0001% -0.0021% 0.0225% 0.0072% 16.3537% 
  -0.0056% -0.0048% -0.0061% -0.0012% -0.0012% -0.0013% -0.3150% -0.3140% -0.2730% 
5 -0.0004% 0.0126% -0.0032% 0.0008% -0.0007% -0.0012% 0.0308% 0.0094% 16.2817% 
  -0.0041% -0.0039% -0.0053% -0.0007% -0.0006% -0.0008% -0.3140% -0.3140% -0.2740% 
6 -0.0011% 0.0122% -0.0030% 0.0007% -0.0008% -0.0011% 0.0388% 0.0112% 16.2101% 
  -0.0040% -0.0039% -0.0052% -0.0007% -0.0006% -0.0008% -0.3140% -0.3140% -0.2750% 
7 -0.0009% 0.0123% -0.0031% 0.0008% -0.0008% -0.0012% 0.0470% 0.0131% 16.1387% 
  -0.0040% -0.0039% -0.0052% -0.0006% -0.0006% -0.0008% -0.3150% -0.3140% -0.2770% 
8 -0.0009% 0.0123% -0.0031% 0.0008% -0.0007% -0.0012% 0.0552% 0.0151% 16.0676% 
  -0.0040% -0.0039% -0.0052% -0.0006% -0.0006% -0.0008% -0.3150% -0.3150% -0.2800% 
9 -0.0009% 0.0122% -0.0031% 0.0008% -0.0008% -0.0012% 0.0633% 0.0170% 15.9969% 
  -0.0040% -0.0039% -0.0052% -0.0006% -0.0006% -0.0008% -0.3160% -0.3160% -0.2830% 
10 -0.0008% 0.0122% -0.0030% 0.0008% -0.0008% -0.0011% 0.0714% 0.0189% 15.9264% 























DO SOVEREIGN CREDIT RATINGS POSITIVELY AFFECT CAPITAL 
MARKET EFFICIENCY IN AFRICA? 
 
5.1 Summary abstract 
This chapter investigates the effect of long-term foreign currency sovereign credit rating 
announcements on long-term foreign currency denominated bonds and stocks in 19 
African countries over the period of 1994 to 2014. The results of Ljung–Box Q 
autocorrelation, runs and variance ratio tests find that sovereign credit ratings do not 
significantly impact bond market efficiency. In contrast, stock markets show evidence of 
weak form efficiency implying that long-term sovereign credit ratings positively affect 
equities market efficiency in Africa. 
 
5.2 Introduction 
A SCR is one of the major external forces that influence financial markets by imposing 
discipline on governments and other market participants (Duygun et al., 2016). Bolton et 
al. (2012) claim that the monitoring indicators assigned by CRAs reduce governments’ 
monopoly in structuring policies, regulations and controls that stifle innovation and 
productivity. In addition, Ekins and Calabria (2012) report that CRAs contribute to 
market efficiency by providing accurate, clear and reliable assessments of the solvency 
of participants in the financial markets.  
 
Other studies argue that the informational effects of rating agencies on financial markets 
is irrelevant in developed markets because they are efficient (Fama, 1965; Fama, 1970; 
Ojah and Karemera,1999; Norden and Weber, 2004; Hooper et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
Gande and Parsley (2014) add that the significant decline in the reputation of CRAs 
following the global financial crisis suggests that their role in influencing financial market 
efficiency is diminishing. On the other hand, Kiff et al. (2010) argue that credit ratings 




information asymmetry through ‘rating shopping’ from agencies that assign high ratings 
in order to reduce borrowing costs. However, the correct function of credit ratings is to 
enhance transparency and efficiency in financial markets by reducing the information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (Gande and Parsley, 2014).  
 
The theory of market efficiency was pioneered by Fama (1965), whose efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) assert that it is impossible for investors to outperform financial 
markets because security prices reflect all available relevant information. Consistent 
with the EMH, Samuelson (1973) developed the random walk hypothesis (RWH) from 
Cootner (1966)’s idea of the random character of stock market prices, which argues that 
security prices fluctuate randomly and cannot be predicted. However, Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980), Lo and MacKinlay (1988), Stein (1989) and Campbell et al. (1996) 
subsequently provide empirical evidence that financial markets are not efficient and that 
the random walk model is not consistent with the stochastic behaviour of security 
returns.  
 
Malkiel (2003) argues that investors are subject to waves of optimism and pessimism 
created by credit ratings, which cause security prices to deviate systematically from 
their fundamental values. It can thus be argued that financial markets cannot be 
perfectly efficient as there would thus be no incentive for investors to hire financial 
analysts to actively optimise their security portfolios (Shleifer, 2000; Shleifer, 2004; 
Birru, 2012; Majumder, 2012; Hirshleifer et al., 2013). Furthermore, the increasing 
sophistication of information databases (Zuo, 2016) and empirical techniques suggests 
that investors are confident that it is possible to fundamentally forecast future security 
prices (So, 2013). Therefore, abnormal returns arise from the departures of security 
prices from efficiency (Ikram and Nugroho, 2014). Thus, Ikram and Nugroho argue that 
if credit ratings enhance financial market efficiency then inefficient markets should 
become more efficient in the long-term following credit rating announcements. 
 
The information function of CRAs constitutes due diligence, which enhances investor 




information efficiency (Sewell, 2011). While studies on market efficiency have been 
widely conducted in both developed and emerging markets, investigation on the 
efficiency of African markets. However, most studies find that African stock markets are 
weak form efficient (Muragu, 1990; Mlambo and Biekpe, 2007; Ajao and Osayuwu, 
2012), and are thus comparable with emerging stock markets in Asia and Latin America, 
depending on the type of information being incorporated.  
 
Although the literature on African financial market efficiency has been growing, studies 
that test the effects of SCR announcements on financial markets efficiency are rare. 
Thus, this chapter contributes to the African financial market efficiency literature in three 
ways. First, by being amongst the first empirical analysis to explore how credit rating 
announcements enhance the efficiency of stock and bond prices.  Second, by applying 
a combination of three weak form efficiency tests instead of the more common 
approach of utilising just one or two tests. Lastly, by measuring the efficiency of both the 
capital markets rather than just focusing on the efficiency of equities markets. Thus, it 
explores the following two sub-questions. First, does the levels of market efficiency 
change following sovereign credit announcements? Second, does the presence of 
sovereign credit ratings have an effect on market efficiency? 
 
Following Mlambo and Biekpe (2007) and Ajao and Osayuwu (2012), this paper applies 
Ljung–Box Q, Runs and the variance ratio tests (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Ntim et al., 
2011) to examine if African bond and stock prices remain weak form inefficient after 
SCR announcements; and the Engle-Granger Cointegration (Engle and Granger, 1987) 
and Granger causality (Granger, 1988) tests to investigate SCRs effect on semi-strong 
market efficiency. 
 
5.3 Literature Review 
The empirical analyses on the efficiency of financial markets gained momentum in the 
1960s with studies in support of the EMH and the RWH indicating that security prices 
always fully reflect available information. No investor or analyst could outperform the 




chance (Fama et al., 1969). Critics however present the momentum effect observed in 
the security returns of some countries (such as seasonal effects, asset bubbles and 
credit bubbles) to argue against financial markets efficiency (Shiller, 2003).  
 
Thus, this literature review proceeds as follows. First, the literature that analyses credit 
rating impacts on market efficiency using cross-regional data is explored, followed by 
studies on developed countries and emerging markets. The literature review then 
concludes with an analysis of studies exploring the sovereign rating information 
efficiency of African financial markets. 
 
5.3.1 Cross-Regional Studies 
Generally, cross-regional studies report mixed findings on the effect of credit ratings on 
efficiency at different times and market conditions. Notably, Norden and Weber (2004) 
analyse the efficiency of financial markets in responding to rating announcements made 
by the three international rating agencies during the period from 2000 to 2002. Applying 
the event study method to 60,827 credit default swap spreads of 90 firms from Europe, 
the United States and Asia, and on the Stoxx 50, S&P500 and Topix 100 indices, they 
find that financial markets anticipate all credit rating actions starting approximately two 
to three months before the announcement date. Thus, they conclude that financial 
markets are weak form efficient. However, they further observe that rating reviews are 
still associated with significant abnormal reactions, which implies evidence against the 
semi-strong form efficiency. 
 
Additionally, Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) measure the weak form sovereign rating 
information efficiency of the debt and equity markets in 34 emerging and developed 
countries over the period of 1990 to 2000. They find that market efficiency depends on 
the cost of relevant information and argue that if the marginal benefit of collecting and 
processing relevant information (such as credit ratings) exceeds its marginal cost to an 
investor, then the market will be information efficient because prices will incorporate all 
publicly available information. It can however be assumed that, in an efficient market, 




arbitrage opportunities. Thus, Hooper et al. (2008) investigate the speed of security 
prices adjustment to rating announcements among 42 countries listed on Datastream 
Global Market Indices, the S&P or the IFC over the nine-year period from 1995 to 2003. 
Their panel regression models reveal that the speed of security price adjustments to 
rating announcements is insignificant on the announcement day, which indicates that 
markets are thus absorbing new tradable information in weak efficient form.  
 
Contrary to other cross-regional studies, Lee et al. (2010) argue that security returns are 
weak form inefficient. They employ panel data stationarity tests that incorporate multiple 
structural breaks to investigate whether the efficient market hypothesis holds in stock 
markets in 32 developed and 26 developing countries over the period from 1999 to 
2007. They find that stock returns are stationary processes in both developed and 
developing countries. Since nonstationarity is a necessary condition for market 
efficiency, they conclude that security returns are inconsistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis, which implies that there are profitable arbitrage opportunities among stock 
markets.  
 
Safari and Ariff (2015) examine the FTSE Bond indices for a sample of 94 rating 
announcements from nine developing countries between 1998 and 2013. They report 
that inefficiency and instability of capital markets are economic consequences of 
emotionally driven information whereby investors overreact when they are uncertain on 
how to incorporate announcement information into their expectations of future security 
performance. Therefore, Safari and Ariff argue that fund managers are paid to beat 
benchmarks above their peers to maintain funds inflows. Hence, the contracts between 
investors and their fund managers are a critical point of friction that encourages them to 
look for momentums, which are usually divorced from the real fundamentals, eventually 
creating bubbles and mispricings. Safari and Ariff then conclude that, in accordance with  
Lee et al. (2010), developing financial markets are weak form inefficient.  
 
The majority of cross-country studies thus find that financial markets anticipate credit 




are weak form efficient. In contrast, some cross-country studies find that security returns 
are stationary processes in both developed and developing countries, which implies that 
security returns are weak form inefficient. These studies thus argue that if financial 
markets were efficient, there would be no rational reason why investors hire fund 
managers and pay them to exploit arbitrage opportunities. However, studies on 
developed markets imply that the investing public is confident in their financial system 
because the channels of information dissemination are assumed to be well-established 
and efficient. Thus, the information provision role of credit ratings is irrelevant because 
there would be neither information asymmetries nor arbitrage opportunities.  
 
5.3.2 Developed Countries’ Studies 
Fama (1965) is acknowledged as among the key contributors to the theory of financial 
market efficiency. Applying serial correlation tests on the U.S. DJIA index returns over 
the time period 1957 to 1962, he finds evidence in support of the random walk in stock 
market prices. Fama thus challenges the proponents of both technical and fundamental 
analyses, empirically proving that the markets are efficient because security prices 
adjust very rapidly to new information. Fama (1970) further reports that markets are in 
equilibrium when current prices at any point in time fully reflect all available information. 
Therefore, institutions such as rating agencies that are created to provide expert 
information to financial markets are irrelevant. 
 
In the North American region, Pinches and Singleton (1978) investigate the efficiency 
equilibrium market models using 207 companies listed on the CRSP U.S. total market 
index between 1950 and 1972. Later on, Goh and Ederington (1993) apply event 
studies to examine the reaction of the Wall Street Journal Index returns to Moody's 
bond rating changes during  the period from 1984 to 1986. Similar to Fama (1970), both 
studies find that financial markets are efficient when in equilibrium and that financial 
market participants are rational, well-informed and have the ability to determine the 
quality of the borrowers in the market without the aid of credit rating information. Hence, 
ratings are irrelevant in security pricing because all fundamentals are quickly 





However, other studies on the North American markets suggest that markets routinely 
depart from efficiency and random walk. Katz (1974) is acknowledged as amongst the 
first to discover security markets inefficiency in the context of sovereign rating 
information by testing the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis. In support of Katz (1974), 
Danos et al. (1984) and Ederington et al. (1987) assert that bond rating agencies 
possess expert judgement and are specialists at processing information related to firm’s 
financial condition at low cost than the benefit. Similarly, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) apply 
volatility-based specification test to examine the random walk hypothesis on NYSE-
AMEX market return indices between 1962 and 1985. Their tests reject the random 
walk hypothesis, which imply that security price formation is inefficient. Thus, credit 
ratings play a pivotal role in disseminating information and reducing uncertainty. 
 
Reisen and von Maltzan (1998) conduct an event study on a sample of U.S. stock 
markets measured by International Finance Corporation (IFC) Global indices to test the 
information efficiency during the period 1987 and 1996. Brooks et al. (2004) also apply 
the event study method on The MSCI World Index over the period from 1973 to 2001 to 
test the weak form efficiency. The results of both studies show that financial markets are 
weak form informationally inefficient. Both studies thus conclude that public 
announcements such as credit ratings act as an equalizer in the capital markets by 
reducing the ability of investors to outperform each other by making better judgements 
about creditworthiness. Brooks et al. (2004) however questions the inconsistent 
financial market reactions, which cannot be solely attributed to informational events, 
superior judgements and expert knowledge conveyed in information published in credit 
rating reports.  
 
Thus, Kim et al. (2011) follow on Brooks et al. (2004) and examine the efficiency of the 
U.S. markets by using two autocorrelation test statistics (the variance ratio and 
portmanteau) to test the predictability of the DJIA index from 1900 to 2009. They find 
evidence that time varying returns are highly predictable with a moderate degree of 




economic fundamentals. This implies that a publicly available prudent credit rating 
system can aid in counteracting the effects of rumours and speculation, which increase 
efficiency and public confidence in a financial system. 
 
With regards to Japanese and European markets, Naraya and Smyth (2007) provide 
evidence in support of the random walk hypothesis in G7 stock market indices from 
1960 to 2003 using unit root test that allows two structural breaks in the returns series. 
Furthermore, they find insignificant evidence in support of mean reversion in security 
returns. However, unlike other countries that follow a random walk, they find mixed 
evidence in Japan, which shows that stock prices are stationary. They argue that the 
ratings can increase rather than reduce information asymmetry when market 
participants misinterpret and mischaracterize them by creating faulty assumptions and 
flawed decisions.  
 
In contrast, some studies on European markets counter that financial markets are 
neither completely efficient nor inefficient. Dockery and Kavussanos (1996) investigate 
the weak form efficiency on the Athens stock market between 1988 and 1994 using 
regression models and Wald statistical tests. Contrary to studies that find evidence in 
support of the random walk hypothesis in G7 countries,  Dockery and Kavussanos’ 
results significantly reject the random walk hypothesis, which is a necessary condition 
for a financial market to be called efficient. Similarly, Steiner and Heinke (2001) analyse 
the Eurobond market over the period from 1985 to 1996 by means of univariate tests 
and cross-sectional regressions. They also find the Eurobond market to be significantly 
weak form inefficient, which concurs with Dockery and Kavussanos (1996). Both studies 
thus conclude that financial markets are informationally inefficient and security prices 
move systematically over time. Hence, credit rating reports convey information that is 
not entirely available to all market participants.  
 
Thus in summary, there is little consensus on the effects that credit rating 
announcements have on the efficiency of financial markets in developed countries. 




efficient, the effects of credit ratings on financial markets efficiency are significant. Thus, 
credit ratings play an important efficiency role by disseminating information and 
reducing uncertainty, which improves public confidence in a financial system. However, 
as explored below, empirical studies undertaken on developing countries argue that 
markets are generally inefficient and weak form efficient at best; possibly due to their 
relatively small, under developed and illiquid states, and thus credit rating information 
could have a significant impact. 
 
5.3.3 Studies on Developing Countries 
In contrast to the studies discussed above, the majority of the literature on developing 
countries finds that financial markets are largely inefficient and institutions such as 
rating agencies possess information that is not available in the public domain. Thus, 
investors rely primarily on credit rating announcements to determine asset values.  
 
With regards to Asian markets, Griffin and Sanvicente (1982) are acknowledged as 
among the first to investigate financial market information efficiency in the context of 
sovereign rating announcements in Asian markets (excluding Japan). Applying an event 
study method to monthly data from 1970 to 1980, they find that financial markets are 
efficient and thus they argue that the role of credit ratings in shaping market efficiency is 
largely insignificant. They however note that the efficiency observed in both developed 
and developing markets could be a result of the increased regulatory oversight by the 
Securities and Exchange Commissions which aims to promote transparency and 
efficiency following the security market crashes.  
 
In contrast, Subasi (2008) examines the behaviour of Asian market indices returns 
around the time of sovereign bond rating changes by Moody’s and Fitch between 1995 
and 2007. The analysis rejects the market efficiency and random walk hypotheses, 
which implies that CRAs are specialists at generating, obtaining and processing issuers’ 
default risk information that was not previously in the financial markets. Thus, Subasi 
concludes that indices of thinly traded markets may not represent the true underlying 






In the case of Arab countries, Islam and Khaled (2005) adopt heteroskedasticity-robust 
tests to examine the efficiency of the relatively small Asian stock markets (Dhaka and 
Muscat Stock Exchanges) between 1990 and 2001. Their findings concur with Subasi 
(2008) as they also significantly reject weak form market efficiency and the random walk 
hypothesis in the small Gulf markets. They thus conclude in accordance with Subasi 
(2008) that the infrequent trading on the Gulf markets could have significantly influenced 
their results. Nonetheless, Islam and Khaled argue that market participants constantly 
look for sovereign creditworthiness signals through the fiscal health and economic 
prospects of a country. 
 
Similarly, Abraham et al. (2002) test the random walk behaviour and weak form 
efficiency of the three major Gulf stock markets (Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) 
using the variance ratio and runs tests over the period 1992 to 1998 while Abdmoulah 
(2010) examines 11 Arab stock markets for the period 2009 to 2011 using GARCH-M 
(1,1) model with state-space time-varying parameters. Both studies observe weak form 
inefficiency in all the stock markets and a high sensitivity to the past market shocks such 
as contemporaneous crises. This contrasts with more stable and mature markets in 
developed countries. Abdmoulah however cites the ineffectiveness of liberalisation and 
reforms undertaken to intensify efforts to expand, deepen, improve liquidity, 
transparency and reduce consentrated trading in these markets. Thus, Abdmoulah 
conclude that credit ratings enhance long-term investment culture that effectively 
develop market efficiency.  
 
With regards to the efficiency of Latin American and Caribbean emerging markets, 
Urrutia (1995) uses variance ratio tests on four Latin American (Agentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and Chile) emerging markets from 1975 to 1991. Similarly, Ojah and Karemera (1999) 
also test the random walk by applying multiple variance ratio and autoregressive 
fractional integrated moving average tests on the same countries from 1987 to 1997. 




They suggest that the rejection of random walk and acceptance of weak form efficiency 
is because Latin American index returns are expressed in local currencies and that 
domestic investors may not be able to detect patterns in stock returns to realise the 
abnormal returns trends. This implies that there is an inconsistent credit rating impact on 
market efficiency between domestic and international investors. Hence, domestic 
investors may not be able to design profitable trading strategies leveraged on credit 
rating information like their international counterparts using comparable index 
adjustments.  
 
Conversely, Grieb and Reyes (1999) examine the random walk properties of the 
Brazilian and Mexican stock markets from 1988 to 1995 using variance ratio test. They 
find that market returns are mean reverting in Mexico whilst they are not in Brazil. They 
also report that only Brazil has a tendency towards exhibiting a random walk. More 
recently, Robinson and Bangwayo-Skeete (2015) use event studies on six emerging 
markets in the Commonwealth Caribbean over the period from 2001 to 2015 to test the 
semi-strong form market efficiency. In accordance with Ojah and Karemera (1999), they 
find that security markets in the region are generally weak form efficient. Robinson and 
Bangwayo-Skeete however observe semi-strong form inefficiency as the markets do not 
generally react to sovereign debt restructurings and credit ratings reviews because 
investors fundamentally anticipate these events. Grieb and Reyes (1999) attribute the 
mixed findings in studies on the Latin American region possibly to the cross-sectional 
variations in the degree of infrequent trading in these emerging financial markets. Ojah 
and Karemera (1999) further suggest that the markets could have become efficient 
possibly because of strengthened regulatory frameworks following the structural breaks 
caused by financial crises.  
 
Finally, Majumder (2012) develops a rational model of asset pricing to examine the 
weak form efficiency of the BRIC and U.S. markets between 2001 to 2011. He finds  
that in less efficient markets, security prices are more emotionally driven and 
incorporate a high degree of market sentiments. Thus, fund managers and analysts 




fundamentals. He therefore argues that financial markets, in both developed and large 
emerging economies, cease to be efficient when driven by emotions because investor 
sentiment dominate decision-making.  
 
Thus these studies show that, with only a few exceptions, most emerging financial 
markets are largely inefficient and that the informational role of credit rating institutions 
in shaping market efficiency is significant. However, the literature below, analysing 
market efficiency using cross-regional data, argues that the effect of credit ratings on 
market efficiency depends on the cost of accessing the credit rating information.  
 
5.3.4 Studies on Africa 
Magnusson and Wydick (2002) adopt autocorrelation functions and the Box-Pierce Q-
statistics to test whether the eight largest27 African stock markets meet the weak form 
stock market efficiency criterion over a 24-month period from 1998 to 2000. They find 
that African markets are generally weak form efficient, comparable to other emerging 
financial markets in Asia and Latin America. Magnusson and Wydick conclude that the 
weak form efficiency observed in African markets could thus largely be a result of the 
internationalization of financial markets, which improves transparency and efficiency so 
as to deter market manipulation. Hence, increasing the level of transparency in 
emerging financial markets reduces uncertainty about the issuers’ credit risks.  
 
Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003) address the variable measurement and econometric 
problems in most market efficiency studies that assume linearity in expected returns and 
also fail to account for thin trading by applying EGARCH-M to model index returns of 11 
African stock markets from 1990 to 1994. In contrast to Magnusson and Wydick (2002), 
Appiah-Kusi and Menyah reject weak form efficiency in Botswana, Ghana, Ivory Coast, 
Nigeria and Swaziland South Africa; whilst Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius and Morocco and 
Zimbabwe are found to be weak form efficient. They argue that despite prior evidence to 
the contrary, age and market size are not important factors in determining  efficiency. 
                                                          
27 Based on market capitalisation, the countries are; Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, 




Their findings show that the two largest and oldest markets in Africa (Nigeria and South 
Africa) are amongst the inefficient markets whereas some smaller and newer financial 
markets such as Mauritius show evidence of weak form efficiency. They thus conclude 
that weak form efficiency is not directly related to market age, number of firms, trade 
volume, market capitalisation, nor transaction costs as market participants do not exploit 
potentially profitable opportunities because the transaction costs that arise will outweigh 
any potential gains. 
 
Jefferis and Smith (2005) test the evolving efficiency of all 29 Africa’s stock markets for 
the period 1990 to 2001. Adopting the GARCH approach with time-varying parameters, 
they find that in contrast to Magnusson and Wydick (2002) and Appiah-Kusi and 
Menyah (2003), only the Johannesburg stock market (JSE) is weak form efficient, while 
Morocco, Egypt and Nigeria are below weak form efficient, and the other 25 African 
stock markets show no tendency towards weak form efficiency. Additionally, Simons and 
Laryea (2006) employ both parametric (autocorrelation, variance ratio autoregressive 
tests) and non-parametric tests (Kolmogrov-Smirnov goodness of fit and runs tests) to 
explore the efficiency of four African stock markets (Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius and South 
Africa) between 1990 and 2003. Their results find that only the South African stock 
market is weak form efficient, whereas Ghana, Mauritius and Egypt are inefficient. 
Contrary to Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003), both Jefferis and Smith (2005) and 
Simons and Laryea (2006) conclude that market imperfections, low disclosure 
requirements, thin and nonsynchronous trading and high cost of capital to investors 
cause the inefficiencies in African markets.  
 
Mlambo and Biekpe (2007) further investigate the weak form efficiency of 10 African 
stock markets using the runs test for serial dependency from 1998 to 2005. Partially 
similar to Jefferis and Smith’s (2005) findings, they report that not all securities on each 
exchange are efficient. Thus, a significant number of securities in each market show 
evidence of generally weak form market efficiency while the remainder rejects the 
random walk hypothesis. Ajao and Osayuwu (2012) apply the Box-Ljung statistic and 




2001 to 2010 to test the weak form efficiency. Similar to Mlambo and Biekpe (2007), 
Ajao and Osayuwu also find a significant number of securities showing evidence of 
weak form market efficiency. Both studies thus conclude that not all securities are weak 
form efficient even when the financial markets overally show weak form efficiency 
tendencies. 
 
The literature on the informational efficiency of African financial markets is still relatively 
thin and the conclusions are highly fragmented. A number of studies present evidence 
that the more established financial markets with large number of securities and high 
capitalization levels are usually weak form efficient because information about them is 
widely available on the market. In contrast, other studies argue that age and market size 
are irrelevant in determining market efficiency, as large and old markets remain weak 
form inefficient whilst some smaller and newer markets show evidence of weak form 
efficiency. However other literature posits that no financial market has all its securities 
completely weak form efficient or inefficient and instead most markets have a 
combination of both efficient and inefficient securities. 
 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
Thus in summary, the majority of studies that analyse the efficiency of financial markets 
in Africa find that the responses to rating announcements made by the three 
international rating agencies tends to adhere to weak form efficiency as they anticipate 
credit rating actions prior to their announcement dates. There is however disagreements 
on why there are significant abnormal reactions associated with the announcements of 
credit rating changes. Hence, other studies on emerging markets argue that markets 
are inefficient and unstable following credit rating announcement because investors 
overreact to the uncertainty of how to incorporate the announcements information into 
their expectations of future security performance. The general consensus is therefore 
that security price formation is inefficient and credit ratings play a pivotal role in 
disseminating information and reducing uncertainty. Thus, the role of credit ratings in 
shaping market efficiency is still an area of ongoing debate and studies dedicated to the 





5.4 Data and Methodology 
Africa’s financial markets are relatively under-developed and thus suffer from illiquidity, 
thin trading and information asymmetry (Kenny and Moss, 1998; Patel, 2014; Ravi and 
Hong, 2014). Hence, securities traded in African financial markets are classified as high 
yield to compensate investors for perceived high risk (Smith and Dyakova, 2014). Since 
1994 a total of 30 African countries have received SCRs from the three international 
CRAs; the information which, in accordance with Ikram and Nugroho (2014), could 
positively affect the efficiency of financial markets. This section provides a summary of 
the data and methodology used in exploring how credit ratings affect financial market 
efficiency in Africa. 
 
5.4.1 Data 
The analysis of the credit rating effect on market efficiency makes use of the foreign 
currency long-term sovereign ratings announcements of 19 African countries28 that have 
both operational stock and debt markets, and have received a SCR by any or all of the 
three largest CRAs (Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch) over the period of 1994 to 
201429. As suggested by Flores (2010), only long-term foreign currency-denominated 
ratings are used because they are more liquid and have extensive rating information. In 
accordance with Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), to create a series, the long-term 
sovereign rating symbols used by the three international rating agencies are linearly 
transformed from ordinal rating scales into numbers corresponding to each rating grade. 
The positive (negative) changes in rating outlook and positive (negative) additions to 
watchlists are accounted for by adding 0.5 (-0.5) and 0.25 (-0.25) to one credit rating 
notch respectively.  
 
In addition, the daily foreign currency-denominated S&P 10-year sovereign bond index, 
which track the performance of both local and sovereign bonds, and the daily United 
                                                          
28 There are a total of 30 African countries with a SCRs from the big three international CRAs, but only 19 
of them have considerably active debt and stock markets. 
29 These include Burkina Faso, Benin, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, 





States dollar-denominated Africa-oriented S&P value-weighted stock indices for each of 
the 19 countries are used to measure bond and stock market performance respectively. 
The daily bond and stock market data was obtained from Bloomberg and Reuters, while 
the SCR and outlook change information was obtained from the three rating agencies’ 
websites. It is envisaged that the lengthy sampling period increases the power of 
random walk test and reduce the problem of non-trading bias which might arise from 
thin or infrequent trading in some African financial markets. The daily bond and stock 
index return series are converted into logarithmic returns to make them analytically 
more tractable and to improve the normally of their distributions. As suggested by Freud 
and Pagan (2000), logarithmic transformation removes most of linear dependence 
between successive daily returns, which is more appropriate for the application of 
market efficiency tests. 
 
5.4.2 Methodology  
This chapter performs several tests to examine the efficiency of African financial 
markets in the context of SCR information. First, following Mlambo and Biekpe (2007) 
and Ajao and Osayuwu (2012), the Ljung–Box Q autocorrelation function (ACF) test 
(Box et al., 1994) is used to test if the successive security returns are independent. It is 
hypothesized that if African financial markets are weak form efficient in incorporating 
new information published by CRAs, then the autocorrelation coefficients should be 
significantly different from zero. Thus, the following two regression models are 
estimated: 
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Where 𝑛, 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙 are the number of lags that adequately model the equations, 𝜀𝑡 are 




returns,  𝑦  represents bond returns, and 𝛽𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑖 are constant coefficents. The 
correlation between time 𝑡  and 𝑡 –  𝑘  security returns are examined using the test 
statistic of autocorrelation specified as follows: 
 
𝜌𝑘 =
∑ (𝑥𝑡 − ?̅?)
𝑇−𝑘
𝑡=1 (𝑥𝑡−𝑘 − ?̅?)
∑ (𝑥𝑡 − ?̅?)2
𝑇
𝑡=1
                                                                                                      (5.3) 
 
Where 𝜌𝑘  is serial correlation coefficient of lag 𝑘 , 𝑇  is the sample size, 𝑘  is the lag 
length, 𝑥  is the security return at time 𝑡 , and ?̅?  is the sample mean of the security 
returns. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic is then used to test the joint null hypothesis that all 
autocorrelations are equal to zero as follows: 
 





 ~𝜒2                                                                                                      (5.4) 
 
Where 𝑄𝐿𝐵 is asymptotically distributed as a chi−square,  𝜌𝑘 is the serial correlation of 
lag 𝑘 , 𝑛 is the number of observations, and 𝑚 is the degrees of freedom and the 
maximum lag considered (as suggested by Tsay (2005), that 𝑚 ≈ 𝐿𝑛(𝑇) to improve 
performance power of the test). 
 
Second, the runs test (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1940) is used to examine if successive 
security returns are independent and randomly distributed. It is hypothesized that if the 
stock and bond returns are random then the observed number of runs in the series 
should be close to the expected number of runs. The runs test implies that the elements 
of a sequence are mutually independent over time if the number of runs is not 
significantly higher or lower than expected. Thus, the security returns are categorized 
into three types of runs: an upward run, where prices go up; a flat run, where returns do 
not change; and a downward run, where prices go down. The expected number of runs 
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Where 𝑇 is the sample size, 𝑖 is the signs of plus, minus, or no change, 𝑛𝑖 is the total 













                                                     (5.6) 
 
The standard normal Z-statistic is then used to conduct a run test, which is given by: 
 
𝑍 =
(𝑅 ± 0.5) − 𝑚
𝜎𝑚
                                                                                                                         (5.7) 
 
Where 𝑅 is the number of observed runs, 𝑚 is the expected number of runs, and 0.5 
denotes the correction factor for continuity adjustment. The positive serial correlation 
indicates a positive dependence of stock price, which accordingly violates the random 
walk theory. 
 
Third, after examining the randomness and independence of successive security 
returns, it is necessary to ascertain weak form market efficiency by examining the 
random walk hypothesis using the variance ratio test (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Ntim et 
al., 2011). As suggested by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) the variance ratio test analyses 
two independent variance coefficients in each sovereign security returns. If the multiple 
variance ratios are significantly close to zero, then African markets can be deemed to be 
efficient. If the return series follow a random walk, the variance of its 𝑞-differences would 
be 𝑞  times the variance of its first differences. With a sample size of 𝑛𝑞 + 1  and 





























                                                                                      (5.10) 
𝑚 = 𝑞(𝑛𝑞 − 𝑞 + 1) (1 −
𝑞
𝑛𝑞
) ;   𝜇 =
1
𝑛𝑞
(𝑃𝑛𝑞 − 𝑃0) 
 
Where 𝜎2(𝑞) is the scaled variance of the 𝑞 −difference, 𝜎2(1) is the variance of the 
first difference, and 𝑃𝑡 is the closing price. 
 
Fourth, having found evidence of weak form efficiency, which is a necessary condition 
for semi-strong informational efficiency, the analysis next uses the Engle-Granger 
cointegration test (Engle and Granger, 1987) to establish if there is evidence of the 
semi-strong form efficiency on African financial markets. If there is no cointegration 
between the credit rating and security returns series, it implies that there are 
comovements between them, which indicate that the series can be used to predict each 
other thus violating the semi-strong form efficiency hypothesis. Since the population 
parameters are unknown and returns are not normally distributed, to test the 
significance of the cointegration hypothesis, t-statistics are calculated (as in studies by 
Ikram and Nugroho, 2014; Cooke and Bailey, 2015). The time-series t-test of Serra 
(2002) is applied as follows:  
 
𝑡?̂? =   
?̂?𝑡 − 𝛽0
𝑆𝐸(?̂?𝑡)
                                                                                                                         (5.11) 
 
Where 𝑡𝛽 is the student t-test at ∝ significance level, and 𝛽0  is an estimate constant 




the estimator ?̂?𝑡 for 𝛽𝑡.  
 
Lastly, to further analyse the semi-strong form of market efficiency, as applied in 
Mabakeng and Sheefeni (2014), a Granger causality test (Granger, 1988) is conducted 
to verify the results of the cointegration test. The Granger causality examines whether 
lagged values of the SCRs help to predict stock and bond return series by testing the 
following hypothesis for identification of a causal effects:  
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑡+1  ∈ 𝐴|Ω𝑡)  ≠ 𝑃(𝑌𝑡+1  ∈ 𝐴|Ω−𝑥(𝑡))                                                                                (5.12)  
 
Where 𝑃 is the probability, 𝐴 is the set of security returns, 𝛺𝑡 is the sovereign rating 
information available at time t in the market, and 𝛺−𝑥(𝑡) is the modified market where the 
SCR information  Ωt  is excluded. The Granger causality test estimates the three 
regression equations: 
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+ 𝜀3𝑖                                      (5.15) 
 
Where 𝑛 is the number of lags that adequately model the dynamic structure, 𝜀𝑖 are white 
noise error terms, 𝑥  represents SCR, 𝑦  represents stock returns,  𝑧  represents bond 
returns, and βi are constant coefficents. The significance of the Granger causality from 
one series to another is determined by the p-values and test statistics. 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
To estimate the regression equations for the efficiency tests, a sufficient number of lags 




criteria presented in Table 5.1 show that either 2 or 7 lags adequately model the 
regression equations. Ng and Perron (2001) mathematically prove that the lag selection 
of AIC is more preferable for parsimony and predictive model strength. Thus, model 
over-identification is better than under-identification (Howard, 2013). Hence, all the 
analyses in this chapter apply 7 lags as suggested by three criteria (the LR, FRE and 
the AIC) as compared to 2 lags selected by two criteria (SC and HQ). 
 
Table 5.1: Lag Length Selection Criteria Results 
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0  4795 6899  7.150 -1.031 -1.031 -1.031 
1  3927  6895  4.290 -8.451 -8.450 -8.450 
2  3929  363.4  4.270 -8.455  -8.452*  -8.454* 
3  3929  7.306  4.270 -8.454 -8.451 -8.453 
4  3929  15.30  4.270 -8.454 -8.450 -8.453 
5  3929  3.566  4.270 -8.454 -8.449 -8.453 
6  3929  30.16  4.270 -8.454 -8.449 -8.453 
7  2994   36.97*   4.270*  -8.455* -8.448 -8.453 
8  3002  15.12  4.270 -8.455 -8.447 -8.452 
9  3930  2.372  4.270 -8.454 -8.446 -8.452 
10  3930  2.139  4.270 -8.454 -8.445 -8.451 
       
       * represents sufficient number of lags 
 
Having selected the appropriate number of lags, Table 5.2 below presents results of the 
Ljung–Box Q autocorrelation test. As can be seen from the results, the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected for the bond returns model, which shows that 
bond returns are independent of each other. These results contrast with other emerging 
markets studies such as Katz (1974), Khurana and Raman (2003), and May (2010), 
which suggest that bond prices are not weak form efficient. Thus, successive bond 
prices are not predictable and the historical bond returns cannot be used to predict 
future returns. Hence, the effect of SCRs on bond market efficiency is significant. This 
result could be because most of Africa’s bond markets are still relatively small and  
undeveloped (Mu et al., 2013). 
 
The results of the stock returns model shows in contrast that the null hypothesis of no 




be rejected thereafter. This result suggests that stock returns become significantly weak 
form inefficient 10 days after a SCR announcement. The result accords with Nam et al. 
(2006) who argue that the positive and negative autocorrelation at higher order lags in 
both stocks and bonds suggests that the security returns are predictable at long 
horizons because their returns are mean reverting in the long-term, which is the general 
evidence against weak form market efficiency. These results are consistent with the 
previous findings on African markets by Magnusson and Wydick (2002), Mlambo and 
Biekpe (2007) and Ajao and Osayuwu (2012) who conclude that not all securities in the 
financial markets are weak form efficient even when the financial markets overally show 
weak form tendencies.  
 
Table 5.2: Ljung–Box Q Autocorrelation Test Results 
Lags Bond returns Stock returns 
  AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* AC   PAC  Q-Stat  Prob* 
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.984 
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.999 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.999 
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.999 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.999 
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.999 
7 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.996 -0.001 -0.001 0.069 0.999 
8 -0.005 -0.005 2.257 0.972 -0.006 -0.006 3.593 0.892 
9 0.002 0.002 2.704 0.975 0.006 0.006 6.450 0.694 
10 -0.002 -0.002 3.071 0.980 -0.001 -0.001 6.504 0.771 
11 -0.001 -0.001 3.144 0.989 0.022 0.022 51.110 0.000*** 
12 0.001 0.001 3.224 0.994 0.022 0.022 94.898 0.000*** 
13 -0.001 -0.001 3.398 0.996 -0.003 -0.003 95.860 0.000*** 
14 0.002 0.002 3.936 0.996 0.013 0.013 111.090 0.000*** 
15 0.002 0.002 4.159 0.997 0.142 0.142 1987.800 0.000*** 
16 0.002 0.002 4.456 0.998 -0.083 -0.084 2628.800 0.000*** 
17 0.000 0.000 4.463 0.999 0.001 0.002 2628.900 0.000*** 
18 0.001 0.001 4.574 0.999 -0.011 -0.011 2640.900 0.000*** 
19 0.000 0.000 4.577 0.999 0.016 0.017 2664.400 0.000*** 
20 -0.003 -0.003 5.362 0.999 0.002 0.001 2664.800 0.000*** 
*** represents significance at 1 percent level 
 
The results of the runs tests are presented in Table 5.3 below and show that the null 
hypothesis that the order of the bond and stock returns is random can be rejected at the 




random as both the stock and bond returns series reject the null hypothesis of 
randomness of security returns. Contrary to the random walk theory, past price 
movements and trends may thus be used to predict current or future security price 
changes. As hypothesized above, if SCRs have a positive impact on financial market 
efficiency, Africa’s bond and stock returns should be random following the 
announcements. It can therefore be argued that SCRs do not impact efficiency since 
African financial markets remain inefficient in the weak form. These results thus accord 
with previous studies on emerging markets by Abraham et al. (2002), Abdmoulah (2010) 
and Hong et al. (2012) who also reject weak form efficiency. 
 
Whilst studies such as Knoke (1975), Knoke (1977), Ali (1989) argue that models with 
non-autocorrelated residuals are synonymous with random series and vice-versa, the 
findings from the Ljung–Box Q autocorrelation in Table 5.2 and runs test in Table 5.3 
suggest otherwise. The results of the Ljung–Box Q autocorrelations suggest that bond 
returns are weak form efficient and stock returns are significantly weak form efficient up 
to 10 days after a SCR announcement, whereas the runs test shows that there is no 
significant influence from SCR announcement on weak form efficiency as both bond 
and stock market returns remain non-random. The contradictory results of the 
autocorrelation and runs tests find support for Lo and MacKinlay (1988) who argue that 
a model with uncorrelated residuals does not necessarily indicate that the data is 
generated from a random process. However, in time series regression models the runs 
test is more robust and is thus recommended for testing if a data set is from a random 
process (Ley and Paindaveine, 2013). 
 
Table 5.3: Runs Test 
Runs Stock returns Bond returns 
R1 33380 40166 
R2 0.000*** 0.000*** 
*** represents significance at 1 percent level 
 
The results show conflicting insights into the independence and randomness where the 




and stock prices are weak efficient at lower lags whereas the runs test finds inefficient 
returns over both short and long-term. Thus, the next test for weak form efficiency is the 
variance ratio. Table 5.4 below present results of the joint and individual variance ratio 
test with heteroskedasticity robust standard error estimates, which is regarded by Kim 
and Kim (2010) as a stronger random walk test. As can be seen, the p-values for both 
SCRs and bond returns are less than 0.05 and thus the null hypothesis that the bond 
and SCR series are a martingale can be rejected, which implies that bond returns and 
SCRs have no equal variances at the 1 percent significance level. However, there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the stock returns are a martingale 
and thus, the stock returns have equal variances at the 1 percent significance level. The 
findings imply that bond prices are neither random nor independent, and hence weak 
form efficiency can be rejected, whereas stock prices show weak form efficiency. Thus, 
it is possible to predict bond prices whereas trading strategies that use past 
announcements such as credit rating changes are unlikely to be profitable on African 
stock markets.  
 
These empirical findings accord with Ojah and Karemera (1999), Grieb and Reyes 
(1999) and Simons and Laryea (2006) who report that emerging stock markets exhibit 
evidence of a random walk. However, the findings partially contradict the results of both 
the autocorrelation and the runs tests. This could have arisen for the following reasons. 
First, the analysis of weak form efficiency in the variance ratio technique allows for 
conditional heteroskedasticity in the disturbance term (Lo and MacKinlay, 1988), making 
it a more robust weak form efficiency test (Kim and Kim, 2010). Second, the 
autocorrelation and runs tests are designed to test the random walk and weak form 
efficiency by providing a mean (Knoke, 1975 and 1977) whereas the variance ratio 
method tests the random walk and weak form efficiency against stationary alternatives, 
based on linear increments in all sampling intervals (Ntim et al., 2011). Lastly, the 
autocorrelation and runs tests measure the long-run effects of changes on the path of 
real returns  whereas variance ratio uses overlapping data in computing the variance of 
long-horizon returns (Charles and Darne, 2009). Although the use of overlapping data 




of the variance ratio test, it is nearly impossible to analyse the exact sampling 
distribution of the variance ratio test statistics in a finite sample (Cecchetti and Lam, 
1994), creating significant bias and right skewness (Tse et al., 2002). In addition, the 
variance ratios are asymptotic tests because their sampling distributions are 
approximated by their limiting distributions (Charles and Darne, 2009). Hence, these 
deficiencies may give rise to negative distortions in significance of asymptotic 
approximations. 
 
Table 5.4: Variance ratio test results 
    Bond returns Stock returns Soveign Credit ratings 
Joint Tests Value Prob. Value Prob. Value Prob. 
Max |z| (at period 2)  4.271  0.0001**  2.232  0.0984  5.106  0.0000** 
Individual test 
 Bond returns Stock returns Sovereign Credit Ratings 











 2  0.461 -4.271  0.0000***  0.436 -2.232  0.0256**  0.500 -5.106  0.0000*** 
 4  0.228 -4.077  0.0000***  0.210 -2.065  0.0388**  0.250 -5.106  0.0000*** 
 8  0.115 -3.999  0.0001***  0.107 -1.988  0.0468**  0.125 -5.106  0.0000*** 
 16  0.057 -3.975  0.0001***  0.058 -1.948  0.0514**  0.062 -5.103  0.0000*** 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively 
 
Table 5.5 below provides a summary of the three weak form efficiency tests results. As 
can be seen, the tests generally agree that African bond prices remain inefficient 
whereas the stock prices are weak form efficient. This accords with previous studies on 
emerging markets by Abraham et al. (2002), Abdmoulah (2010) and Hong et al. (2012) 
and Smith and Dyakova (2014) who also find that bond markets in emerging and 
developing countries are less competitive than stock markets which are generally weak 










Table 5.5: Summary of weak form efficiency tests results 
Autocorrelation test Bond prices are efficient 
Stock prices are efficient  
Runs test Bond prices are inefficient 
Stock prices are inefficient 
Variance ratio test Bond prices are inefficient 
Stock prices are efficient 
 
Having found evidence of weak form efficiency from the Ljung–Box Q autocorrelation 
and the joint variance ratio tests, which is a necessary condition for semi-strong 
informational efficiency, the next step is to conduct cointegration tests using the Engle-
Granger and the Johansen tests to establish if there is evidence of cointegration 
between the credit rating and security returns series. The results presented in Table 5.6 
show that the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the credit ratings and security 
returns series can be rejected by both the Engle-Granger tau-statistic (t-statistic) and 
the Johansen trace statisic at the 1 percent level. Thus, the results of the cointegration 
test imply that there are comovements between credit ratings and security returns. 
Hence, these findings suggest that the series can be used to predict each other, which 
violates the semi-strong form efficiency hypothesis.  
 
The intermediate results used in constructing the test statistics in the Engle-Granger 
cointegration test present long-run residual variances for all the three series below are 
0.05, which indicates that there are no serial dependences in standard errors of the 
sample mean. In addition, there are three stochastic trends with the bond and stock 
returns lagging one and 30 periods respectively. This may also suggest that all three 
series are cointegrated. Hence, it can be concluded that the stock and bond returns 
series violate the semi-strong market efficiency form, which implies that SCR 
information does not affect market efficiency as security prices in African markets do not 
instantly reflect all publicly available information. These results also accord with the 
majority of studies in both developed and emerging markets (Katz, 1974; Norden and 
Weber, 2004; Robinson and Bangwayo-Skeete, 2015) that also find evidence against 





Table 5.6: Cointegration Tests results 
Engle-Granger Johansen 
Dependent tau-statistic Prob. 
Hypothesisized 
No. of CE (s) 
Trace 
Statisic Prob. 
BOND -227.8591  0.0000*** None 29.797 0.0002*** 
SCRC -305.1602  0.0000*** At most 1 15.4947 0.0084*** 
STOCK -48.84684  0.0000*** At most 2 602.27 0.0219*** 
     
 Intermediate Results:   
     BOND SCRC STOCK 
 Rho - 1 -1.101118 -1.000004 -1.00296 
 Rho S.E.  0.004832  0.003277  0.020533 
 Residual variance  0.011569  0.048136  0.000141 
 Long-run residual 
variance  0.011866  0.048136 0.000052 
 Number of lags  1  0  30 
 Number of observations  93121  93123  93063 
 Number of stochastic 
trends**  3  3  3 
 *** represents significance at 1 percent 
 
In addition to the cointegration test, a Granger causality test is conducted to further 
analyse and verify the rejection of semi-strong market efficiency form. Table 5.7 
presents the results of testing whether lagged values of the SCRs help to predict stock 
and bond return series. The results show that the p-values associated with the F-
statistics are insignificant for all the pairs associated with SCRs changes. Therefore, the 
null hypothesis that SCRs do not Granger cause either the bond or stock returns can 
not be rejected. These results also accord with Katz (1974), Norden and Weber (2004) 
and Robinson and Bangwayo-Skeete (2015) and therefore confirm the earlier findings 
from the Engle-Granger Cointegration test that also reject the semi-strong form 
efficiency. Thus, it can be inferred that the SCR information does not affect market 
efficiency as security prices in African markets do not instantly reflect all publicly 






Table 5.7: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests Results 
 Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic Prob.  
 SCRC does not Granger Cause BOND  0.02180 0,9784 
 BOND does not Granger Cause SCRC 0.04227 0.9586 
 STOCK does not Granger Cause BOND  14.0936 0,0000*** 
 BOND does not Granger Cause STOCK 0.12615 0.8815 
 STOCK does not Granger Cause SCRC 0.35312 0.7025 
 SCRC does not Granger Cause STOCK 0.13675 0.8722 
*** represents significance at 1 percent 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the effect of foreign currency long-term SCR announcements 
on financial market efficiency in 19 African countries that have both operational stock 
and debt markets over the period of 1994 to 2014. The results of the Ljung–Box Q 
autocorrelation, runs and variance ratio tests of weak form efficiency find significant 
evidence of weak form efficiency in stock markets whereas the bond markets are 
generally weak form inefficient. Thus, SCRs do not impact bond markets efficiency 
since African bond markets remain inefficient in the weak form. In contrast, stock 
markets show evidence of weak form efficiency implying that  long-term SCRs positively 
affect equities market efficiency in Africa. However, the Engle-Granger Cointegration 
and Granger Causality tests of market efficiency do not find significant evidence that 
SCRs impact African financial markets in semi-strong efficiency form. 
 
There are therefore two implications arising from these results. First, SCRs determine 
the ‘best times’ that investors choose to buy or sell their bonds in African markets 
because their pricing patterns are weak form inefficient. Thus, bonds are either 
overvalued or undervalued as investors underreact or overeact to SCRs when 
determining an appropriate risk adjusted rate of return. Second, the bond markets in 
emerging and developing countries are less competitive than stock markets which are 
generally weak form efficient. Hence, credit ratings are more influential and useful for 









DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the 2008 Global Financial crisis, the wave of very low to negative interest rates in 
developed economies such as Japan, Europe and United States (Hannoun, 2015), has 
left investors with very few choices in investment options. On the other hand, although 
emerging markets currently offer potential investment growth and higher returns, large 
corporations and other institutional investors with surplus financial resources are 
skeptical of investing in these markets because of high risk (Smith and Dyakova, 2014). 
Most emerging financial markets are relatively under-developed and thus suffer from  
illiquidity, thin trading and information asymmetry (Kenny and Moss, 1998; Patel, 2014; 
Ravi and Hong, 2014), which exposes them to manipulations by a few participants.  
 
Thus, CRAs have become an important source of information on the creditworthiness of 
emerging markets’ debt issuers for international investors (Agarwal et al., 2015). As 
investors grapple with the uncertainties inherent in investment options, CRAs have 
wider access to crucial information needed to sift through the growing number of 
securities being issued in financial markets. Thus, countries and corporates that 
maintain positive macroeconomic indicators retain high credit ratings on their debt and 
borrow cheaply, which makes their financial securities attractive to investors.  
 
However, CRAs have suffered from a number of shortcomings. First, the conflict of 
interests created by their issuer-pay model whereby the issuing sovereign pays for their 
credit rating, has compromised their credibility (Bayar, 2014). Second, credit rating 
methodologies are highly subjective and include key variables that are permeated by 
ideologically conditioned judgements and biases (Gaillard, 2014). Third, regulators 




requirements for countries and corporates to issue financial market securities (Ekins 
and Calabria, 2012). These credit ratings are usually from a few approved international 
credit rating firms. Thus, the artificial demand for credit ratings compromise the quality 
of ratings whilst elevating the importance of ratings but this is not based on market 
forces, and does not reflect the economic value of their output. Lastly, CRAs were 
offering favourable credit ratings to insolvent borrowers and approving extremely risky 
securitised mortgage-related obligations that were at the centre of the 2008 debt crisis, 
which could not have been marketed or sold without their high investment-grade 
approvals (Bolton et al., 2012).  
 
Thus, the objectivity of CRAs and the impact of their announcements on financial 
markets have been the subject of ongoing debate. Some studies find that SCRs 
effectively summarize and supplement the information contained in macroeconomic 
indicators (Ferri et al., 1999; Elkhoury, 2008; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2013; Gande and 
Parsley, 2004, 2014; Duygun et al., 2016). Other studies argue however that credit 
ratings simply tell the market what it already knows (Fama, 1965; Matolcsy and Lianto, 
1995; Hirshleifer et al., 2013; Bissoondoyal-Bheenick and Brooks, 2015). Nevertheless, 
rating announcements continue to have an impact on financial markets despite 
resistance, especially from downgraded borrowers who contend that CRAs fail to 
appreciate their economy, business and operating environment (Ntswane, 2014; 
Mohapatra, 2016; Sensoy, 2016).  
 
Since liberalization, Africa’s financial market systems have failed to broaden and 
deepen to be seamlessly integrated into the global financial system (Mu et al., 2013). In 
addition, information asymmetry, which is a common characteristic associated with 
African financial markets, has been exacerbated by low disclosure requirements, which 
create further imperfections and inefficiencies (Patel, 2014; Ravi and Hong, 2014). 
Despite these limitations, the investment appetite for Africa’s financial assets has 






Hence, this thesis empirically investigated the effects of the information provided by 
CRAs on African financial markets to determine whether SCRs contain material 
information that influences the secondary market securities pricing model and debt 
markets’ interest rates. In particular, this thesis has sought to answer four primary 
research questions: (i) do SCR announcements influence excess bond and equity 
returns in Africa; (ii) what is the net effect of SCRs on bond and equity markets in Africa; 
(iii) what are the effects of SCR spillovers on neighbouring countries’ financial markets, 
and; (iv) do SCRs affect financial market efficiency? 
 
6.2 Summary of Findings 
This section presents the findings from the investigation on the effects of the foreign 
currency long-term SCRs information on African financial markets. First, a summary of 
the findings on whether SCRs impact excess bonds and equities returns is presented, 
followed by the findings on the net effect of credit ratings on African bond and equity 
markets. Thereafter, the findings on whether there are credit ratings spillover effects to 
neighbouring countries’ financial markets and lastly, the findings on the impact of credit 
ratings on the efficiency of African financial markets are reported. 
 
6.2.1 Excess Market Returns 
The importance of SCRs for investors has been a subject of ongoing debate. Some 
studies argue that SCRs announcements bridge the information gap between investors 
and issuers of securities, and hence their impact on financial markets is significant 
(Alsakka and Ap Gwilym, 2013; Rhee, 2015; Almeida et al., 2017). In contrast, other 
studies report that SCRs have no impact on financial markets because they are a mere 
repetition of information that is already known (Matolcsy and Lianto, 1995; Ferreira and 
Gama, 2007; Michaelides et al., 2015). Hence, this study investigates the effect of 
sovereign rating announcements on excess bond and equity returns. The analysis finds 
that the African financial markets are weakly sensitive to SCR announcements. This 
finding implies that there is no significant evidence of excess returns influenced by 
credit rating announcements. The finding accords with the literature (Andrianaivo and 




investment (junk) grade and consequently suffer from illiquidity challenges. Hence, the 
announcements of SCR announcements do not significantly change the African 
financial market because they are already perceived to be risky markets, which attract 
mostly passive and long-term investors. These results indicate that both foreign and 
domestic investors in African financial markets are resilient when investing in low growth 
economies that have uncertainties such as sub-investment grade credit ratings, 
inefficient public enterprises, political turmoils, corruption scandals.   
 
6.2.2 Net Effect on Bonds and Equity Prices 
It is widely accepted that stocks and bonds do not move in the same direction because 
rising stock prices are associated with rising bond yields and falling bond prices (Stivers 
and Sun, 2002) as investors commonly sell bonds to raise money to buy stocks and sell 
stocks to raise money to buy bonds, which thus affects the prices of both asset classes 
(Maslov and Roehner, 2004). Hence, stocks and bond prices move in opposite 
directions because of their inverse responses to macroeconomic fundamentals (Ncube 
and Brixiov, 2015). On the other hand, SCR downgrades (upgrades) announcements 
are generally viewed as bad (good) news by market participants (Galil and Soffer, 
2011), and thus it is expected that bonds and stocks react negatively (positively) to SCR 
downgrade (upgrade) related announcements. Therefore, an empirical analysis was 
conducted to assess whether SCR announcements have the same effect on both 
African bond and equity markets. 
 
The empirical estimation finds evidence of unidirectional causality running from stocks 
to bonds and from credit ratings to bonds, but not in reverse. Thus, implying that 
investors prefer to buy stocks first and later sell them to buy bonds when a country’s 
credit rating profile changes. Therefore, unfavourable SCR announcements cause 
bondholders to raise their required returns and drives bond prices down, which leads 
investors to then transfer funds from stocks to buy cheaper bonds. Furthermore, there is 
a significant moderately positive relationship between Africa’s stock and bond markets; 
and a weakly significant positive association between SCR announcements and bond 




announcements therefore do not have the same implications for both stockholders and 
bondholders as shown by the weak association between SCRs and stock returns.  
 
6.2.3 Rating spillovers 
Studies on the spillover effects of SCR announcements on neighbouring and regional 
countries are still inconclusive and very scant when considering African markets. Thus, 
estimation was conducted to determine whether SCR announcements have spillover 
effects on the bond and equity markets in neighbouring countries. The findings show 
that the regional sovereign rating spillover impacts are marginal and are quickly 
absorbed into stock and bond markets prices. These findings thus imply that investors 
consider regional countries’ credit rating profiles as a whole rather than on an individual 
country basis. Investors therefore shift funds from downgraded lower sovereign rated 
countries to higher rated countries, which generate spillover effects in the region’s 
neighbouring countries. However, the cross-country shocks - from a sovereign rating 
shock in one country to the sovereign ratings in other countries in the same region - are 
also marginal but persist over longer time periods. These findings thus suggest that the 
investment environment in regional countries is interconnected, which allows cross-
country information flows and credit rating spillovers. As suggested by Sun et al. (2010), 
macroeconomic fundamentals are shared across countries through trade and financial 
linkages, which are some of the key potential interconnection and transmission 
channels that expose countries to common shocks. 
 
6.2.4 Market efficiency 
There are few studies that test the impact of SCRs on financial market efficiency. Thus, 
the final estimation in this thesis explored how credit rating announcements enhances 
the efficiency of Africa’s bond and equity prices. The analysis finds that stock markets 
are weak form efficient whereas the bond markets are generally weak form inefficient. 
These findings imply that SCR information does not enhance bond market efficiency 
since African bond markets remain inefficient in the weak form. In contrast, SCRs 





With regards to the inefficiency in African bond markets, the findings suggest that bonds 
are usually overvalued or undervalued as investors underreact or overreact to SCR 
announcements when determining an appropriate risk adjusted rate of return. Hence, it 
is implied that the timing of buying or selling bonds is significantly influenced by the 
SCRs. It can therefore be inferred that the weak form inefficient pricing patterns of 
bonds means that the ‘best times’ to sell (buy) would be just before a rating downgrade 
(upgrade). Credit ratings are therefore more influential and useful for providing credit 
risk evaluations in African bond markets than in stock markets. Hence, there are 
significant portfolio shifts in bondholders following sovereign rating announcements. 
 
With regards to the stock markets in Africa, the findings show that they are more 
competitive than the bond markets since they are generally weak form efficient. This 
implies that macroeconomic indicators considered in SCR announcements would have 
been discounted into equities prices before such announcements are made. Therefore, 
SCRs do not generate abnormal stock returns because there are no significant portfolio 
restructuring in stocks following the announcements. In contrast to bonds whose value 
may largely be determined by the probability of default of the issuing sovereign, stock 
market investors are generally able to achieve the market rate of return from indexed 
stocks. Consequently, it can be deduced that if investment decisions are based on 
sovereign creditworthiness of security issuers, then in African markets, stocks are a 
more preferable investment option than bonds. 
 
Thus in summary, the results of the empirical analysis show that SCR announcements 
only have a relatively weak effect on bond and equity returns in African financial 
markets. With regards to the net effects of SCR downgrade and upgrade 
announcements on bond and equity returns, announcements in sovereign ratings do not 
have the same implications for both stockholders and bondholders. A sovereign rating 
downgrade (upgrade) causes bondholders to raise (lower) their required returns and 
drives bond prices down (up), which leads investors to then transfer funds from stocks 
(bonds) to buy cheaper bonds (stocks). With regards to spillover effects, credit ratings 




positively affect the weak form efficiency of African stock markets to a greater extent 
than bond markets, which remains generally weak form inefficient following SCRs.  
 
6.3 Policy implications 
The empirical findings in this study lead to the following policy implications and 
recommendations. 
 
6.3.1 Sovereign Domestic Policy 
International investors around the world rely on credit ratings for information to guide 
their investment decisions (Hooper et al., 2008). Some asset managers are restricted by 
their investment policy statements to invest only in countries or corporates that have a 
certain credit rating grade from one (or more) of the three international ratings agencies 
(Ellul et al., 2011). It is widely accepted that sovereign credit rated governments are 
transparent and prudent (Gande and Parsley, 2014), thus their debt levels and cost of 
debt are significantly reduced (Elkhoury, 2008). The net benefit of reduced debt is 
passed to businesses and households. The lower-working class to middle class that 
relies on credit significantly benefit from reduced cost of borrowing (Beegle et al., 2016). 
Governments should therefore seek to improve their credit rating profiles to reduce cost 
of borrowing.  
 
The empirical analyses described in this thesis show that the operations of CRAs 
appear to be less important in the operation of stocks and bond markets in Africa. 
Governments should however appreciate the long-term information exchange between 
investors and borrowers, and the consequential nature of credit ratings in Africa’s 
nascent financial markets to proactively manage the risks of negative ratings. As donor 
funding to most African countries is decreasing (Joffe, 2015), more states are opting for 
issuing sovereign bonds to finance fiscal deficits and other infrastructure development 
initiatives (Collier, 2014). This has led to a significant growth in financial markets as they 
become a more important source of current and future funding (Yartey, 2009).  
 




both their budgets and developmental expenses (Loxley and Sackey, 2008; Omotola 
and Saliu, 2009; Powell and Bird, 2010). On average, according to Tradingeconomics30 
and Countryeconomy31 data, government debt in most sovereign credit rated African 
countries stands between 20 to 50 percent of GDP, with around 30 percent being held 
by foreign investors who usually preclude asset managers from investing in sub-
investment grade economies. As SCRs impact government expenditure and taxation in 
Africa, an unfavourable announcements in credit rating can have a negative effect on 
the cost of servicing national debt. Subsequently, government spending in key sectors 
such as education, human settlement, health, sanitation and other infrastructural 
development is negatively impacted, which leads to a budget deficit if governments 
continue to borrow to finance its expenditure (Johnson and Kriz, 2005; Elkhoury, 2008; 
Stallmann et al., 2012). Furthermore, as foreign investment makes up a significant 
portion of financing in most African goverments’ spending needs (Arslanalp and Tsuda, 
2014), unfavourable SCR announcements could lead to a withdrawal of these funds,  
which could significantly alter the nature of the fiscal policy.32 Sovereign governments in 
Africa should therefore aim to reduce and maintain low levels of national debt to ensure 
that sovereign debt accumulation does not negatively impact long-term economic 
growth. In addition, it is recommended that foreign currency denominated national debt 
should be kept at minimum levels in order to reduce government exposure to foreign 
exchange risk, which is highly volatile in most African countries (Oseni, 2016). 
 
Empirical studies show that credit ratings directly impact monetary policy through 
changes in interest rates (Brooks et al., 2011; Ellul et al., 2011; Crosta, 2014) and 
exchange rates (Abad et al., 2012; Alsakka and Gwilym, 2013; Agarwal et al., 2015). 
Thus, sovereign credit downgrades result in an increase in interest rates, which is part 
of a deflationary monetary policy (SARB, 2016). In addition, as countries’ SCR move 
from the investment grade into the sub-investment grade, their interest rates curve 
                                                          
30 https://tradingeconomics.com 
31 https://countryeconomy.com 
32  For example, according to Tradingeconomics data, South Africa lost an estimated US$8billion to 
US$13billion due to forced selling by foreign investors following a SCR downgrade announcement in 
2017; Namibia and Botswana also lost an estimated US$2.73billion following a SCR downgrade in 2017; 
and foreign investors withdraw an estimated US$0.65billion from Gabon and Mauritius after a negative 




steepens from a linear to an exponential trend. This further increases the cost of 
servicing debt for both corporates and households, and consequently reduces 
aggregate demand by lowering consumption and investment. Households discretionary 
income decrease while borrowing cost increases and for firms, the opportunity cost of 
investment rises while higher interest rates also reduce aggregate demand by lowering 
net exports. It is therefore recommended that countries should maintain prudent 
domestic policies to avoid sovereign downgrades, which negatively affect financial 
markets and hamper economic development. In addition, while most African 
governments usually issue sovereign debt at the cheapest maturity (IMF, 2015), it is 
recommended that governments should rather construct their own favourable yield 
curves and term structures of interest rates on both foreign currency and domestic debt 
to enable their financial markets to develop and become competitive. 
 
6.3.2 Regional and Foreign Policy 
The findings show that there are linkages between regional stocks and bond returns, 
which decline as emerging countries become more creditworthy. In addition, the 
significant spillover effects from SCR announcements in one country to neighbouring 
financial markets show that regional markets are interlinked. With the growth of 
globalisation (Causevic, 2003), the channels of information flow expose countries to the 
vulnerabilities in other neighbouring sovereigns’ poor policy choices and outcomes. It is 
therefore recommended that countries in the same region should aim to maintain or 
improve their macroeconomic environment to avert unfavourable SCRs that would 
affect the objectives of regional economic integration to the disadvantage of all other 
regional countries’ credit ratings. However, despite the ongoing attempts by regional 
associations of African countries 33  to foster both internal and inter-regional trade, 
together with regulatory uniformity for Africa’s economic development and 
diversification, the regional groups have failed to tackle cross-border externalities and 
their costs because of the sharp differences in policy preferences across member 
                                                          
33 These include the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), East African Community (EAC), Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 





countries (Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva, 2014). Furthermore, the overlapping and 
concurrent membership by member states has often divided countries efforts towards 
the regional integration goals as each member state prioritise on identifying its own 
economic opportunities at the expense of collective economic interests (AfDB, 2014).  
 
With regards to regional and foreign policy, there are five implications arising from the 
findings in this thesis. First, the regional bilateral linkages between countries serve as 
channels of capital and SCR information flow. Second, there are interactions in the 
region’s economic policies, financial resources, infrastructure, institutional strength, and 
political stability and thus regional sovereign ratings are susceptible to other member 
countries’ unfavourable macroeconomic conditions. Third, the disparities in the levels of 
economic development of African countries affect the regional economic integration 
objectives such as the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs). Fourth, the stronger 
economies such as Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt commonly dominate and influence 
the terms of reference, as well as the operation of the regional blocs to the 
disadvantage of the poorer and weaker members leading to growing inequalities among 
member states. Lastly, the success of the common market areas depend on member 
countries aligning their national policies to regional policies to avoid conflicting 
frameworks and priorities. Hence, the findings suggest that it is imperative for regional 
countries to pursue developmental macroeconomic policies that enhance cooperation 
and integration, and to avoid negative ratings that will have regional spillover effects. 
 
In summary, the empirical analyses in this thesis show that although African financial 
markets are weakly sensitive to SCR announcements, the information is important for 
the development of financial markets. In addition, CRAs’ opinions significantly impact 
market confidence and the long-term stability of emerging markets. Thus, policymarkers 
should maintain prudence in crafting pro-growth policies and creating a conducive 
investment climate that fosters transparency. 
 
6.4 Direction for further study 




First, this study analyses the impact of SCRs on Africa’s financial markets as one 
sample. Given the arguments in the literature that the behaviour of individual securities 
is different from index performance (Nam et al., 2006). Further study could be 
conducted to examine the effects of SCRs on individual stocks and bonds.  
 
Second, this study only considers long-term SCRs, which is usually more sensitive to 
changes in macroeconomic indicators (Reusens and Croux, 2015). Thus, the effects of 
both short term foreign currency and domestic SCRs on financial markets could be 
further explored.  
 
Third, the information content hypothesis argues that rating agencies handle 
confidential information and therefore, rating revisions include new information for the 
market that is rapidly included in asset prices (Mendoza-velazquez, 2009). Thus, credit 
rating reviews accompany changes in market activity and high trading volumes 
(Acharya and Pedersen, 2005), which is characterized by high liquidity as investors 
consider investing or withdrawing funds from some securities to others. In addition, 
investors prefer liquid financial markets because they facilitate transactions without 
causing drastic changes in asset prices (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Whilst 
some studies such as Karam et al. (2014) and Abad et al. (2015) argue that liquidity 
shocks in the financial markets are induced by credit rating announcements, others 
such as Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Covas and Fujita (2010) contend that 
liquidity shocks are driven by capital requirements for institutional investors and financial 
assets holding restrictions. Furthermore, Da and Gao (2009; 2010) report that liquidity 
shocks are clearly caused by asymmetric reactions. Thus, further study could explore 
the performance in the expected trading activity after credit rating announcements and 
the market pricing pressure before and after credit rating announcements.  
 
Lastly, a number of emerging countries (such as; Benin, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, 
Niger, Sudan and Tanzania, Togo and Zimbabwe) have significant capitalisation in both 
stock and bond markets although they do not have SCRs from the three international 




international investors who either prefer credit rated securities or compare the issuing 
country to the other benchmarks in the rated sovereigns. Thus further study could 
consider how investors grapple with the uncertainties of information asymmetry before 
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